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## Editorial

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### Handover

After 13 years in which I was allowed to head the Austrian Military Journal ÖMZ, my active period of service ends with the present issue. Allow me, esteemed readers, to seize the opportunity and look back at the achievements of the military science medium of the Austrian Armed Forces during this period and the development steps and changes that were necessary to create this new profile.

Now, the ÖMZ is an integral element of strategy research and teaching within the tertiary education of the AAF and has so far made its substantial contribution to the higher officer training of the National Defence Academy. It covers the perception of strategy based on abstracted military assessment logics. The steering function of strategic thinking inherent in this perception also substantiates the journal's ability to moderate the content of the National Defence Academy's cross-institutional research and publication projects. The developmental step from an exclusively publishing medium to a content-generating actor in military science could thus be completed.

I would like to begin my retrospection with sincere thanks to those who have accompanied me along the way and made this success possible in the first place through their tireless support – first and foremost my commanding officer, Lieutenant General Erich Csitkovits, my senior duty editor, my editorial team, the permanent staff, authors, editors, peers and the Science, Research and Development Division of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The performance of the editorial team deserves special mention, among other things, because the personnel framework was previously only dimensioned for the production of the print edition.



The starting point, which could be interpreted as the "founding mission", was the implicit objective of Archduke Carl, the founder of the ÖMZ, to compensate for the still lacking university recognition and institutional representation of the core subjects of military science (at that time initially war theory) by publishing essays written by experienced and deserving military leaders and using them as a basis for scientific training. The authors were to study the classics of war theory, analyse them and incorporate them into officer training in the form of condensed essays.

Moreover, our approach followed an international example. The Royal United Services Institute sees itself as a research think tank, the results of which are the basis for the success and broad international recognition of the RUSI journal.

By now, the ÖMZ has become the key to the academic development of military science researchers and teachers in the tertiary education sector of the AAF; firstly because it is the only Austrian medium to offer a peer review process for papers on core military science topics and secondly because it reaches a narrow but constitutive segment of high-ranking experts for the recognition of the military science quality of the AAF in the external academic world.

However, the recognition of the unique performance of military science for the security of the state and for society as a whole depends – and this closes the circle – on the fact that the ÖMZ not only publishes contributed articles, but also demonstrates its own scientific performance.

The content-generating quality has been achieved in particular through the following sub-steps:

- Thematic focus, in particular on the military science core subjects of strategy/geostrategy, theory of war/polemology, operations-level command, general command theory/philosophy of command (including command ethics) and military logistics, as well as orientation of the contributions from the research fields of security and defence policy, constitutional and military law, military history, the militarily relevant humanities and social, economic and technical sciences in each case to a strategic or operational reference.
- Targeted control of the topic profile and the core content of the individual topic baskets on the basis of an annual self-evaluation, which takes place with the involvement of the permanent staff, peers and editors.
- Authors of individual contributions are offered the possibility of a peer review process. This procedure, which is aimed at quality assurance and objectification of the international standing of the ÖMZ as a specialist periodical in military science and polemics, ensures that the authors publishing in the ÖMZ



receive appropriate scientific recognition. It contributes significantly to increasing the quality of the contributions and strengthens the authors' public image. It offers officers and civilian employees who aspire to a further academic career the opportunity to obtain the publication credits that are mandatory, especially for PhD studies. The ÖMZ is one of the few media that can offer this for the field of military science in the German-speaking world.

- In addition to the print publication, the journal offers an independent homepage at [www.oemz-online.at](http://www.oemz-online.at) in addition to the print version as well as a social media presence.
- Starting with issue 2/2021, the ÖMZ and its core content is also published online in English as the Austrian Military Journal (AMJ). The establishment of this English-language online journal is our innovation project for 2021. The primary objective of the English-language edition is to extend the reach of the ÖMZ and thus of Austrian military science thinking beyond the borders of the German-speaking world, while not abandoning the German language of the print version, which corresponds to the depth of the subject matter.
- The ÖMZ makes its contribution to strategy research and teaching within the framework of tertiary education and, on behalf of the National Defence Academy, has led the Vienna Strategy Conference series as a strategy development platform emanating from the German language area and also featuring high-ranking international participants. The aim of this annual event is to cross-link military science thinkers and authors and to lay the basis in terms of content for "strategic thinking" as a teaching subject in its own right. The 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 conferences were each concluded with a conference volume published by Miles-Verlag.
- The editorial team works on research projects decreed by the Austrian Ministry of Defence/Research and Development Division, primarily in the area of structuring a military science core subject "strategic thinking" and an organic military science per se.
- The editorial office of the ÖMZ is an active member of the European Military Press Association (EMPA) and also held its presidency from 2015-2021.
- In addition, the editorial board of the ÖMZ had to assume the presidency of the International Society of Military Sciences (ISMS) in 2019 and subsequently represent the NDA on the board of the ISMS. In the year of the presidency, the ISMS annual conference was able to focus on content and was concluded with the publication "Building Military Science for the Benefit of Society", which was published by Miles-Verlag in English and in complexu subjected to peer review. Within the framework of the ISMS, the ÖMZ has also been entrusted with the preparation of the section "Strategy and the Military", which is to be published as a sub-chapter of the Springer online publication "Handbook of Military Sciences" of the Norwegian Defence University.

I wish my successor the strength and perseverance necessary to continue in the direction I have embarked upon, which in my view is imperative to ensure the external perception and recognition of the military science capabilities of the Austrian Armed Forces.

I wish you, esteemed readers, continued interest in the results of military science research stemming from the tertiary education landscape of the Austrian Armed Forces, the joy of discussion and the willingness to communicate the unique benefit of this research for the security of the state to the outside world and to represent it in particular vis-à-vis civilian academia.

In deep gratitude for having been allowed to head the military scientific publication organ of the Austrian Armed Forces and to further develop it to its current performance profile, I remain

yours faithfully,

Wolfgang Peischel, Editor in Chief

## Military leadership in the light of Niccolo Machiavelli

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### Thoughts on the modern concept of leadership from a historical-philosophical perspective

Georg Kunovjanek/Georg Maier

The concept of leadership was and is of central importance for organisations of various sizes. This applies also and especially to the military. To this effect, we can look back on a long historical development of the concept of leadership. When viewed in a contemporary light, the concepts of the past can make a valuable contribution to understanding leadership and its nature. Alongside many famous historical figures such as Plato, Spinoza or even Clausewitz, the political philosopher and power theorist Niccolo Machiavelli dealt with the subject of leadership in the political and the military context.

#### Leadership in a military context

Leadership is positioned between thinking, planning and action. These three characteristics of leadership have evolved historically and can be clearly assigned today to the different command levels. In this case, it must be considered that all three characteristics are used at all command levels/echelons, albeit with different weighting. It can be determined that the lower the level, the more direct the command. (Figure 1) Leading means making decisions<sup>1)</sup> and making decisions ultimately means finding solutions.

Niccolo Machiavelli is primarily associated with political philosophy and power politics. His discussion of the role of the state and even more so the role of the ruler for the state is universally known. Frequently quoted, and yet often essentially misunderstood, he has shared the fate of many another great philosopher. In this context, we also need to consider Clausewitz and the misinterpretation of absolute war.<sup>2)</sup> Machiavelli is not only quoted in relation to state governance, but is also very important for the consideration of military leadership. In his works, he deals with the nature of sovereignty, and since the ruler and the supreme commander of the army were often the same person, his statements have direct relevance for the military.

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<sup>1)</sup> Konrad Paul Liessmann: In Wirklichkeit ist alles ganz einfach – Aufbau und Reduktion von Komplexität in sozialen Systemen, in: Armis et Litteris 7/2001, Wiener Neustadt 2001, p. 18.

<sup>2)</sup> On this matter, see Wolfgang Peischel: Grundprinzipien militärischen, strategischen Denkens an der Schnittstelle zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung. In Wolfgang Peischel (Ed.), Wiener Strategie-Konferenz 2016. Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag 2017, p.162.



In his works, he clearly expresses the difference between management and leadership. His focus is clearly on sovereignty – the shaping, recreation and leading – and not so much on administration – the organisation and the smooth governing of state business.<sup>3)</sup> This text will present aspects of military leadership in the light of Niccolo Machiavelli and put them in a contemporary context. This is intended to show that today's (military) leadership has a solid historical foundation, the manifestation of which did not begin with such significant personalities as Carl von Clausewitz, Archduke Charles or other military thinkers after them.

## The military, man and might according to Machiavelli

The military is of fundamental importance in Machiavelli's depiction of the state. In addition to religion and laws, he names the army as the third pillar of a state.<sup>4)</sup> Later he sees religion simply as a tool of the state and no longer as a mainstay of the political system.<sup>5)</sup> The laws create unity inwardly and the army maintains the community outwardly. Unlike the major Greek thinkers, Machiavelli does not see man as a mature rational being, but instead as a being that must be educated (forced) to reason. In principle, however, he believes that man is capable of development, therefore his interpretation of the concept of man is not as negative as one might believe.<sup>6)</sup> For him, the task is thus to give man the appropriate incentive to renounce idleness.

For Machiavelli, therefore, the key to a functioning political system, alongside the role of the ruler, is also to have an appropriate constitution. The key to functioning leadership, on the other hand, is orientation towards the people. Leadership always works with, for, but also against people. Furthermore, leadership – in the dialectical sense – requires leaders on the one hand and people who are led on the other. From Machiavelli's perspective, leadership (via the ruler with the aid of a constitution) is required, in order to give people the above-mentioned incentive.

His view on the army is also interesting. His comparison of compulsory military service (arming the people) with a professional army (mercenaries) is still topical in many countries. Since, as already mentioned, in Machiavelli's lifetime the sovereign was not only the ruler but also simultaneously the supreme military leader, many of his statements in his two main works "The Prince" and "Discorsi" also apply to the military. Similar to Plato, these are two very opposing or at least very different works on the same subject. In his "Republic", Plato described the ideal state and what that state should be like, and in the "Laws", he presented the real state as it actually is. Machiavelli does the same with his two works about power. In "The Prince", he describes the ideal ruler or the ideal authority, and in

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<sup>3)</sup> See Niccolo Machiavelli: Der Fürst, Stuttgart 1978.

<sup>4)</sup> See Niccolo Machiavelli: Discorsi, Gedanken über Politik und Staatsführung, Stuttgart 1977, p. LII.

<sup>5)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. LV.

<sup>6)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. LI.

“Discorsi”, he restricts himself to the characteristics of power and authority displayed in Roman history. This is the essence of Machiavelli’s dialectic, from which he derives his concept of power.

