High Politics - rule geography, military structure and power structure: an overview of the object area

 

Clemens Eicher

 

Introduction

A problem area may be defined simply as a bundle of several possible design options for a particular slice of reality applicable to contacts with the target systems of States in a diverging mode1). A problem thus defined enters the policy area2), if governments put it on their agenda and thereby initiate a policy cycle, which entails international decision-making, implementation and revision. International decisions are generated through a political process or the use of force. Within political processes, decision making may be obtained through coalition, judiciary and negotiations.
During the decision-making process ‘Coalition’ an (international) decision-process through elections or by vote is obtained in order to obtain an international decision3). Such a decision might confirm the status quo or initiate a partial or even an entire revision in a political issue. In the decision-making process of the judiciary a central and parent instance promulgates a binding decision for the parties concerned with regard to the issue in dispute4). The means of negotiation and resorting to violence are largely known and need not further be discussed within this context.

Whenever several states are concerned repeatedly with territorial5) and statutory issues6), problems of forming interior regime design7), as well as dealing with security issues8), a system of states is implied, if regarded from a realistic perspective9). In the current system of states, international decisions in dispute concerned with the complex of classical politics, i.e. high politics, can be effected mainly by negotiation or violence.

For thousands of years multiple state systems existed on a parallel level, which suggests that sets of questions were shared by an array of states, but not, significantly, the bulk of existing states, and enforced by conflictual means. With the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the foundation of today’s global state system evolved in Europe. When European states began to conquer overseas territories and created imperial structures, Non-European states became increasingly absorbed into the European state system.

The territorial expansion of the European state system spread overseas and gradually assumed global dimensions. Those problem areas, resulting from the self-organisation of a decentralised anarchic system, may be horizontally sub-devided into political categories of geography, military and power. Vertically a dividing line has to be drawn within the problem areas between the structure and order levels. As a result, the following typology emerges: geography of rule, political geography, military structure/order and power structure/order10).
The order level in general and regime as a sectoral version have been sufficiently alluded to and reconsidered, therefore the structural level of politics will form the central topic of this article11).

Structure and Order levels

Structures are to be considered as realistically existing material facts and effectual options: more precisely, one may borrow the term ‘structure’ from structural- functional approaches towards analysis and convey it into international politics: “...simply speaking, structural-functional analysis consists of nothing more complicated than phrasing empirical questions in one of the following diverse forms or some combination of them: (1) which observable uniformities (or patterns) can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied?” (2) which conditions (empirical states of affairs) resultant from previous operations can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied? (3) when process (or action, i.e. changes in the patterns, conditions, or both, depending on one’s point of view, are discernible between any two or more points in time) can be discovered (or alleged) to take place in terms of observable uniformities, which resultant conditions can be discerned? The first question asks, ‘What structures are involved?’ The second asks, ‘ which functions have resulted (or have been performed). And the third asks ‘which functions take place in terms of a given structure(s)?’12).

At the order level, the evaluation key for this defining term in international law may be unhesitatingly applied: “In the doctrine of international law, the notion of the ‘international public order’, ‘public international order’, has been used to designate those principles and rules of international law that may be regarded as the fundamental basis of the legal system (...) Although the term has been used in a wider sense to describe the whole legal framework within which decisions with international effect are taken on the universal, regional and national level (...), it is mostly used in the more restricted sense...” 13) Orders or international regimes as specific parameter levels refer to provisions - formal or informal - that regulate the demeanour of members of each system when dealing with certain material commodities (conventions, standards).
The order level has been exhaustively illumined and emphasised by the English School14), as well as by the regime theory15) in the field of international politics. Now, the present task for the structures of policy areas within high politics shall be implemented.

 

High Politics

Geography of Rule

Wherever individuals are permanently forming social federations, which differentiate themselves territorially, socio-culturally and politically from other, similar structures; wherein a functioning decision-making organisation has been raised, where the value allocation is governed by a system of standards and defence against external influences is ensured, the modern concept of a state will be redeemed16). Such territorial and political entities exist since the fourth millennium17). The modern state differs from its historical predecessors by the fact that rule in the sense of institutionalised power is inextricably interwoven with the territory and territorial issues. Eventually further territorial units in the form of colonies, mandate areas and occupations have arisen besides the original territory18). The management of the distribution of the earth’s surface and of the subsoil and airspace among the states in the form of territory, as mandate territories, colonies and occupied territories, is well beheld under the term political geography. The end of the East-West Conflict has altered not only the global map, but also the status of sovereign states. In the political upheavals of 1990/91 a phenomenon emerged which hitherto was latent and appeared only sporadically during the cold war. This phenomenon is called “failed states”19) and its spread forms the root cause of the instability in some regions of the world.
This necessitates the consideration of the topic area in a differentiating manner. To serve this purpose in this particular issue, a separation between order and structural levels ought to be included in this field of high politics as well. Political geography shall serve as a shorthand for the order level, whereas the term geography of reign designates the structure level. Such distinction proves therefore helpful to the research strategy and for the definite problem approach respectively, since relatively numerous states are considered de jure sovereign, notwithstanding the fact that their governments are quite unable to guarantee either internal or external sovereignty20).

The peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück of 1648 factually ended the thirty years war, thereby initiating a regional or rather continental system of states. This first regional state system was characterised by individual rulers of the member states of the Westphalian system by wielding a legal decision-making authority, whether external factions in domestic political processes were to be included or excluded. Specifically, foreign interdiction in the external comportment of a state, its power processes21) as well as the exercise of domination was prohibited. Among the means of access, command, intervention and legally based claims can be differentiated22). Imperial and papal privileges by means of edict, to decree the desired attitude of a local ruler in the areas of foreign affairs, exercise of power processes as well as rule enforcement, were terminated by the Peace of Westphalia. This step entailed the system status of anarchy, which still pervades the global state system. Anarchy in this context implies not lawlessness, but the absence of a central authority to decree and enforce universally binding decisions for all system participants23). Even the founding of the United Nations and the Security Council has changed little in the anarchic basic characteristics of the Westphalian State system. The permanent members and veto powers of the Security Council base their votes on their respective current ‘national interests24)’.

The option for intervention embraces both the threatening and conducting of counter-terrorism-, guerrilla-and conventional operations and also covert operations by means of of subversive or diverted operations25). Although this type of interdiction has been per banned per jure, domestic as well as intergovernmental conflicts are waged in this manner up to the present day. With regard to the legally-based claim, this type of interdiction still remains at the disposal of all rulers. An enforcement effort of legally based claims is usually flanked by the threat or the application of negative sanctions.
An augmentation of order in excess of the Westphalian Statute, this instrument is presently used routinely in foreign policy for implementing national interests.
Once a state has gained diplomatic recognition26), i.e. other system participants acknowledge a ‘new’ state as equitable subjects of international law, its rulers/government enjoy the crudely sketched Westphalian regulatory framework. Since the foundation of the United Nations, the inclusion into the latter entails the inclusion into the Westphalian State system, which presently spans the entire globe. Frequently such an access to the United Nations - especially in the wake of decolonisation - was effected without appraising the functionality of the state in question. What the term “governmental functions” herein implies shall be treated under the heading Geography of Rule.
Rule geography will serve as a generic term for internal sovereignty27) as well as for the factual repudiation and/or regulation of interstate routine interactions28) and transnational routine interactions29).

Internal sovereignty refers to the relationship between rulers and ruled within a State.
A legally-based entitlement is realized through setting and enforcing generally binding decisions with the aim of rule-setting,-application and interpretation30). Accomplishing such a realization in the long term, requires also, apart from regularity, a structure and process organisation.
The function of a process organisation consists primarily in creating task-part units, taking into account the specifications by a target system, and in turn assigns tasks and competences to them. The second step consists of the functional realization of the horizontal as well as the vertical coordination amongst the respective organisational units. The workflow of proceedings describes the content, spatial and temporal sequence of activities in fulfilling target-systematic requirements. It regulates the flow of intra-organisational activities, taking into account the requirements for the desired result and the performance of both people and resources.
The organisation of structure and proceedings within the State can be divided into the segments authority structure, decision structure, directiveness31) and assertive authority32).
The authority structure decides between the two vertexes monism and pluralism. The decision structure decides between the vertexes of monopoly and competition. directiveness vary the scope of design among the two vertexes of totality and partiality.
The decision still remains whether access to the power structure, participation in the decision structure and assertive authority is attainable for all subjects or limited to a specific group of individuals.

If a central Government is willing and able to implant solely binding decisions upon the entire territory of a State, then their degree of enforcement is nationwide. If normative regulations, their implementation and interpretation are confined to a part or several parts non-nationwide, one might refer to a partial degree of enforcement. Such a supplementation to systematics after Hättich is due the circumstance that working central governments do exist in certain regions of the world where, however, enforcement does not extend over the entire territory of a state and the territory of which might end even close to the walls of the capital. For example, the factual exercise of power of Hamid Karzai stretched only to the outskirts of Kabul.