As for many political philosophers (e.g. Spinoza in his political treatise), for Machiavelli a common threat creates community. This requires the threat to also be perceived as such by everyone. People then unite in order to have more combined power and in order to be able to fend off the threat. States therefore evolve due to pressure from outside, and conversely they crumble when this pressure subsides and the people surrender to idleness.<sup>7)</sup> This is when the constitution comes in with its laws in order to impose obligations on citizens, preventing them from drifting apart. Spinoza differentiated the concept of power, which leadership is based on, into “potentia” and “potestas”.<sup>8)</sup> The first term describes the creative, shaping power that should come to the fore in a crisis, and the second term describes the inhibiting, obstructive characteristic of power, in which the individual stakeholders restrain themselves in their exercising of power.

## The military between administration and power

For the military – the military leaders – this means that a problem or threat needs to be recognised as such by everyone in order to then solve or confront it together. The problem therefore inspires cooperation. In this context, the military leaders are required to make the problem visible to the people they lead.<sup>9)</sup> For if there is no problem, the (military) leaders operate in the sphere of management – the organisation of things – and not in the field of leadership – the shaping and leading of people. Leadership needs a challenge, a crisis or a problem (the moment of leadership) in order to be put into operation.<sup>10)</sup>

A problem is always located in force, time and space. When solving the problem, leading or leadership activities (the resolution/decision) must be aligned with the problem, or in other words, the solution must address the problem. (Figure 2) This means that conflict/crisis has a strong creative force.<sup>11)</sup> According to Machiavelli, there can only be development in discourse, in conflict or in dispute.<sup>12)</sup> He sees the so-called need – the necessity – for “[...] the final and strongest weapon [...]”<sup>13)</sup> in order to force a decision and set things in motion. Leadership – the leadership activities – is determined by this precise necessity (necessità), luck (fortuna) and virtue, in the sense of initiative (virtù). However, the moment of leadership does not need to arise from a necessity; in fact, it can be consciously brought

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<sup>7)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>8)</sup> See Michael Hampe/Robert Schnepf (Ed.): Baruch de Spinoza, *Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt*, Berlin 2006, p. 224.

<sup>9)</sup> See Reinhard Sprenger: *Radikal führen*, Frankfurt am Main 2015, p. 59.

<sup>10)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>11)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>12)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 19.

<sup>13)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 326.

about, namely when an opportunity (*occasione*) arises. The moment of leadership is the targeted triggering, due to need or opportunity, of the leadership activities.

We now know what triggers leadership according to Machiavelli, what the moment of leadership as the trigger of the leadership activities is, but how does leadership now develop and what characteristics does it take on? Initially, in order to solve a problem the task is to draft a plan based on an appropriate decision. Machiavelli already had a very pronounced error awareness<sup>14)</sup> and assumed that a decision can never be perfect if it is intended to bring about a solution to the problem in good time.<sup>15)</sup> He emphasises the need for a quick decision.<sup>16)</sup> He is therefore a proponent of heuristic decision-making. A quick decision requires the decision to be made with limited knowledge, i.e. incomplete information, in the shortest time possible. In Austria, this decision-making in the leadership activities is also known as accelerated or type C technique of the military decision making process (MDMP). If there is sufficient time available in order to make a decision to solve a problem and it is possible to include various sources of knowledge (e.g. assistants/staff officers), we talk of MDMP techniques that involve the staff (in Austria, types A and B).

Time is very important for leadership activities, and in particular for decision-making, whereby the quality of the decisions does not necessarily improve when there is more time for assessment. This is precisely what Machiavelli is reflecting with his statement on necessity. The resolution forms the basis for a plan to accomplish an objective/solve the problem. If the plan is in the implementation phase, the task of the (military) leader is first to enable a smooth procedure. Here, we traditionally find ourselves in the realm of management. Now the plan may be subject to various influences – this will always be the case – and this may result in an intentional or forced departure from the route that has been embarked on.

A plan is always a controlled error.<sup>17)</sup> Ambiguity is a constant companion of leadership activities; it is reflected in the decision, the implementation and also in the problem. This is also, where Niccolo Machiavelli's error tolerance comes to light. It is therefore possible to conclude that a decision is not right or wrong, and instead can be classified as more or less usable in its ambiguity.<sup>18)</sup> However, it is wrong not to make a decision at all. If certain factors impact on the achievement of an objective, the leader must decide what should or should not be done – even doing nothing requires a decision.

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<sup>14)</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>15)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 26.

<sup>16)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 399.

<sup>17)</sup> See Sprenger, loc. cit., p. 219.

<sup>18)</sup> See Reinhard Sprenger: *Magie des Konflikts*, München 2020, p. 69.



These influences therefore represent the moments of leadership that trigger a leadership activity. Unlike the planning initially carried out to solve the problem, the leader is now required to make a subsequent decision, by and large alone, which is neither right nor wrong – to enter the sphere of leadership.

In this context, Sprenger, who has taken up many of Machiavelli's ideas and transferred them to the modern day, talks of the "[...] fundamental dilemmatic existence [...]"<sup>19)</sup> of a leader. A decision must always be assessed at the time at which it was made.<sup>20)</sup> The decision-maker makes the decision personally and must also be responsible for it. This is also echoed by Machiavelli, based on the descriptions of the Roman historian Titus Livius.<sup>21)</sup> A solution to a problem, i.e. a decision to solve a problem, is always based on a certain thirst for action or initiative. This driving force for action that Machiavelli described as *virtú* (virtue) strives towards the respective disruptive influences (e.g. the coincidence/surprise or expectation – *fortuna*) or even uses them to achieve success. The disruptive factors either result, in one extreme, in a necessity (*necessità*) to remove them or, in the other extreme, in an opportunity (*occasione*) that needs to be exploited. (Figure 6) The moment of leadership moves between these two extreme characteristics. In this case, the leader is positioned between external control and self-control.

## Leadership activities between necessity and opportunity

Different tools are therefore available in the two extreme situations. When exploiting an opportunity in order to perhaps achieve success more quickly or easily, the question arises about abandoning the principles (leadership principles and concepts) of the command activities. In particular, when can I or when do I even need to disregard these principles in order to be successful? In order to return to normal from a forced necessity, it is advisable to comply with and apply the stated principles. In time-critical and perhaps even existential phases, this standard procedure helps to achieve a normal state as quickly as possible and to then even make use of it.<sup>22)</sup> At the end, the purpose is effected, when the initial problem is solved. Machiavelli expressed this concept in his two main works, firstly presenting it by example of a real situation in the Roman Empire on the basis of an examination of the writings of Titus Livius, and secondly, formulating it idealistically as a code of conduct for a prince.

Because Machiavelli saw conflict, in whatever form, as quite valuable for the further development of communities, he thought that a leader needed to be a person who remained capable of acting in crises. Conflict juxtaposes thesis and antithesis against each other in order to achieve a result in a synthesis.

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<sup>19)</sup> Ibid. p.69.

<sup>20)</sup> See Philip Meissner: *Entscheiden ist einfach*, Frankfurt am Main 2019, p. 17.

<sup>21)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 38.

<sup>22)</sup> See Sprenger, *Magie des Konflikts*, loc. cit., p. 127.

For him, war was the symbol of this dialectic of crisis (the wartime enemies as thesis and antithesis, peace as their synthesis) and this is where the leader was particularly necessary. Only someone who “[...] had not neglected warfare in times of peace” would be able to lead successfully.<sup>23)</sup>

What does this mean for military leadership/command and control today? Command and control requires a problem/crisis, because without a problem or crisis there is no command and control. The aim of it is to solve the crisis situation, whereby “ensuring survival” is the focus of military command activities.<sup>24)</sup> Learning how to command/lead is experienced-based, which means that in order to be crisis-proof, training in similar crisis situations is required. Military action usually takes place in a crisis or when a crisis needs to be resolved. In principle, the military acts in order to establish or remove a legal framework (whatever this may look like). Military command activities therefore always change the system. Problems that need a military solution, mostly because they are of existential significance, can only be solved together. The military is built around the idea of cooperation. It is not about the sum of individual actions, but instead about the simultaneous efforts of everyone to reach the objective.<sup>25)</sup>

## The military decision-making process between decision distance and leadership tranquility

Leadership, and in particular military command and control, is about enabling cooperation. It is about the foresighted securing of survival within the scope of solving a problem in a way that brings about cooperation as decided by the military leader. Making decisions means finding and communicating routes to solutions. In this case, decision distance and leadership tranquility are two central concepts for Machiavelli. Decision distance is the need for the decision-maker to have spatial and temporal distance from the event and expresses confidence in the subordinate levels. (Figure 7) For Machiavelli, this is about being conscious of the “[...] dignity of his (the leader’s) position [...]”.<sup>26)</sup> For him, in order to achieve your objectives successfully, it is essential to be aware of the respective level in which one is performing the command activities.<sup>27)</sup>

Leadership tranquility is closely connected to the decision distance. This is the possibility to make decisions without serious additional external influences, and it promotes individual responsibility. (Figure 9) Machiavelli describes or paraphrases this concept as follows: “In leadership for major matters, it is best if one person alone is in supreme command.”<sup>28)</sup> This could also be understood to be

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<sup>23)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 71.

<sup>24)</sup> See Sprenger, *Radikal führen*, loc. cit., p. 54 et seq.

<sup>25)</sup> See *ibid.*, p.55.

<sup>26)</sup> Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 374.

<sup>27)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 330.

<sup>28)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 333.

the unity of command as a command principle. However, in relation to the command level, this means that the respective commander must take the decision. Interference from higher levels or into lower levels will result in the loss of leadership tranquility and reduce the necessary decision distance.<sup>29)</sup> The solution of the leadership tasks/problems by the respective level allows the superior level to focus on its tasks.

If the superior level of command interferes in the command activities of the subordinate levels, it will lack the time (and also the strength and space) to ensure the necessary requirements for the command activities of the subordinates. One literally immerses in the event and loses the room for manoeuvre. Leadership success develops via the balanced relationship between decision distance, leadership tranquility and the moment of leadership. (Figure 4) Confidence and personal responsibility are also fundamental building blocks of the command principle in mission-type tactics, and are therefore essential for modern (military) leadership.

In this context, a shifting of levels – which goes along with the level-related unity of command – plays a major role. (Figure 8) The leaders at the subordinate levels are raised to the level of the decision-maker (the objective and means of implementation are specified, they need to plan the implementation themselves) through the lack of interference in their leadership area by maintaining a certain decision distance and by ensuring the resulting leadership tranquility. This leads to intentional leadership.