Inseparable from intact domestic sovereignty are the screening and the regulation of inofficial interstate routine operations, as well as those of transnational routine interactions33). Unofficial interstate operations assuming forms of diversion, subversion, espionage, infiltration etc. must be prevented or repelled by agencies of the target-state. Inofficial interstate operations are aiming solely at the overreaching or destabilisation of a state.
The complex of transnational interactions comprises personal communication, mass communication, goods (primary products and industrial products), services, labour and capital, means of transport (land -, air -, sea - and inland water traffic), passenger movements (travel, tourism, migration), environmental and human-biologic effects (epidemics, drugs waves) 34), and is being referred to as “Low Politics”. To regulate and control transnational interactions remains therefore inherently important for any central government, because in this sphere events could pose a direct or indirect threat to the general security of a state or to the prevalence of rulers wielding the levers of power35).
Rule geography is collated since 2005 annually by the think-tank ‘Fund for Peace’ as a “Failed State Index”36) and published in the journal ‘Foreign Policy’. The FSI is based on a broader scale than the represented concept of “Geography of Rule” and focusses primarily on national ‘construction sites’ or ‘ruins’.

Military Structure

Today, the modern state system spans the entire globe. With the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the development of the modern state system ensued, which has retained an anarchic basic imprint up to the present. Anarchy in this context does not imply that the law of the jungle prevails, but the non-existence of a superior authority that would ordain and implement universally binding decisions for each state37). That means that the modern state system is a decentralised system of self-help, where system participants, i.e. the states, seek to ensure their survival in a hostile environment, thus striving for political power and security.
The security dilemma38) of international politics arises from the aforesaid conditions. The latter arises when system units (states) exist side by side without a parent authority to be obliged, which might prevent the use of force by means of regulatory decrees, their implementation and interpretation. In order to surmount this dilemma (allegedly at least), an ensemble (structure) of military options including deterrence, defence or even pro-active pursuance of interests are at the disposal of states. Basically, a state could choose among individual or a collective variants for satisfying its military security requirements.
In this context, MIT security expert Barry Posen differentiates between neo-isolationism, selective engagement, primacy and cooperative security39). Of these military options, only the cooperative security is based on a liberal worldview, while the other options are derived from the realist or neo-realist school of thought.
Within the poseanic canon on security strategies (neo-)isolationism assumes a special standing, because governments that decide on such military strategies withdraw almost completely from international politics, in order to warrant national security. Any kind of interference in domestic or regional conflict is regarded as a source of danger to the safeguarding of national security interests, thus memberships and cooperations within military alliances are to be evaded. “International organisations are a place to talk, perhaps to coordinate international affairs, to improve the overall global quality of life, but not to make or keep peace40)”. As regards the concept of the military apparatus: the latter is defensively oriented and based on the principle of deterrence; this can presently be attained solely through nuclear armament with a second strike capacity. Prophecies of doom set aside: nuclear armament remains a factor in international politics.
Modern military special forces are ideally suited to cope with the protection of landlocked or maritime borders, as well as for the preventive defence against terrorist operations contrived by other states or countercultural elite-power organisations. Such a military unit requires a modern intelligence-gathering structure41), which can perform much the same function as the periscope does on a submarine, namely observation and reconnaissance on the environment, observing neighbouring countries in the regional system, as well as the international state system.
That takes us to the security strategy of “Selective Engagement”. This concept is rooted in the ‘defensive realism’ after Kenneth Waltz42), which argues for a bipolar shaping of the international state system, for on the one hand a centralisation of power could thus be prevented, and on the other he ascribes a higher degree of predictability to multipolarity as opposed to bipolarity. Stability is apt to be threatened particularly by the proliferation of nuclear weapons generally and by the horizontal variant, such as the transfer of nuclear weapons or armament designs to non-nuclear-armed States, in particular. “The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is viewed as an instrument to permit countries who have neither the wealth to support nuclear forces, nor the political insecurity or ambition to need or want them, and a refuge from a race that they would rather not run43)”. The threat is presently amplified increasingly by counter-elitist power organisations with an irredentist, separatist or anti-regime agenda accessing the world stage and indirectly competing with governments for power within a state and directly to attain the levers of power. The deployment of a nuclear weapon such as a so-called “dirty bomb” might be an option to persuade foreign governments to discontinue the assistance for any hostile government or even to persevere against it. Simultaneously the stability of that bipolarity will be threatened by future armed conflicts over access to resources - resource wars - as well as armed conflicts diametrically affecting vital security interests of the great powers. In these cases a targeted military intervention is considered an effective means to maintain the stability of the bipolar system. For this purpose military alliances are being forged, a high potential of nuclear deterrence built up and the military power raised to a level to wage two parallel inter-state wars or to intervene militarily in two armed conflicts44).
This takes us to the security strategy of ‘collective security’. This concept is rooted in the liberalism and its entailed institutionalism, i.e. the security dilemma and inter-State wars could be either resolved or avoided by a régime of global safety. Via the establishment of such an international régime behaviour or patterns of interaction among states are regulated for certain issues, permanently, within a fixed framework. International régimes occur in policy issues, which are characterized by a status, for which the term “complex interdependence” has been devised. This implies that in certain issues the attitude of values of the Government concerned are differentially affected, whereas in regard to common profit and loss the partners involved are interdependent. Through the establishment of an international régime a coordinated behaviour should be achieved in order to realize common gains, whereas common losses can even occur if a government concerned unilaterally contrives to impose its particular interests45). It is therefore obvious, that advocates of this security strategy are aiming at a pluri-or multi-polar international system of states.
„Collective security was the name given by the planners of a new world order after World War I to the system for maintenance of international peace that they intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power. The new system, as they envisaged it, involved the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent or suppress aggressors by any state against any other state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, … to enforce the peace… In short, Collective Security was put forward as a particular and preferred method for keeping the peace; it advocates emphasized its differentiation from other methods, giving special attention to the argument that it was different from and superior to the system of competing alliances that was associated with the balance-of-power concept46)“.
If this security strategy is decided upon, it basically constitutes a contract-wide non-aggression pact with a mutual assistance clause in the event of an attack by a non-descript opponent against one of the Pact States. This narrow action repertoire has been expanded by the instruments of arms control - weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular - and humanitarian military intervention in domestic conflicts. Resembling the concept of “selective engagement” it classifies the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as a main threat to world peace, although decision makers employ the instrument of coercive diplomacy47) in this context. Coercive diplomacy prevails wherever governments exert diplomatic sanctions or negative sanctions against an individual state, when exercising their ability to influence legal cross-border social transactions. The military apparatus possesses a defensive as well as a task-sharing status48), in order to prevent a pact partner from pursuing vested interests, backed by his military potential, to the detriment of the pact community.
This takes us to the concept of security primacy. This concept is rooted in the ‘offensive realism’ after John J. Mearsheimer, who pleads for a unipolar character of the international system of states, i.e.: a powerful state will set the rules of the game for the entire outward attitude - large and small policies - for all participants forming a part of the state system or even the entire State system as a whole49). For attaining and above all maintaining the hegemonic dominance as a State, economic and military potentials must be augmented with a view to exerting predominance, for both of these will form the pillars for indirectly exerting influence and, directly, the build-up of influence on an international level. “Certainly the most serious threat to (...) primacy would be an across-the-board political, economic, and military challenger. Yet even a power that rivaled (...) in only one or two of these three dimensions of national power could erode (...) preponderance50)”. In addition, horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as a potential source of danger to the protection of the hegemonic status. Additionally, a military intervention in domestic or inter-state conflicts contrived by third parties would de facto be unfeasible, if the conflict is waged within the sphere of influence of a nuclear power.
As regards military involvement in regional conflicts, the position of the representatives of the ‘selective shared commitment’ prevails; thus a military intervention in the target state will take place wherever there is a risk that a super power might aspire dominance in the spheres of economy, military or the projection of influence, regionally or globally51).
For the fulfillment of its functions the military apparatus must have an offensive aspect, i.e. both the conventional as well as the unconventional weaponry must be arranged in width and depth in a way that it is superior to all potential challengers. In other words: “...analogous to Britain’s two-power standard of old, in which the Royal Navy was meant to be superior to the two next strongest navies in the world combined52)”.
Depending upon how many States will choose one of the outlined security strategies to protect their national security interests, a uni -, bi -, pluri - or multi-polar security architecture53) at either regional or global level will emerge.

Power Structure

Some analysts54) define the regional or global security architecture on the mere distribution of military potential and perceive large -, medium - and other powers in the international system likewise55). Thus they judge an empirical question on assumption. While a certain power configuration is feasible only with a definitive military architecture (for example the bipolar power configuration) each military architecture allows several differing power configurations. However, the realities of the military sphere are trans-epochal and trans-cultural, through historical systems of state, only one, albeit a very important one, is coextensive with the numerous determinants of power configuration on a global scale, but never coextensive with the latter56).