Deduced from Kant's philosophical system<sup>30)</sup>, the path to a resolution/decision largely passes three stages: The mind stage is used to present the given situation and state the facts. At the stage of reason, these facts are assessed in order to use judgement to determine what should be done. The result of this process is the decision. (Figure 3) In order to be able to better comprehend the decision, reference is made here to another philosopher who also addressed this subject in his works. In relation to the decision, Søren Kierkegaard talks of turning a possibility into reality.<sup>31)</sup> This means that a decision is made from several possibilities for action, whereby one chooses to dismiss the other possibilities. At the moment a decision is made there are therefore several possible actions compared with one reality of action. In terms of the decision, this eliminates the freedom of action, which can only be seen within the scope of the possibilities. Once a decision has been made, this freedom is lost. For Kierkegaard, this loss of freedom results in a certain fear of making a decision – namely when the leader is aware of this loss of freedom.<sup>32)</sup>

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<sup>29)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 332.

<sup>30)</sup> See Konrad Paul Liessmann: *Die großen Philosophen und ihre Probleme*, Wien 2003, p. 80 et seq.

<sup>31)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>32)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 126.



This fear of making decisions needs to be overcome. When giving up freedom, the decision-maker experiences feelings of guilt in the sense of consciously leaving behind the other possibilities. This guilt leads to responsibility for the decision and, for the first time, the decision-maker is transformed into a leader. The responsibility also means that the person who makes decisions remains visible as an individual and does not disappear.<sup>33)</sup> Here, it is important to be able to give an answer about why one made this decision as the leader. Ultimately, one will only know what he/she has decided with the benefit of hindsight.<sup>34)</sup> This takes place within the scope of responsibility at the stage of reason. This process underlies all decisions (in the sense of intersubjective traceability), whether they are of a military nature or not.<sup>35)</sup>

The process described here is therefore the lowest common denominator of a military decision-making process. In association with this process and the concepts of decision distance and leadership tranquility, more detailed consideration also needs to be given to the different requirements for the related plans for problem-solving at the respective command levels. The plan that follows the decision in the process will have a different/varying scope for its implementation, according to the command level. This is where the connection to the decision distance and leadership tranquility comes in. The so-called scope of an order – i.e. how long the implementation of the plan must be effective – is directly proportional to the decision distance and the resulting leadership tranquility. The bigger these two parameters, the more wide-reaching the effect of the plan and/or command. The leader who is rooted directly in the event is focused on solving the present problem, and this is precisely how far the effect of the order extends. The further you go up the levels, the more the planning focuses on the events and/or consequences that follow immediate problem-solving.

If the phase directly after problem-solving is still covered by the leadership's so-called planning horizon – dealing with the consequences of solving the problem and the further achievement of the objective – at this level, the superior level's order already covers the planning horizon of the lower level. This demonstrates why the factors of decision distance and leadership tranquility are so essential in achieving an objective in which several command levels are involved.

The functioning of the entire system – the leadership success – is dependent on this. In this instance, the planning horizon of the lower level is generally the same as the scope of the order of the higher level. Here Machiavelli's demand for the level-specific unity of command is again clearly demonstrated and justified, whereby a corresponding initiative for command activities is required at all levels. Ultimately, a lack of resolve (initiative/virtù) will rarely be successful. In order to support resolve, in

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<sup>33)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>34)</sup> See Sprenger, *Magie des Konflikts*, loc. cit., p. 71.

<sup>35)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 26.

addition to necessity (necesitá) as the ultimate force promoting decisions, Machiavelli believes that clearly identifying the differences between the available alternatives is of primary importance. Here, the positive force of conflict clearly emerges again according to Machiavelli.<sup>36)</sup> Leadership itself consequently remains controversial, and is therefore "[...] always leadership in dilemma."<sup>37)</sup> In addition, the leader is not only in conflict during the command activities, but he or she must also be able to bear the imperfect and the ambiguity.<sup>38)</sup>

## Conflict as the central force

For Machiavelli, conflict is the normal status and peaceful coexistence is a cultural achievement, this being justified by the idea that desire is always stronger than possession. This asymmetry between having and wanting is also the origin of the thirst for action (virtú).<sup>39)</sup> When the state in which wanting and having are one has been reached, the thirst for action starts to wane, and instability and strife increase.<sup>40)</sup> This is where the Florentine's extremely positive assessment of conflict shows, because this asymmetry promotes development and is a powerful impetus for organisation.<sup>41)</sup>

As already described above, Machiavelli believes that command authority, and therefore also the authority to make decisions in a crisis or for important undertakings, should always be in the hands of one person. For him, this unity of command is very important, particularly in conflict.<sup>42)</sup> Nonetheless, he is aware of the importance of a leader having a critical advisor. The selection of a faithful, critical assistant to examine and check a leader's actions is particularly important for Machiavelli. Meissner, for example, talks of finding a critic and attempting to understand this person.<sup>43)</sup> In Machiavelli's opinion, this person needs to demonstrate initiative and intelligence.<sup>44)</sup> Here, he describes the interplay of alpha (the decision-maker in the crisis, the leader) and omega (the administrator or manager) in leadership activities.

He borrows from the political system of the Roman Empire. In peacetime, leadership is the responsibility of the consuls, the tribunes and the senate, which can be seen as analogous to MDMP techniques that involve the staff in today's military. However, if a crisis has broken out and there is high time pressure, it is advisable for the decision-making to be focused on the commander (the respective command echelon). According to Machiavelli, this accelerated or type C technique of the

<sup>36)</sup> Herfried Münkler: *Über den Krieg, Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion*, Weilerswist 2002, p. 50.

<sup>37)</sup> See Sprenger, *Magie des Konflikts*, loc. cit., p. 117.

<sup>38)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>39)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>40)</sup> See Münkler, *Über den Krieg*, loc. cit., p. 39 and 47.

<sup>41)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 19.

<sup>42)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 333.

<sup>43)</sup> See Meissner, *Entscheiden ist einfach*, loc. cit., p. 77 et seqq.

<sup>44)</sup> See Niccolò Machiavelli: *Der Fürst*, Stuttgart 1978, p. 96 et seq.

MDMP, as described above, is comparable to the Roman system of dictatorship.<sup>45)</sup> This system requires a critical omega as feedback – in the sense of a conflict in a microcosm to generate usable leadership decisions – for leadership in crisis. This critical intellect of the advisor – in the military sense, the staff officer or deputy – must be used before the decision, and not just once the decision has already been made.

## Summary

Machiavelli's thinking is dialectic in nature and therefore leadership is also put through a dialectic when viewed in the Machiavellian context. The relationship between virtue, opportunity and necessity in his works is reflected in the command activities of today's (military) leaders. The necessary self-impetus, the initiative, is – based on a challenge/problem – the core of successfully achieving an objective. For Machiavelli (as with Spinoza and others), the unifying factor is the danger, threat or, as we understand it, the problem. Pressure, no matter what form it takes, binds people together.<sup>46)</sup> This either happens internally through laws, or externally through an enemy.

The problem that unifies people is usually of a comprehensive nature. In other words, the more fundamental a problem, the more it promotes cooperation. The moment of leadership and its acknowledgement therefore play a decisive role. Leadership by mission (shifting of levels) – or, in the Austrian understanding, mission-type tactics – is based on Machiavelli's demand to ensure the unity of command at the respective leadership level. This results in connections between decision distance and leadership tranquility on the one hand and, on the other hand, their relationship to the moment of leadership – action versus reaction.

In his statements, the focus is very much on the ruler/the leader. However, based on the unity of command, in combination with the quick decision-making by an individual (type C process), the MDMP techniques that involve the staff (types A and B) can also be identified in his works. For example, in the description of the political system (democracy in peacetime versus dictatorship as an emergency system in crisis times) in the Roman Republic. The importance of the leader in the leadership activities can be seen in the requirement for leaders who are capable of working in a crisis.<sup>47)</sup>

Accordingly, leadership activities are actions based on experience. Knowledge and readiness for implementation need to be trained appropriately. Knowledge around and about the conflict and the readiness to act in the situation are core skills for the (military) leader. Handling ambiguity (in all phases

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<sup>45)</sup> See Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 96 et seq.

<sup>46)</sup> See Niccolò Machiavelli: *Gesammelte Werke in einem Band*, Frankfurt o.J., p. 831.

<sup>47)</sup> See Sprenger, *Radikal führen*, loc. cit, p. 172 et seqq.; or Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, loc. cit., p. 71.



of the leadership process) and dealing with decision-making processes under time pressure is very important in modern leadership.

For a leader, it is advisable to have an adaptive leadership style (which considers ambiguities) in order to implement effective leadership activities in crisis situations. Sticking to a rigid process also harbours the risk of missing out on success. In other words: "The scheme kills the spirit"<sup>48)</sup> In relation to this, Machiavelli also pleads for a certain error tolerance, which is based on a quick and usable resolution. The quality of decisions, including their implementation, is not only based on the leader, but is also greatly dependent on the implementing forces. An excellent decision can be counteracted by poor implementation and vice versa. In this case, two factors – the leader (thesis) and the people who are led (antithesis) – are inextricably linked for successful leadership (synthesis).

In addition, once again the dialectic intersection of leadership is shown. The interplay of leader and assistants is just as important as this relationship when it comes to the quality of the leadership. Here, the assistant uses his/her critical mind in the service of the leader in order to improve the quality of the leader's decisions. For Machiavelli, power is the force that enables the leader firstly to create the framework conditions for the leadership activities and, secondly, to overcome the crisis via targeted leadership activities. For him, crisis, power and coercion are absolutely necessary in facilitating the existence and survival of the community. In consideration of the current circumstances in politics, economy, education and other areas, it can therefore be said that Machiavelli is a realist with recommendations for action that have already been tested in the past, which in some cases should also be applied today. "Never miss a good crisis!"<sup>49)</sup>

## Curriculum Vitae

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


<sup>48)</sup> Eike Middeldorf: Taktik im Russlandfeldzug, Erfahrungen und Folgerungen, Darmstadt 1956, p. 235.

<sup>49)</sup> Sprenger, Radikal führen, loc. cit, p. 213.

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## The naval battle of Salamis:

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### Pre-emptive wars and a security dilemma 2,500 years ago

Holger Alisch

#### Significance of the battle and background to the campaign

Two and a half thousand years ago, probably on 29 September 480 BC, two fleets clashed in the Saronic Gulf, a branch of the Aegean Sea, in a bloody battle over the future and fate of Classical Greece. In the view of many chroniclers and historians over the centuries, it was certainly about more than just the survival of the independence of Athens or the other Greek city-states; about more than preventing a maritime bypass of the Greek army on the Isthmus of Corinth.<sup>50)</sup> From the still recent experiment of Athenian democracy, to the western philosophy (and the concept of the individual), through to a titanic dispute between western freedom and oriental despotism<sup>51)</sup>, much (the most possible<sup>52)</sup> has been read into this military confrontation at the start of the traditional history of Europe.<sup>53)</sup> However, as almost always in the history of war, in the case of Xerxes' campaign to Greece, the roles of "good" and "evil", of aggressor and attacked, of black and white are by no means so clearly assigned as historians have traditionally always been so keen to imply for the purpose of polarising and formulating a narrative.