Power can be considered a causal factor57). Factually, influence should be exerted upon individuals or collectives, deciding upon a particular situation, to be guided in a desired direction.
Max Weber defines power as the ability to enforce one’s wishes. (Situational). Power58), in its more narrow sense, means the ability to influence individuals or collectives by threat of violence, detriment, or even its application, as well as by promises or previously afforded rewards, so that a specific issue will be guided in a desired direction. (Anticipated) Power59) in a still more narrow sense means that individuals or collectives, as a result of an anticipated reaction or anticipatory obedience, decide on a certain issue in the desired direction. This category of power is a result of evil past experiences, whereupon the immediate action is not based upon the own free will. Power in the strict sense is ‘Conditional Power60)’. Here X has already interwoven his wishes in the decision premises61) of Z, thus restricting the selection scope in decision-making and neutralizing the latter’s will in certain directions. This category of power is based on the attribution of authority, expertise, prestige and charisma, as well as the sensation of diffuse anxiety or ideological proximity62). With this perspective the analyst of the ‘Comparative Politics’ is well-acquainted63), for social systems and the political systems operating within them, dwell on that category.
For establishing this power in international politics, in trans-epochal and trans-historical terms, the following tactics or structures are at disposal:

 

Infiltration

If non-members of a state combination - foreign governments or non-governmental agencies - try to exert influence on the local distribution of positions within the dominating apparatus as well as directly on policy making in general, or on arrangements in other subsystems in particular, then such a phenomenon is justly placed under the heading: infiltration. The presented concept was originally created by James N. Rosenau and ‘penetration’ was introduced in 196664) as a term of scientific discourse. Taking into account semantic logic, the term ‘penetration’ in this context has to be substituted by ‘infiltration’. The term ‘penetration’ is limited to the phenomenon of intrusion, while ‘infiltration’ indicates both intrusion and subsequent lodgement or expansion.
Nataliya Shapovalova differentiates among four variants:
„Political methods are used when the object of external steering is maintaining or executing power. The use of military methods implies that the penetrated state cannot defend itself, because its armed forces are under foreign subordination. Economic methods are applied when financial or technological dependence render it impossible to provide their own economic policy. Finally, we deal with cultural methods when the foreign system of values and way of life is imposed on the society of the penetrated state”65).
The Chinese central government has recently developed a fifth variant in order to expand and consolidate its strategic position in the Pacific region, and to secure access to raw materials on the African continent. Specifically, China attempts by a select migration to establish local fifth columns in certain targeted countries on the African continent as well as in the Pacific region. That variation of penetration pre-suggests that there exists a high degree of loyalty between migrants and their native country. A geopolitical variant of infiltration such as the latter had been implemented by the communist central government in Moscow during the founding phase of the USSR - keyword Ukraine. This fifth variant of infiltration may well be termed ‘ethno-political infiltration’.

Military Reputation66

Military reputation is gained primarily by the capacity of the military apparatus to execute anti-terrorist, conventional and guerrilla operations. Secondly, a government must have repeatedly employed their potential for exerting force in the past on behalf of the perseverance and implementation of their interests to attain the attribute of “military toughness”. If such an attribute is ascribed to a government, often even the mere threat of military force suffices to effectuate a permanent course correction on the part of the opposing faction.
Military reputation can also rest upon the available weapons technology. North Korea may serve as an example on this issue. Possession of nuclear weapons render a foreign-initiated and conducted régime change most unlikely. The possession of nuclear weapons thus transforms the status of a state within the regional system, towards a higher or the highest position in the regional hierarchy of power.
Whenever a state seeks to acquire nuclear armament, its intention is, analytically considered, to secure its own regime against external threat or/and consolidate its status of dominance in a region.

Ideological diffusion67)
Ideologies and religions are systems of values by which the conduct of individuals or collectives, as well as the legitimacy and usefulness of institutions are appraised; they serve as control systems whenever a selection from a scope of future designs is due. Ideologies consist of values, norms and rules of conduct and, occasionally, of emotions68). Religions differ from ideologies only through their lack of instructions69).
The systematic and targeted diffusion of an inherent system of values enormously facilitates the incorporation of own notions in the premisis70) of other governments. This applies also, analytically considered, to the logic of the Western human rights policy as it does to the neo-Islamic revisionism71) as well as to the ideological offensives of both the Soviet Union and of the NS-régime. The ‘success’ of Western human rights politics within islamic cultural domains suggests that such tactics, wherever serious cultural differences prevail, have had no effect. The diffusion of neo-islamic revisionism in parts of Asia was and is far more successful than that of the Western human rights policy, since Neo-Islam can partially avail itself of existant pre-modern value systems on location.