More recent research has justifiably developed a trend of classifying the disputes in the years 490–479 BC in a broader context of the collision of several power-political areas of influence. The Achaemenid dynasty in the east, which had ascended to become a major classical power within a few generations (from 553 BC), had not only annexed the kingdoms of the Medes and Lydians, the Babylonians and Egyptians,<sup>54)</sup> but with Thrace and Macedonia had also made two territories at the northern border of the Greek environment subject to their own rule. In particular the Greek-speaking Ionian cities on the coast of Asia Minor, which had still played a privileged special role in the Empire of wealthy Croesus, were now in a miserable position, in which they were increasingly restricted in their development because, with the exception of Miletus<sup>55)</sup>, they had refused to defect to the conqueror

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<sup>50)</sup> See Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst. Das Altertum. Von den Perserkriegen bis Cäsar*, Hamburg 2003, p. 100 et seqq.

<sup>51)</sup> See, for example, Plato's assessment of the supererogatory increase of sovereign power of the Achaemenids, quoted according to: Josef Wiesehöfer, *Der Zusammenbruch des Perserreiches der Achämeniden*, in: Alexander Demandt (Ed.), *Das Ende der Weltreiche*, Hamburg 2007, p. 11.

<sup>52)</sup> See, for example, J.F.C. Fuller, *Die Entscheidungsschlachten der westlichen Welt*, Tübingen 2004, p. 16 and 21.

<sup>53)</sup> In one respect, this certainly exaggerated intensification of the war into a battle of "freedom against suppression" is, at its core, highly significant, as the reforms of Cleisthenes from 506 BC were only one-and-a-half decades old at the start of the Persian Wars. There is no consensus as to whether the (for the circumstances at the time) democratic nature of the Athenian political system would have survived a loss against Darius I or Xerxes. See, for example, Heinz E. Herzig, *Der Freiheitskampf der Griechen*, in: Stig Förster/Markus Pöhlmann/Dierk Walter (Ed.), *Schlachten der Weltgeschichte. Von Salamis bis Sinai*, München 2001, p. 30.

<sup>54)</sup> See Fuller (2004): p. 14–16.

<sup>55)</sup> See Herodot, *Neun Bücher zur Geschichte*, 1,76.

Cyrus II in good time<sup>56)</sup>. The imminent consequence was the famous “Ionian Revolt” (499–493 BC), during which the armies of the Persians, after initial losses and setbacks (destruction of Sardis 499 BC) were able to defeat an uprising of these areas on the edge of their eastern empire. The most important ally for the rebels during the conflict was a modest-sized expedition of the Athenians.<sup>57)</sup> This included around 20 ships and 4,000 to 5,000 men.<sup>58)</sup> It is unlikely that the warships sent out at the request of the ruler of Miletus, the Tyrant Aristagoras, were already triremes, especially as these were first used in larger numbers in Attica because of the fleet building programme of Themistocles.<sup>59)</sup> It was therefore in no way surprising that Athens, the increasingly important trading centre of Greece, soon afterwards, and in dramatic fashion, became a focus for Great King Darius I.<sup>60)</sup>

The approach of the Greeks in the motherland seems rational and comprehensible in view of the rebellion against the Achaemenids, even from the perspective of the modern world of 21<sup>st</sup> century-states in view of contemporary theories of international relations. While Sparta, as the traditional supreme power of southern Greece at least, had to practise a policy of restraint, as it were for domestic political reasons, because excessive losses in the ranks of the Spartiates or full citizens would have jeopardised the already precarious relationship with the subordinate helots.<sup>61)</sup> It was in the interests of Athens, which was increasingly oriented towards the sea,<sup>62)</sup> to prevent or at least delay the inclusion of the entire maritime potential of the coastal cities of Asia Minor into the Persian sphere of influence. This is because, as long as a major power has not gained a hegemonial, uncontested position in its regional power distribution system, there is considerably less risk for other geographic regions and political systems to fall victim to this potentially expanding power.<sup>63)</sup> Consequently, the well-travelled traders and sailors of Attica could envision that the triumphal procession of the Persian conquerors after subjugating the whole of Asia would continue on the other side of the straits and the Aegean. The Ionian Revolt was therefore the last opportunity to counter a further expansion of the

<sup>56)</sup> As the most important coastal city alongside Halicarnassus, Miletus on the other hand timely agreed to a treaty with the victorious Cyrus, which granted the city the same privileges which it had held under the Lydians. See *ibid.*, 1, 141. An early example of what Randall Schweller calls “Wave of the Future Bandwagoning”. See Randall Schweller, *Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In*, in: *International Security*, Vol. 19 (Summer 1994), p. 96.

<sup>57)</sup> See William Shepherd, *Salamis 480 BC. The naval campaign that saved Greece*, Oxford 2010, p. 10 et seq.

<sup>58)</sup> See *ibid.*, see also Raimund Schulz, *Feldherren, Krieger und Strategen. Krieg in der Antike von Achill bis Atilla*, Stuttgart 2018, p. 61/62.

<sup>59)</sup> Schulz believes that penteconters, i.e. “fifty-oared vessels”, were used. See Schulz (2018): p. 62 These ships, which had 25 rowers on each side, achieved nowhere near the acceleration of the later triremes. The manning with heavily-armed men and archers weighed even more due to the comparatively less important battering ram. As they were easier to build and steer, however, different variants of these ships of the Archaic period were of certain importance during all conflicts in the Mediterranean area until Late Antiquity.

<sup>60)</sup> According to Herodotus, Darius I had his bow brought to him and shot an arrow upwards into the sky. When doing so, he cried that Zeus himself should take vengeance on the Athenians. See Herodotus, 5, 105.

<sup>61)</sup> See Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, *Sparta. Aufstieg und Niedergang einer antiken Großmacht*, Stuttgart 2004, p. 122.

<sup>62)</sup> Gradually, Athens was able to prevail against the rival polis/island of Aegina in the Saronic Gulf. For a century and a half, their ships had repeatedly impaired Athens’ growth due to constant attacks. However, perhaps the presence of these neighbouring pirates was one of the best arguments of Themistocles and Cimon for investing the newly gained profits from a rich vein of silver in Attica into building a new navy, instead of a new temple.

<sup>63)</sup> See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2001, p. 140–141. Obviously, there is only a limited extent to which empires and city-states of early antiquity can be compared with modern nation states. However, the basic assumption of structural realism according to Mearsheimer or Waltz – a power political competition of an anarchic system of arming yourself and taking the law into your own hands – still remains valid.

Achaemenids in a preventative or pre-emptive manner.<sup>64)</sup> For the Persians, however, the intervention of the Athenians in Asia Minor was an excellent smokescreen for a campaign to Europe, and a cause for concern about securing the western side of Persia.<sup>65)</sup>

Three years after the defeat of the rebellious Greek city-states on the coast of Asia Minor in 490 BC, Darius I got the opportunity to take revenge for the destruction of his western satrapy capital Sardis after his commander Datis had already – thanks to clever tactical manoeuvring and cautious measures – prepared for the landing of an army of probably 15,000 to 25,000 men. Miltiades, the leading man of Athens, had predicted an attack on the Greek mainland by land and sea since the end of the battles on the Ionian coast, and had made first arrangements for defence, for example the fortification of Piraeus.<sup>66)</sup>

At the recommendation of the dispossessed Attic Tyrant Hippias, who accompanied the invaders,<sup>67)</sup> the Persian forces landed near Marathon around 40 km from Athens. After hesitating briefly, an Attic force led by Miltiades as the strategist and reinforced by a small division from Plataea attacked the Persian troops. According to Herodotus, the heavily armed hoplites attacked here for the first time in a close formation and at double-quick pace. He mentions the lack of archers and cavaliers, and that the Persians noticed this, as a result of which they initially seemed to be pleased about the abrupt approach of the Athenians and their allies.<sup>68)</sup> Herodotus does not waste a single word on the most powerful arm of Datis' forces. So where was the Persian cavalry? The unilateral fixation of the Greeks on close combat on foot with shield and lance was undoubtedly a major weakness, and the flanks of each advancing phalanx must have been vulnerable to the cavalry. At the same time, the dense mass of hoplites steadily advancing in unison must have suffered especially from the arrow fire of the well-trained soldiers of the eastern empires.<sup>69)</sup>

Whether the description of the biography of Miltiades according to Cornelius Nepos<sup>70)</sup> may be more suitable to explain the surprising victory of maximally 10,000 Athenians and their allies against a battle-hardened and well-equipped enemy, is obviously uncertain.<sup>71)</sup> Nonetheless, this description, which proceeds on the assumption of a well-selected Greek defensive position between woods and

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<sup>64)</sup> The fact that the Athenians would have been clear that there was a growing threat of further expansion from Darius, is already evident in their behaviour when faced with the looming defeat of the rebellious Ionians or during their excesses in Sardis (499 BC). See Herodot, 5, 103.

<sup>65)</sup> See *ibid.*, 6, 44.

<sup>66)</sup> See Montgomery Viscount of Alamein, *Kriegsgeschichte. Weltgeschichte der Schlachten und Kriegszüge*, Cologne 2005, p. 61.

<sup>67)</sup> See Shepherd (2010): p. 14.

<sup>68)</sup> See Herodot, 6, 112.

<sup>69)</sup> See Delbrück (2003): p. 59–60.

<sup>70)</sup> See Cornelius Nepos, *Miltiades*: 5.1–5.3.

<sup>71)</sup> Schulz refers to the short range of the Persian bows (150–200 m) and the lighter armour of the Attic hoplites. He therefore believes that the traditional description by Herodotus may well be possible. See Schulz (2018): p. 65. In fact, a surprise attack by the Greeks could also have neutralised the cavalry of Datis. You only have to think of Hannibal's victory at the Trebia (218 BC). The Carthaginians were indeed victorious on the flanks and were vastly superior in their cavalry; however the centre of the Roman legions with 10,000 men broke through the Punic lines. The flanks did not have time to sufficiently unfurl – an error that Hannibal would of course avoid repeating two years later.

impassable terrain,<sup>72)</sup> makes more sense. Either way, the campaign of 490 failed and the Persians had to retreat to their ships after having suffered heavy losses. Whether or not they subsequently came within a whisker of occupying Athens (after circumnavigating Attica) will have to remain a historical mystery. Without doubt, Delbrück is correct when he wrote about the "colossal figure"<sup>73)</sup> of Miltiades at the start of European or world history.

As Darius I died four years later and his son and successor Xerxes I was, for the time being, confronted with an uprising in Egypt and revolts in Babylon,<sup>74)</sup> the Greeks got a bit of breathing space, in which they were able to regain and gather their strength. It also gave them an opportunity to analyse their own weaknesses identified in the previous conflict with the Persians and to make necessary improvements. The first significant naval battle that was fought during the Ionian Rebellion was the naval battle of Lade (494 BC). Insufficient discipline and motivation and the fragility of the weak alliances between the various Greek poleis became blatantly obvious here and cost an otherwise well-armed Greek-Samian-Milesian force its victory.<sup>75)</sup> Although there were heavy casualties on both sides,<sup>76)</sup> the defeat of the Greek fleet resulted in the rapid containment of Miletus and the collapse of the Ionian Rebellion in the following year. It was precisely this kind of fragility of the political alliance that Xerxes was hoping for in 480 BC, if we are to believe what has come down to us and is to be discussed below, namely that an alleged messenger or defector warned Xerxes of the flight of the discordant Greeks.<sup>77)</sup> The victory of Miltiades at Marathon described above carried the risk that the Athenians might have felt a false sense of security. Due to their incredible luck not only to have beaten the army of the Persian Datis, but also to have found an extraordinarily rich silver mine in Laurium in Attica,<sup>78)</sup> they risked losing their guile.

Themistocles, who was born in humble circumstances but was respected and resourceful, and who was increasingly able to prevail against the conservative and noble Aristides, his adversary in the people's assembly of Athens, was able to invest the earnings from the silver into building a fleet of 200 triremes under the pretence of primarily wanting to fight the residents of Aegina, who operated as bandits. "It was these ships with which they (the Athenians, H.A.) would actually fight against Xerxes at Salamis."<sup>79)</sup> Themistocles, who had ascended to be the Archon and Strategos, also began to forge a Greek alliance against future invasions. He therefore pursued, in the vocabulary of modern political

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<sup>72)</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>73)</sup> Delbrück (2003): p. 70.

<sup>74)</sup> See Josef Wiesehöfer, Xerxes I., in: Förster/Pöhlmann/Walter (Ed.), *Kriegsherren der Weltgeschichte. 22 historische Porträts*, München 2006, p. 22.

<sup>75)</sup> See Owen Rees, *Great Naval Battles of the Ancient Greek World*, Philadelphia 2018, p. 3.

<sup>76)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>77)</sup> See Shepherd (2010): p. 67.

<sup>78)</sup> See Plutarch, *Leben des Themistokles*, 4.1.

<sup>79)</sup> *Ibid.* However, unlike all other sources, Plutarch only writes of a hundred triremes.



realism, both internal (fleet building and the cancellation of exile for his conservative opponents)<sup>80)</sup> and external (alliances with other poleis even under the leadership of Sparta) balancing;<sup>81)</sup> i.e. the foresighted formation of a counter-power. Delayed only by the uprisings in several satrapies, however, Xerxes also started a huge campaign of armament and conscription of new armies and fleets.<sup>82)</sup>

## The fleets and armies of the two warring parties

On the Greek side, it is possible to identify a transformation of warfare from around 700 BC, the consequences of which were of huge significance – not just in a military sense but also socially and in terms of the state structure.<sup>83)</sup> Whereas previously, armed conflict throughout Achaea, not unlike the feuds of the Middle Ages, was a matter for small bands of adventurers and aristocrats on horseback,<sup>84)</sup> from the seventh century onwards, with the transition from the Heroic Age to the Classical Period, there was a change in the nature of “palace wars” with their chariots and knaves.<sup>85)</sup> Small, feudal squads of individual aristocrats with their companions (hetaira) were replaced with urban militias of heavily armed men armed with helmet, armour, shield and lance and who were brought into action as hoplites (Greek ὅπλον hóplon). The entire caste of land-owning yeomen therefore replaced the noble aristocracy to become the fundamental element of the political system of the approximately 1,000 independent city-states of Hellas.<sup>86)</sup> The most important virtue of the hoplites was their bravery, which readers also encounter in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. The struggle of “man against man”, perfected in the dashing hero Achilles, was crucial.<sup>87)</sup> In fact, many Greeks thought that the Persian fighters were “cowards” because they “hid” behind their bows and avoided close combat. Increasing the troop numbers due to the transition to the mass formation of the phalanx (Greek φάλαγξ) initiated the replacement of tyranny in Athens.

However, the fleet building or, to put it better, the need to man the new galleys, meant that a much greater number of personnel was required. Consequently, the war constitution of the city-states needed to be amended. The rowers or oarsmen, who in emergencies risked or sacrificed their lives and limbs on the triremes in order to defend the city community, could no longer be denied participation in civic rights all the way through to decisions about war and peace. In addition to convicts, mercenaries and slaves, a huge number of unpropertied citizens also needed to be called into service. From 406 BC at the latest, slaves were no longer used in the Attic fleet. Those who did serve were

<sup>80)</sup> See Stephan Elbern, Schwert und Geist, Darmstadt/Mainz 2012, p. 125.

<sup>81)</sup> See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Boston/New York/San Francisco 1979, p. 168.

<sup>82)</sup> For a very detailed and vividly colourful description of troops gathering in the west of the Persian Empire, see Herodot, 7, 55–98.

<sup>83)</sup> See Joachim Hack (Ed.), Die Kriege der Griechischen Antike, Königswinter 2008, p. 48.

<sup>84)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p.21.

<sup>85)</sup> See Hack (2008): p.38.

<sup>86)</sup> See ibid., p. 48–49.

<sup>87)</sup> See Fuller (2004): p. 14.

emancipated.<sup>88)</sup> The conversion of Athens into a naval power after 490 BC cemented the foundations of the popular sovereignty in Athens – just as the agricultural basis of the economy of the Peloponnese demanded the use of a large number of helots in the fields, which preserved the strict Spartan class society.<sup>89)</sup>

The biggest warship by far at the time was the trireme (or triere). Fully equipped, the ship weighed around 50 tonnes, was approximately five metres wide and between 37 and 40 metres long.<sup>90)</sup> The regular crew consisted of 170 rowers, who rowed in three consecutive rows (hence the name of the ship class) on both sides. There were also 16 sailors and officers, as well as four archers and ten hoplites.<sup>91)</sup> This clearly demonstrates the huge need for rowers and soldiers at Salamis. If the Athenian fleet included 180 triremes,<sup>92)</sup> then around 36,000 men were fighting on the galleys. As there were around 100,000 inhabitants of Athens and its surrounding territories, this was probably practically the entire male population of the polis that was fit for military service.<sup>93)</sup> In total, the Greek alliance probably provided around 360 ships,<sup>94)</sup> meaning that half were from Athens.

Although, as already mentioned, there were armed hoplites and archers (later also spear throwers, known as peltasts) on board, the most important weapon of a trireme was its battering ram (émbolon). This was not commonly used in a frontal manner, but was ideally suited to ram the flanks of an enemy ship or for demolishing its rudder system. This kind of flank attack was known as diékplous.<sup>95)</sup> The attempt to hit turning ships when they were at their most vulnerable, on the other hand, was called periplous.<sup>96)</sup> Only the later, much stronger battering rams of the Syracusans were intended to be able to carry out frontal ramming during the Peloponnesian War or the Sicilian Expedition of 415–413 BC. According to Thucydides, the Athenians lost here, explicitly because they had previously relied too much on their traditional flank manoeuvre.<sup>97)</sup> However, it is not certain that the Greek fleet fighting at Cape Artemisium and Salamis can be compared with the fleet of the Delian League from the late fifth century in terms of their battle tactics. Perhaps on the Persian side with the Ionians, Rhodians and Egyptians, who were used to the sea, there were more sailors who were skilled in these sophisticated manoeuvres than the armada of Themistocles and his allies.<sup>98)</sup> If the Greeks did not have superior naval engineering or manoeuvring skills, then it could be conceivable that it was (as, for example, at Lepanto

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<sup>88)</sup> See Rees (2018): p. xi.

<sup>89)</sup> See Michael Stahl, *Gesellschaft und Staat bei den Griechen: Archaische Zeit*, München/Wien/Zürich 2003, p. 66. On the territorial expansion of Sparta and the associated need for workers: See *ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>90)</sup> See Shepherd (2010): p. 25.

<sup>91)</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>92)</sup> See Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, *Im Schatten des Desasters. Zwölf Entscheidungsschlachten in der Geschichte Europas*, Osnabrück 2008, p. 20.

<sup>93)</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>94)</sup> See Richard Overly, *A History of War in 100 Battles*, London 2014, p. 88.

<sup>95)</sup> See Schultz (2018): p. 78.

<sup>96)</sup> See *ibid.* See also Shepherd (2010): p. 34.

<sup>97)</sup> See Thucydides, *Der Peloponnesische Krieg*, 7, 36.

<sup>98)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 78–79.

in favour of the Holy League in 1571) the stronger weaponry and armament of the own infantry in the battle against the boarding parties of the Persians that were to help Themistocles and his men to victory. However, this deliberation is not supported by the main source Herodotus. A large proportion of the troops on Xerxes' ships (allegedly up to 1,207, but more likely probably 600–800 units) were, after all – particularly in the case of Ionians or Phoenicians – equipped in the style of the heavily armed hoplites.<sup>99)</sup>

The ancient authors, starting with Herodotus himself, astronomically exaggerated the number of Persian troops and warships, the transport fleet, the support staff and so on. In his first volume of the "Geschichte der Kriegskunst" [History of the Art of War] (original from the year 1900), the German military historian Hans Delbrück calculated over several pages that the numbers of 400,000 to 520,000 men in the army of Xerxes that circulated in ancient times must have been completely exaggerated. The logistics and infrastructure possibilities that existed at the time would never have allowed for reliable supplies or even just the movement of a fighting force of this magnitude.<sup>100)</sup> Not only the expansion of the territories of the Great King and the associated supply problems will have been responsible for the practical limitation on the numbers in the Persian army. While the Greek poleis had army constitutions which, with the exception of the small regular Spartan army, practically amounted to mass drafts liable for military service,<sup>101)</sup> in the entire period between 553 and 331 BC – in relation to the Persians – there were always mixtures of mercenaries, allied contingents, nomad riders (from modern-day Turkestan or Afghanistan) and a few elite Persian troops (the "immortals" or "apple bearers" are prominent). The fact that therefore – in spite of the total population of the Persian Empire being much, much bigger – the armies of Xerxes will not have been faceless mass armies<sup>102)</sup> is evident in the structure of the fighting forces, which to a certain extent is reminiscent of the feudal forces of the Middle Ages with various loyalties to the respective monarchs.<sup>103)</sup> The Persians were certainly also superior in number due to the huge resources that Xerxes and his sub-commanders required. In general, today a figure of 80,000 to 180,000 men in the army is believed to be realistic.<sup>104)</sup> In the case of the cavalry in particular, it can be assumed that there were several tens of thousands of cavalrymen, who had been gathered together over several years from the most far-flung areas of the empire. The combination of shooters (with bows, catapults or throwing spears), lightly armed troops, adaptable mercenaries (including hoplites, such as the prime example of an influential Condottiere Memnon of Rhodes in 334 BC)<sup>105)</sup> and vastly superior cavalry in the most wide-ranging form, gave the Persians great

<sup>99)</sup> See Herodot, 7, 89–95.