This category of power, i.e. the conditional power, is in interstate operations what money is to the economy, namely, a generalised communications or exchange medium72). This renders political power so singularly attractive in interstate operations. By and large so-called “spheres of influence”73) shall emerge, which can assume a uni -,bi -,pluri -or multi-polar shape in a regional or even global scope. Such power configurations are exposed to smaller or larger fluctuations over space and time. Since the end of World War II four configurations of power on a global scale have replaced each other: (1) unipolarity 1945-1949, (2) bipolarity 1949-1991, (3) multipolarity 1991-2001, and (4) the current unipolar system with the United States as hegemon74).


Concluding Annotations

The vertical dividing line between structure and order is essential for the assessment of problem areas of states, for a marked difference lies therein, whether the conflict relates either to the order or the structure of the state system. Orders can be revised relatively quickly, while a correction of the option for action or manifest facts remains quite protracted and sometimes tedious - if at all - to accomplish. In this sense, representatives of realism stick closer to reality in international relations than adherents of the liberal school of thought, leave alone those of constructivism.
The qualitative difference between structure and order is most obviously perceptible within the policy rule of geography of dominance / political geography. As for territorial management, unimproved for many years, because ideas derived from the liberal school of thought75), as well as those of constructivism76), have become pre-dominant among the minds of foreign-policy shapers. An effluence of this development is evident in the current handling of the phenomenon of “Failed States” in international politics. Although failed states are the root cause of many a problem issue in international politics, political decision-makers are unwilling to confront the problem at the structural level. Historically, one might refer to the so-called pariah states and the state system’s treatment of state ruins.
Standards and rules are required for intergovernmental policy operation and implementation of transnational transactions, to keep them in certain tracks, but the principle, that procedure must be adapted to structure and not vice versa, ought to remain valid.
When analyzing and assessing an inter-state conflict, regardless of whether waged ‘cold’ or ‘hot’, maximum attention should be paid to the level - order or structure. The principle of “structure prevails over right” still applies!