<sup>100)</sup> On this matter, see also the superb work of Delbrück (2003): p. 10 et seqq.

<sup>101)</sup> See Hack (2008): p. 86.

<sup>102)</sup> See the counterargument: Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>103)</sup> See Delbrück (2003): p. 53.

<sup>104)</sup> See Bremm (2008): p. 14.

<sup>105)</sup> The characteristic of compensating for missing military skills by recruiting closed, foreign combat formations was later perfected by the Romans in the form of *socii*, *numeri* and *foederati*. See Schulz (2018): p. 317.

flexibility for their operations. This level of versatility was in no way shared by the Greek citizen militias. The successes of Salamis and Plataea (479 BC) were primarily also the victories of citizen armed forces over professional armies led by noblemen.<sup>106)</sup> However, it must not be forgotten that even a Persian fleet of “just” 600 ships (triremes or vessels of a comparable size) must have had a further 120,000 rowers and sailors on board.<sup>107)</sup> Even without any baggage, this would have meant that, in 480 BC, there were up to 300,000 men heading unrelentingly towards Athens and its few allies.<sup>108)</sup> To the Greeks, like all contemporaries, it must have looked literally like the biblical fight of “David against Goliath”.

### The campaign of 480 BC: Thermopylae, Artemisium and Salamis

According to Herodotus, Xerxes initially laughed at the Greek Demaratus, after the latter had prophesied the desperate resistance of the Spartans in particular – even in the most hopeless case.<sup>109)</sup> Nonetheless, the logistical efforts of the Persians with numerous transport ships, the construction of two canals and a pontoon bridge over the Hellespont were more than considerable. The Greek historians made fun of the perceived megalomania of the Great King, illustrating that he allegedly had the sea whipped with iron chains after a first bridge had collapsed.<sup>110)</sup> Operating in close contact with his fleet, which was indispensable for supply reasons, Xerxes set course for Greece and on the way received the traditional Persian submissive gesture of “earth and water” from many poleis until after Boeotia and Thessaly.

The northern Greek cities and regions also had to expect that the focus of the defence strategy of their compatriots would be in the south, in particular the narrow point of the Isthmus of Corinth seemed to lend itself to defence. However, as General Sir John Fuller has determined, the Hellenes could also not leave large parts of their homeland to the enemy without a fight. Not only would the fighting morale have suffered otherwise, also an encirclement of the defenders at Corinth by sea had to become more and more likely.<sup>111)</sup>

Perhaps in order to be able to honour their own religious festivals appropriately,<sup>112)</sup> Sparta did not fully mobilise its army.<sup>113)</sup> Instead of 4,000 to 5,000 Spartiates and three to seven times as many helots

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<sup>106)</sup> See Delbrück (2003): p. 55.

<sup>107)</sup> Other analysts of the campaign assume there were around 175,000 sailors, rowers and marines. See E.B. Potter/Ch. W. Nimitz/ J. Rohwer, *Seemacht. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich 1982, p. 4.

<sup>108)</sup> See Fuller (2004): p. 18.

<sup>109)</sup> See Herodot, 7, 101–103.

<sup>110)</sup> See *ibid.*, 7, 35.

<sup>111)</sup> See Fuller (2004): p. 19.

<sup>112)</sup> According to Herodotus, this was also the (alleged) reason in 490 BC why Sparta refused the the Athenians' request for help before Marathon. See Herodot, 6, 105–106.

<sup>113)</sup> Hack notes that, even in this emergency situation, Sparta feared nothing more than that the 250,000 helots, who worked on state farms and tilled the land of Sparta, would position themselves against the small upper class of Spartans, who never numbered more than 10,000 men. Maintaining internal order was always the prime imperative for ephors and kings of Sparta. See Hack (2008): p. 74–77.

(servants, slaves and auxiliary forces), the famous King Leonidas set off for the north with a guard of 300 men. Initially a defensive position was to be taken up at the Vale of Tempe in Thessaly.<sup>114)</sup> The unexpectedly rapid and coordinated approach of the Persians forced the Greeks to improvise. 130 km to the north of Athens, in the Euripus Strait, around 7,000 men commanded by Leonidas took up position in the mountain pass of Thermopylae. The aim was to provoke the enemy into a naval battle in the nearby coastal region, where the Greek fleet was already waiting under the (nominal) high command of the Spartan Eurybiades.<sup>115)</sup> As all the other heroes of the Persian wars – Miltiades, Themistocles and Pausanias – were then already seen as ambivalent figures,<sup>116)</sup> Leonidas, who after two days of heroic defensive battle remained with a rearguard of 1,000 men at best, was forced to share the fate of Lucius Aemilius Paullus.<sup>117)</sup> He had indeed failed to fulfil his mission of holding up the further advance of Xerxes' army, but fell heroically in attempting to do so and was only defeated due to the betrayal of the defector Ephialtes of Trachis.<sup>118)</sup> He therefore became a myth and has been taken as an example of the Greeks' relentless desire for freedom. Irrespective of any possible exaggeration, however, the defensive position was definitely well selected, particularly as the terrain at Thermopylae initially did not seem to allow circumvention and the flanks of the Spartans and their allies were secured. The problem of the strength of a consolidated Greek formation of heavily armed troops in attack and defence presented the Persians with a challenging military problem from Marathon to Gaugamela (331 BC). Cavalry and archers (Marathon and Plataea), vastly superior forces (Thermopylae or Issus), mercenaries (Granicus), scythed chariots and elephants (Gaugamela) were used. None of the methods proved successful. At the latest with the transformation of the citizen drafts into a professional army under Philipp II (from around 357 BC) and with the integration of peltasts and heavy cavalry, a military instrument was created<sup>119)</sup> that was to have no equal for the coming centuries until the rise of the manipular legion in the Roman west.

The Athenians had pinned all their hopes on the fleet of the Greek alliance, a kind of "coalition of the willing" under the leadership of Athens, and according to the prophecy of the Oracle of Delphi, Zeus would grant Athens a "wooden wall" to protect women and children.<sup>120)</sup> At Cape Artemisium, this new fighting force was able to gain its first, important experience.<sup>121)</sup> After some successes and capturing at first 15 and then a further 20 Persian ships, the Greeks pulled back to the south after they had

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<sup>114)</sup> See Elbern (2012): p. 87.

<sup>115)</sup> See Montgomery (2005): p. 61.

<sup>116)</sup> See Elbern (2012): p. 89.

<sup>117)</sup> Aemilius Paullus fell as Consul at the Battle of Cannae (216 BC). Unlike his surviving joint consul Gaius Terentius Varro, Aemilius was declared a brave soldier and a hero after the defeat. See Titus Livius, *ab urbe condita*, 22, 49. In defeat in particular, it is easy to understand the desire for positive role models. The same applied and still applies for the ability to tell a great story. The Battle of Thermopylae was obviously one such story.

<sup>118)</sup> See Herodotus, 7, 213 et seqq.

<sup>119)</sup> See Hack (2008): p. 138.

<sup>120)</sup> See Rees (2018): p. 19.

<sup>121)</sup> See Plutarch, *Leben des Themistokles*, 8.1.

received news of the death of Leonidas. On the third day of the battle (fought in parallel to Thermopylae), the Athenians and (on the Persian side) the Egyptians had borne the brunt of the struggles. 200 ships from Xerxes' fleet had also been destroyed by a storm.<sup>122)</sup> On both land and water, from the perspective of the Great King the invasion was therefore in no way going according to plan. Nonetheless, with these battles, the defence of Central Greece had initially collapsed. The Persian army marched to Attica. Athens, which was promptly evacuated, was occupied and (as revenge for the looting of Sardis) pillaged.

However, the population of Athens had been taken to the nearby island of Salamis. Meanwhile, the allied fleet had united in the bay of Salamis. The decisive battle was therefore imminent. Obviously, Xerxes did not have to attack this fleet at all. At Lade, the Persians had been able to blast open the Greek alliance via careful diplomacy and quick manoeuvring. The Queen of Halicarnassus, Artemisia, suggested blockades and monitoring the Greeks to the Great King. With a majority of the fighting forces, it was possible to move on without risk and threaten the Peloponnese. The Isthmus of Corinth could not have been held without ships. Would the soldiers, sailors and ships from the Peloponnese leave their home unprotected in order to assist Athens off Salamis?<sup>123)</sup> Luckily for the Greeks, however, Xerxes did not listen to these thoughts. In fact, he heeded the words of an alleged defector from the camp of Themistocles, who warned him that the allies of the Athenians would get away if he did not attack the now demoralised enemy immediately.<sup>124)</sup> Without delay, Xerxes commanded his Egyptian naval squadrons to block the strait of Megara leading to Corinth.<sup>125)</sup> In a sense, Salamis was a kind of "Thermopylae at sea". The Greeks, inferior in number, was able to use the narrowness of the bay to its advantage. Whether with or without sending a personal slave as a messenger to Xerxes, Themistocles wanted the decision at Salamis. The triremes were heavier and better suited to direct confrontations than the eastern ships, which were focused on complex manoeuvres and surrounding ships on the high seas.

As soon as the wind was favourable, the Athenians and their allies launched a frontal attack. The other side was not only surprised, their ships (perhaps 800 of them against 360 Greek ones) also impeded each other.<sup>126)</sup> A squadron from Corinth held in reserve attacked the units of the Persians' first wave in the flank and rear, and evasion was not possible due to the numerous advancing Persian ships.<sup>127)</sup>

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<sup>122)</sup> See Rees (2018): p. 21–24.

<sup>123)</sup> See Herodot, 8, 68. In the modern world of entertainment, the figure of Artemisia, one of the first female military commanders recorded in our history and who must undoubtedly be seen as similarly important as Zenobia of Palmyra or the Queen of the Iceni, Boudica, has been portrayed completely incorrectly (in a way that is almost a character assassination). According to Herodotus, Xerxes attacked the Greeks against her advice. She also escaped her persecutors by sending a false flag signal and feignedly ramming a Persian ship. The Athenians offered 10,000 drachma for her arrest because they were so furious about a woman who dared to campaign against them. See Herodot, 8, 93.

<sup>124)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 81.

<sup>125)</sup> See Herodot, 8, 79.

<sup>126)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 83.