Endnotes:
1) Olav Knudsen, Capabilities, Issue-Areas, and Inter-State Power, in: Kjell Goldmann / Gunnar Sjöstedt (Hg.), Power, Capabilities, Independence, London 1979, p. 90
2) Olav Knudsen, Capabilities, Issue-Areas, and Inter-State Power, in: Kjell Goldmann / Gunnar Sjöstedt (Hg.), Power, Capabilities, Independence, London 1979, p. 94
3) Ira William Zartman: Negotiation as a joint decision-making process, in: Ira William Zartman (Hg.), Negotiation and Conflict Management, London/New York 2008, pp. 53
4) Ira William Zartman: Negotiation as a joint decision-making process, in: Ira William Zartman (Hg.), Negotiation and Conflict Management, London/New York 2008, pp. 53
5) William D. Coplin, Introduction to International Politis, 3rd. Ed., Englewood 1980, pp. 84.
6) Charles F. Hermann / Roger A. Coate, Substantive Problem Areas in: Patrick Callahan/Linda P. Brady/Margaret G. Hermann (Hg.), Describing Foreign Policy Behavior, London 1981, pp. 83
7) William D. Coplin, Introduction to International Politis, 3rd. Ed., Englewood 1980, pp.85
8) Charles F. Hermann / Roger A. Coate, Substantive Problem Areas in: Patrick Callahan/Linda P. Brady/Margaret G. Hermann (Hg.), Describing Foreign Policy Behavior, London 1981, pp. 83
9) See: Barry Buzan / Richard Little, International Systems in World History, London 2000, p. 104
10) See Klaus Faupel, Zum Stellenwert der Macht in der internationalen Politik: Eine systematische Übersicht über den Objektbereich, in: Peter R Weilemann / Hanns Jürgen Küsters, Günter Buchstab (Hg), Macht und Zeitkritik: Festschrift für Hans-Peter Schwarz zum 65. Geburtstag (Studien zur Politik, Bd. 34), Paderborn 1999, passim.
11) Klaus Faupel, Internationale Regime als Gegenstände für sozialwissenschaftlich Forschung, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981-1983, Salzburg, p. 94-105; Volker Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford 1993; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in: Stephen D. Krasner (Hg.), Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations, London 2009, p. 113-128
12) Marion J. Levy Jr. St., Structural Functional Analysis, in: David L. Sills (Hg.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 6, London, New York, 1972, p. 22
13) Günther Jaenicke, International Public Order, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Hg.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume 2, Amsterdam 1995, p. 1348
14) Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, New York 1991, S. 166f; Barry Buzan, From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school, in: International Organizations 47(3)/1993, pp. 330
15) Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, London 1983; Robert Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in: International Organization 36(2)/1982, p. 325-355; Andreas Hasenclever / Peter Mayer / Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge 1997; Beth Simons / Lisa Martin, International Organizations and Institutions, in: Walter Carlsnaes / Thomas Risse / Beth Simons (Hg.), Handbook of International Relations, London 2005, p. 192-211
16) See: Klaus Faupel, Dimensionen der Souveränität, in: Michael Take (Hg.), Politik als Wissenschaft: Festschrift für Wilfried Röhrich zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, p. 181
17) Roy Mellor, Nation, State and Territory, London 1989, S. 41f; Barry Buzan / Richard Little, The idea of International System. Theory meets History, in: International Political Science Review 15(3)/1994, S. 238f; Barry Buzan / Richard Little, International Systems in History, Oxford 2000, pp. 167.
18) Bruce Russett / J. David Singer, A Standardized List of National Political Entities in the Twentieth Century, in: American Political Science Review 62(2)/1968, pp. 934; Theodore Wyckoff, Standardized List of National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: The Russett-Singer-List of 1968 Updated. In: International Social Science Journal, 32(4)/1980, p 834-846
19) See: I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder 1995; Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, in: Foreign Affeirs 81(4)/2002, p. 127-140; Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton 2004
20) See: Richard Muir, Political Geography. A new Introduction London 1997, p. 52
21) The distribution of positions within the ruling apparatus. See: Clemens A. Eicher, Der anomische Machtprozess: Ein Analyserahmen zur ungeregelten und (gewaltsamen) Verteilung der wichtigsten Positionen im Herrschaftsapparat auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene, in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 2/2011, p. 196
22) See: Klaus Faupel, Dimensionen der Souveränität, in: Michael Take (Hg.), Politik als Wissenschaft: Festschrift für Wilfried Röhrich zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, p. 191
23) See: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, New York 1991, pp. 21
24) See: Martin Griffiths / Terry O`Callaghan, International Relations. The Key Concepts, New York 2002, pp. 203
25) See: Bard E. O`Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 2nd. Ed. rev, Washington 2005, pp. 33; John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, Pennsylvania 1966, pp. 30
26) See: Stephen D. Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations, New York 2009. S. 89, 188f
27) Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton 1999, S. 3ff; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Political, in: Neil J. Smelser / Paul B. Baltes (Hg.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences vol. 22, New York 2001, p. 14706-14709; Stephen D. Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations, New York 2009. pp. 89
28) Klaus Faupel, Memorandum zur Gestaltung der Mitwirkung akademischer und anderer externer Fachleute an der Politikentwicklung im Rahmen des Außenministeriums, unveröffentlichtes Dokument 1983; Klaus Faupel, Internationale Regime als Gegenstände für sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981-1983, Salzburg 1984, p.95-105
29) Klaus Faupel, Memorandum zur Gestaltung der Mitwirkung akademischer und anderer externer Fachleute an der Politikentwicklung im Rahmen des Außenministeriums, unveröffentlichtes Dokument 1983; Klaus Faupel, Internationale Regime als Gegenstände für sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981-1983, Salzburg 1984, p. 95-105
30) Gabriel A. Almond / G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach, Boston 1966, p. 29