<sup>127)</sup> See *ibid.*



The battle surged initially, while Xerxes allegedly followed it backwards and forwards on his throne from a nearby hill<sup>128)</sup> in an undecided manner. The Greeks really came under pressure on their right flank.<sup>129)</sup>

However, in the end the Greeks won, probably because they had no other choice. Themistocles must have known that the women and children who had fled to Salamis could not have expected any mercy. At the very least, they would certainly have been made slaves although, contrary to the claims over centuries in philhellenic history, the Persians were no more brutal or repressive than other major powers of their time.<sup>130)</sup> In spite of some difficulties due to their own huge numbers and the waters, gradually almost half of the Persian galleys were able to retreat and withdraw.<sup>131)</sup> Large parts of the Great King's fleet were still intact. Hundreds of triremes from Xerxes' armada, namely the Egyptians, had not (yet) been involved in the battle. However, the Greeks remained the masters of the battlefield.<sup>132)</sup> Their losses were probably high, but they were lower than their enemy's losses.<sup>133)</sup> A further attack from the Persians was feared – particularly because their armed forces had by no means yet been completely defeated – but never happened.<sup>134)</sup>

The Greeks had achieved a tremendous moral success, and this was decisive. As Greek morale rose, Persian morale rapidly declined. Xerxes must have feared that his army's retreat over the Hellespont might be disrupted, which is why he immediately pulled back in the direction of Thessaly with his fleet and the majority of his army. His commander Mardonius was left behind with strong forces. There must be doubts about whether he still believed that victory was an option up until the Battle of Plataea, in which the Persians were finally defeated and expelled from Greece. Even if it was indeed his assignment to break the final resistance of the Greeks on land at Corinth.<sup>135)</sup> At Plataea, almost all poleis from southern and central Greece were united in the field. With 60,000 hoplites and perhaps just as many other armed men and aides, this was the biggest agglomeration of Greek citizen soldiers in the history of the ancient world.<sup>136)</sup> Not even the professional army of Philipp II and his successor Alexander (a century and a half later) came anywhere near these numbers.<sup>137)</sup>

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<sup>128)</sup> See Wiesehöfer (2006): p. 26.

<sup>129)</sup> See Montgomery (2005): p. 62–63.

<sup>130)</sup> Even if in his play "The Persians" Aeschylus moves heaven and earth to convince the audience of the opposite. See Wiesehöfer (2007): p. 12.

<sup>131)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 84.

<sup>132)</sup> See Herzig (2001): p. 28.

<sup>133)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 84.

<sup>134)</sup> See Herodot, 8, 96.

<sup>135)</sup> See Hack (2008): p. 104.

<sup>136)</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>137)</sup> At Chaeronea (338 BC) around 33,000 men, before the Battle of the Granicus (334 BC) approx. 35,000 men. See Fuller (2004): p. 29 and 31.

## The consequences of the battle and the principles of the security dilemma in history

The consequences of the battle, as for any violent encounter in world history, can be divided into short-term, medium-term and long-term consequences. In the short-term, if the result of the Battle of Plataea in the following year is also included, the risk of an annexation of the Greek, European hemisphere into the eastern empire had been averted,<sup>138)</sup> even though the Achaemenid dynasty survived the defeat and the prestige of the Great King Xerxes was not damaged to such an extent that he was forced to relinquish his reign. Initially, the defeat at Salamis didn't have to seem all too catastrophic to him, especially since he responded to the compensation requests from the Spartans sent to him via messenger with courage and good humour.<sup>139)</sup> With the successes at Salamis and Plataea, and with the heroic fight at Thermopylae, Athens and Sparta had finally established themselves as the two major powers in Greece. In the medium term, with its Delian League (Attic maritime league founded in 478 BC), Athens succeeded in establishing a growing centralised tool for enforcing its interests throughout the Aegean and in Asia Minor. However, this "Golden Age" would only last until the death of the great statesman Pericles (429 BC). Pericles was born in the same year as the Battle of Marathon, so he was around ten years old at Salamis.<sup>140)</sup> This clearly shows the short heyday of Athens's power until the defeat in the 27-year struggle with Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC). How quickly the circumstances could change again (and how exhausted even Sparta was at the end in spite of its "victory") can be seen from the fact that, after the fighting between the city states flared up again, the Persian Great King Artaxerxes II summoned the parties to Sardis in 387/386 BC, dictating a "royal peace" to them, in the terms of which the coastal areas of Asia from Halicarnassus to Pergamon also returned to Persia's sphere of influence.<sup>141)</sup>

During the war, the Persian Empire was able to magnificently play the role of an "offshore balancer"<sup>142)</sup> between the two Greek major powers and their respective allies. Sparta's fleet was built with Persian gold,<sup>143)</sup> and this was the only thing that was able to interrupt Athens's supply lines and bring the city, which had been weakened by a serious epidemic and the Sicilian Expedition, to its knees. In the long-term, however, for example in the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, the platoon of Xenophon reinforced the impression established at Salamis and Plataea of the superiority of the Greek hoplite armies over the eastern fighting forces, where they consequently spread fear and dread.<sup>144)</sup>

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<sup>138)</sup> See Rees (2018): p. 37.

<sup>139)</sup> See Herodot, 8, 113–114.

<sup>140)</sup> He was born into the highest circles of the city's aristocracy and was great-nephew of the reformer Cleisthenes. See Plutarch, Pericles, 3.

<sup>141)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 129.

<sup>142)</sup> For the basic principles of the "balancing of last resort", see Mearsheimer (2001): p. 141.

<sup>143)</sup> See Schulz (2018): p. 127.

<sup>144)</sup> See, for example Xenophon, Anabasis, 7, 1.

One way or another, it was the double victory of Salamis and (allegedly on the same day) in the Battle of Himera on Sicily against the Carthaginians, which established the spiritual legacy of the Greeks as the dominant and driving cultural, economic and political power throughout the Mediterranean region. Alexander was to bear this spiritual power until the Battle of the Hydaspes (326), Rome was born out of it and in the second half of its empire even (in the form of Byzantium) entered into a renewed proper symbiosis with it.

Both sides, the Athenians and Persians, were in awe of each other in the late fifth century. The few, but significant, pieces of information about this are found in Herodotus: The explicit concern about the western border of the empire and the unrest in the Ionian areas on the coast were accompanied by the knowledge that the Greeks definitely had about the massive conquests of the Persians which, as described in the introduction, took place over an unbelievably short time. The Athenians also knew about the activities of the dispossessed Tyrant Hippias, who with his followers was holding negotiations with Darius I. and his satraps in exile in Persia.<sup>145)</sup> In an anarchic world of states, in which there are no superior powers that could stipulate binding rules – which sadly remains valid to this day<sup>146)</sup> – rivalling powers can never fully trust each other in spite of all assurances of peacefulness.<sup>147)</sup> Darius was forced to assume, because he could not know the opposite with any certainty, that the Athenians would again incite Asia Minor against him at the next opportunity.

Xerxes must have been even more fearful of this after the defeat at Marathon and after the start of fleet building under Themistocles and Cimon. He was in no way able to rely on the peaceable intentions or on Athens's defensive purposes. Conversely, for the Greeks there was no reason to trust that the small bruise that they had inflicted on the Persian Empire at Marathon would prevent the behemoth from taking revenge in good time. In a world that was much smaller at that time, and well linked via traders and sea routes, the armaments under Xerxes confirmed these negative expectations.<sup>148)</sup> This meant that the Greeks and Persians were in a classic security dilemma.<sup>149)</sup> Their actual intentions (possibly defensive, aimed at stability etc.) played no role. For reasons of state security, both sides had to expect the worst and brace themselves for it. However, the security measures that they adopted strengthened the concerns of their respective opponent. A "competition for security" emerged and got out of control. For example, on the eve of the war between Athens and Sparta, the fear of the

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<sup>145)</sup> See Shepherd (2010): p. 10.

<sup>146)</sup> See Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, in: International Security, Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), p. 10.

<sup>147)</sup> See Mearsheimer (2001): p. 31.

<sup>148)</sup> These negative expectations resulted in fear and dread. Herodotus clarifies this with his description of the reaction of the Attic delegation to the Oracle of Delphi. See Herodotus, 7, 140–141.

<sup>149)</sup> On the concept of the security dilemma, see: John Hertz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, in: World Politics, Vol. 2, no. 2 (1950): p. 171–201.

latter major power clouded its senses; they wanted war because they believed that in peace they would definitely lose.<sup>150)</sup>

## Corriculum Vitae

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<sup>150)</sup> See Thukydides, 1, 23.

## Revisionism at intra-state level: an overview

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Clemens A. Eicher

The development of the contemporary state system that encompasses the entire globe started with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This development was largely accomplished in a conflictual manner because the governments had different ideas about the configuration of the regulatory framework, which today goes far beyond the rules established by the Peace of Westphalia.

As a result, an operating system for the state system has evolved which is subsumed under the term “high politics” and can be specifically divided into the sub-classes military order/structure, power order/structure and political geography/sovereignty geography.

It frequently occurs that individual governments or even coalitions are unhappy with the status quo throughout high politics as a whole or even just in individual areas. These are the conditions under which international revisionism may emerge.

The concept of international revisionism was introduced into academic discourse at the start of the 1990s by Barry Buzan in order to classify or describe political movements aimed at achieving fundamental changes to the state system. This concept can now be applied without loss at the domestic level, where the political class or even counter-elites aim to achieve a fundamental change in the organisation within a state.

This article presents a system of description and analysis that can be used to understand domestic revisionism. As a first step, Buzan’s concept of revisionism will be presented and then the concept of domestic revisionism will be developed. The final section will present the major events that involve the use of force to a greater or lesser extent, and which may result in a fundamental change in a state’s organisation.

### International revisionism

This concept goes back to Barry Buzan<sup>151)</sup> and was introduced into academic discourse to sort and analyse political movements that pursue a fundamental change in the international environment. Before looking into the concept in more detail, it is necessary to provide more information about the object area where such changes in the international environment aim to gain ground. The political areas that are targeted by the political class or even counter-elites are the result of the self-organisation of the state system and can be subsumed under the term “high politics”. “High politics”

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<sup>151)</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, New York 1991, p. 179 et seq.

includes the traditional sub-areas of influence structure/order, military structure/order as well as political geography and sovereignty geography<sup>152)</sup>. As this list shows, within the sub-areas further differentiation needs to be made between the structure and order level.