31) See: Manfred Hättich, Manfred Hättich, Lehrbuch der Politikwissenschaft, Band2, Mainz 1967, pp. 23, pp. 41. Similar: Ted Robert Gurr, Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971, in: American Political Science Review, 68(4)/1974, p. 1482-1504
32) My Modification of Hättich`s Analytical Framework.
33) See: Klaus Faupel, Memorandum zur Gestaltung der Mitwirkung akademischer und anderer externer Fachleute an der Politikentwicklung im Rahmen des Außenministeriums, unveröffentlichtes Dokument 1983; Klaus Faupel, Internationale Regime als Gegenstände für sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981-1983, Salzburg 1984, p. 95-105
34) Klaus Faupel, Entwicklung als Politikbereich auf der Ebene des zeitgenössischen internationalen Systems, in: Wolfgang Jäger / Hans Otto Mühleisen / Hans-Joachim Veen (Hg.), Republik und Dritte Welt: Festschrift für Dieter Oberndörfer zum 65. Geburtstag, Paderborn, 1994, p. 78; Kurt P. Tudyka, Gesellschaftliche Interessen und auswärtige Beziehungen, Das Röhrenembargo, in: Ernst Otto Czempiel (Hg.), Die Anachronistische Souveränität, zum Verhältnis von Innen- und Außenpolitik, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 1/1969, Köln, Opladen, p. 205
35) See: Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, New York 1991, pp. 18, pp. 331
36) See: „Failed State Index 2015“. http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf
37) Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, New York 1991, pp. 21
38) See: Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, New York 1991, p. 271
39) See: Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 5-53
40) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 12
41) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 12-13
42) Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York 1979, pp. 319
43) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 17
44) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 19
45) Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in: International Organization, 36/2(1982) p. 330
46) Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, The Problems and Progress of international Organization, Fourth Edition, New York, 1971, p. 247.
47) Lawrence Feedman, Strategic Coercion, in: Lawrence Freedman (Hg.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford 1998, p. 15-36; Peter Viggo, The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities, in: Lawrence Freedman (Ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford 1998, p. 61-85
48) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 24
49) Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society, London 2003, p. 15
50) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 34
51) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 38
52) Barry Posen / Andrew Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, in: International Security, 21(3)/1997, p. 39
53) See: Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York 1957, S. 21-53; Kjell Goldmann, Bipolarization and Tension in International Systems: A Theoretical Discussion, in: Cooperation and Conflict 1972/7(1), pp. 39
54) See: Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York 1957, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York 1979; John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York 2001
55) See: William K. Domke. Vgl. William KWiliam K. Domke, Power, Political Capacity, and Security in the Global System, in: Richard Stoll / Michael D. Ward (Hg.), Power in World Politics, London 1989, pp. 161
56) Brian Hocking/Michael Smith, World Politics, 2nd ed. London 1995, p. 59-61
57) John N. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power, London 1975, p. 9-11
58) Richard W. Mansbach, The Global Puzzle, Princeton 1994, p. 102
59) Jack H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power, London 1975, pp. 145f
60) John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power, Boston 1985, p. 5-6, S. pp. 24; Ian C. MacMillan: Strategy Formulation: political concepts, St Paul 1978, p. 15; Richard W. Mansbach, The Global Puzzle, Princeton 1994, p. 102
61) George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning, New York 2008, pp. 18f
62) Richard W. Mansbach, The Global Puzzle, Princeton 1994, p. 102
63) See: Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, New York 1963 p. 120-124
64) James Rosenau, Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, in: Robert Barry Farrell (Ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston 1966, p. 27-92
65) Nataliya Shapovalova, The Russian Federation’s Penetration Strategy towards Ukraine. International Graduate Student Symposium: New Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine: Politics, History, and Culture, Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto 2006, p. 8
66) David A. Baldwin, Force, Fungibility, and Influence, in: Security Studies 8/1999, p. 173-183; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York 2001, p. 55-56
67) Peter Gould, Spatial Diffusion: The Spread of Ideas and Innovations in Geographic Space, ISA Consortium for International Studies Education, Learning Package Series Number 11, New York 1975, pp. 4; Marcel Merle, The Sociology of International Relations, New York 1987, p. 231.
68) M. Freeden, Ideology: Political Aspects, in: Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Hg.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 11, New York 2001, p. 7176
69) M. Dubois, Ideology: Sociology of, in: Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Hg.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 11, New York 2001, p. 7179
70) George Albert Steiner, Strategic Planning, New York 2010, pp. 18; George Albert Steiner, Top Management Planning, London 1969, pp. 199
71) See: Tilman Nagel, Islam oder Islamismus? Probleme einer Grenzziehung, in: Hans Zehentmair (Hg), Der Islam. Im Spannungsfeld von Konflikt und Dialog, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 32;
72) David A. Baldwin, Power and International Relations, in: Walter Carlsnaes/Beth A. Simmons/Thomas Risse (Hg.), Handbook of International Relations, London 2013, p. 273
73) Charles W. Kegley, World Politics, 11th Ed. Belmont 2007, p. 59
74) Charles W. Kegley, World Politics, 11th Ed. Belmont 2007, p. 520
75) Martin Griffiths / Terry O`Callaghan, International Relations. The Key Concepts, New York 2002, S. 165
76) Cornelia Ulbert, Social constructivism, in: Siegfried Schieder / Manuela Spindler (Hg), Theories of International Relations, London 2014, p. 248-268