Structures can be seen as the material facts and possibilities that actually exist. To be more precise, the term 'structure' can be borrowed from structural-functional analysis approaches and transferred to international politics: "Simply speaking, structural-functional analysis consists of nothing more complicated than phrasing empirical questions in one of the following several forms or some combination of them: (1) What observable uniformities (or patterns) can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied? (2) What conditions (empirical states of affairs) resultant from previous operations can be discovered or alleged to exist in the phenomena studied? (3) When process (or action, i.e. changes in the patterns, conditions, or both, depending on one's point of view, are discernible between any two or more points in time) can be discovered (or alleged) to take place in terms of observable uniformities, what resultant conditions can be discovered? The first question asks, 'What structures are involved?' The second asks, 'What functions have resulted (or have been performed?) And the third asks 'What functions take place in terms of (a) given structure(s)?'"<sup>153)</sup>

At the order level, it is possible to fall back on the concept of order from international law without having to accept any losses: "In the doctrine of international law, the notion of the 'international public order' has been used to designate those principles and rules of international law that may be regarded as the fundamental basis of the legal system. Although the term has been used in a wider sense to describe the whole legal framework within which decisions with international effect are taken on the universal, regional and national level (...), it is mostly used in the more restricted sense."<sup>154)</sup> Orders, or international regimes as one specific manifestation, relate to the (even informal) provisions (conventions, standards) that are intended to regulate the conduct of the system members or the handling of certain material assets. The order level has been comprehensively examined by the English School<sup>155)</sup> and by the regime theory<sup>156)</sup> in the area of international politics. The structure level has

<sup>152)</sup> See Clemens A. Eicher, *Große Politik – Herrschaftsgeographie, Militärstruktur und Machtstruktur: Ein Überblick über den Objektbereich*, in: *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 2017, <https://www.oemz-online.at/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=11404165>, accessed on 12/06/2020.

<sup>153)</sup> Marion J. Levy Jr. St., *Structural Functional Analysis*, in: David L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, London, New York, 1972, p. 22.

<sup>154)</sup> Günther Jaenicke, *International Public Order*, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Volume 2, Amsterdam 1995, p. 1348.

<sup>155)</sup> Buzan, *States and Fear*, loc. cit., p. 166 et seq.; Barry Buzan, *From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school*, in: *International Organizations* 47(3)/1993, p. 330 et seq.

<sup>156)</sup> Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes*, London 1983; Robert Keohane, *The Demand for International Regimes*, in: *International Organization* 36(2)/1982, p. 325–355; Andreas Hasenclever/Peter Mayer/Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge 1997; Beth Simons/Lisa Martin, *International Organizations and Institutions*, in: Walter Carlsnaes/Thomas Risse/Beth Simons (Ed.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London 2005, p. 192–211.



already been categorised and discussed in detail by the author<sup>157)</sup>, which is why further statements are not needed here.

Depending on the ambition of the political class or counter-elite targeting a fundamental change in structure or order, we can mark out three varieties. Buzan differentiates between orthodox, radical and revolutionary revisionism<sup>158)</sup>. Orthodox revisionists are aiming to improve their own position in the influence structure or military structure, or to achieve change in the sovereignty geography. The status quo at the order level remains untouched. "The challenges of Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan to the status quo can be seen in this light (...)". Radical revisionists aim to improve their own position in the influence and/or military structure of the sovereignty geography or even a "reform" of the rules of the game, i.e. at the order level. "The best example of radical revisionism can be found in the Group of 77 (...)". In addition to an improvement in their own position in the structures, revolutionary revisionists also aim to achieve a fundamental change in the rules of the game. "The Soviet Union has presented this sort of challenge to the capitalist West since 1970, just as Republican France challenged monarchical Europe more than a century previously."

In the current state system, neo-Islam is the political movement with the greatest revisionist power, because it is present in all three manifestations and primarily on a global level to challenge the political classes. At its core, neo-Islam is revolutionary in nature. In other words, following a takeover of power at local, sub-regional or regional level, in these cases the entire state and political structure is altered according to Islamic, primarily Salafist, ideas of order. As a result of the existence of failing and failed states in the continents of Africa and Asia, Islamic revisionism is finding very fertile ground.

## Domestic revisionism

The concept of revisionism presented can be used without any losses to sort and analyse counter-elites and political classes with a revisionist agenda at state level. At the domestic level, revisionist efforts focus either on the internal regime or the existing sovereignty geography.

The modern concept of a state is honoured wherever individuals form a lasting social community, which is marked out from other similar bodies by territorial, socio-cultural and political features, where functioning decision-making is established, the allocation of values is regulated by a system of standards and the defence against external influences is ensured. Territorial and political bodies of this

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<sup>157)</sup> Clemens A. Eicher, *Große Politik – Herrschaftsgeographie, Militärstruktur und Machtstruktur: Ein Überblick über den Objektbereich*, in ÖMZ 2017, loc. cit.

<sup>158)</sup> Buzan, *States and Fear*, loc. cit., p. 181.

kind have existed since the fourth millennium BC.<sup>159)</sup> The modern state differs from its historical predecessors in that sovereignty – in the sense of institutionalised exercising of power – is inextricably linked with territory and territorial matters.

The relationship between rulers and the ruled can be classified and described throughout history and across cultures using a four-dimensional scope of characteristics. The scope of characteristics comprises the dimensions sovereignty organisation, decision-making organisation, social organisation<sup>160)</sup> and level of implementing the decisions made.<sup>161)</sup>

Sovereignty organisation: In modern states, the exercising of power is institutionalised, i.e. the making, application and interpretation of rules are kept within certain channels by standards and regulations. Exercising power in this sense, i.e. sovereignty, requires organisation. Sovereignty organisation can take on different forms, particularly as the administration of justice is an integral part of the sovereignty. The sovereignty organisation can be monistic or pluralistic. If the sovereignty organisation is monistic in nature, then there is “just one single centre of sovereignty in which all key competencies of sovereignty are gathered together and which is solely able to delegate any such competencies.”<sup>162)</sup> There is no other decision-making centre that has an inhibitive or controlling function in policy-making. If there is only one power centre, then the question arises as to how the internal organisation of this centre is arranged. If the power centre has a singular nature, i.e. one individual person has all the decision-making responsibility, then we talk of a simple power centre. If, on the other hand, several people are involved in the decision-making process within the sole power centre and are dependent on each other, we talk of a complex power centre.<sup>163)</sup>

If there are at least two power centres with mutually inhibiting and controlling competencies, the sovereignty organisation is pluralistic. In this case, a differentiation is made between horizontal and vertical segmentation of the sovereignty organisation. If vertical segmentation is present, the power centres below the central government (federal states, regions or towns and cities) have decision-making competencies and organisational capacities that elude access by the central government. The central government is therefore dependent on the cooperation of the power centres at the subsidiary

<sup>159)</sup> Roy Mellor, *Nation, State and Territory*, London 1989, p. 41 et seq.; Barry Buzan/Richard Little, *The idea of International System. Theory meets History*, in: *International Political Science Review* 15(3)/1994, p. 238 et seq.; Barry Buzan/Richard Little, *International Systems in History*, Oxford 2000, p. 167 et seq.

<sup>160)</sup> This classification was adopted by Manfred Hättich: Manfred Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung* (Lehrbuch der Politikwissenschaft, 3 volumes

<sup>161)</sup> In this case, the implementation of the decisions includes the material that Stephen D. Krasner classified as internal sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. See Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton 1999, p. 11. This dimension is indeed intended to be included in the social organisation dimension for Hättich, but for a cleaner analysis, it makes sense to consider separately the implementation of the decisions made.

<sup>162)</sup> Manfred Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung* (Lehrbuch der Politikwissenschaft, 3 volumes, vol. 2), Mainz 1969, p. 41.

<sup>163)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27 et seq.

level in order to be able to achieve its agenda. Horizontal segmentation corresponds to the traditional division of powers, i.e. the separation between executive, judiciary and legislative.

Finally, there still needs to be clarification of how accessibility to the sovereignty organisation is arranged. This is therefore about the manner in which the positions in the centres of power are distributed. This process is called the power process<sup>164)</sup>. The power process is also institutionalised, and various sovereignty appointment procedures<sup>165)</sup> exist. In principle, involvement in the power process may be possible for all ruled people (this is open access) or it may also be restricted to a certain group, in which it would be referred to as 'closed'.

Where the distribution of positions in the centres of power is governed by the use of violence, there is the anomic form of the power process.

Decision-making organisation: This dimension deals with the way in which binding decisions that affect society as a whole are effected. In the broader sense, the decision-making organisation includes the opinion-forming process outside of the political system and the preparation of binding decisions that affect society as a whole within the political system. Here, the decision-making organisation is limited to the preparation of political decisions within the political system, because this area is decisive. The decision-making organisation is monopolised if "one individual, one group (...) is involved in the preparation of decisions without having to expect or even consider contradiction from other factors."<sup>166)</sup> Alternatively, it may be competitive if "various ideas about the content of the decision come into competition with each other before the decision and compete to influence the decision".<sup>167)</sup>

This involves a social process, which can be split<sup>168)</sup> into politics and policy<sup>169)</sup> in order to specify the nature of this dimension. In terms of politics, this is about the shaping of the power process and here in particular the arrangement of the passive electoral right as well as internal party procedures to occupy the positions in the centres of power. In principle, either all subjects of the sovereignty can enjoy passive and active electoral rights, or the enjoyment of these rights can be withheld from certain parts of the subjects of the sovereignty on the basis of ethnic or religious affiliation or ideological orientation. The shaping of access to the power process oscillates between the two extremes of open and closed.

<sup>164)</sup> See Charles L. Taylor/David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 3rd ed., 2 vols., vol. 2 Political Protest and Government Change, London 1983, p. 81 et seq.

<sup>165)</sup> Manfred Hättich, Theorie der politischen Prozesse (Lehrbuch der Politikwissenschaft, 3 volumes, vol. 3), Mainz 1972, p. 43 et seqq.

<sup>166)</sup> Manfred Hättich, Theorie der politischen Ordnung, loc. cit, vol. 2), p. 41.

<sup>167)</sup> Ibid, p. 41.

<sup>168)</sup> See Zeev Maoz, National Choices and International Processes, Cambridge 1989, Chapter 1.

<sup>169)</sup> See Manfred G. Schmidt, Wörterbuch zur Politik, 3rd revised and updated edition, Stuttgart 2010, p. 601, 604.

The policy dimension here is based on the question of whether different views about the shaping of the future compete, which cannot be equated with the number of parties. For example, various ideas about shaping the future may be present even in a one-party system with a complex internal structure. The decision-making organisation is competitive if at least two different plans for shaping the future are in competition with each other. A competitive decision-making process may occur in combination with a monistic or even pluralistic sovereignty organisation. The combination of monistic sovereignty organisation and competitive decision-making can be found in the post-Stalinist era. A monopolised decision-making organisation, on the other hand, is characterised by the fact that the political elite is united by a common ideological orientation and only one plan for the shaping of the future is circulated within the political system.

Finally, there still needs to be clarification of how accessibility to the sovereignty organisation is arranged. If no group is denied the chance to organise itself politically, access is designed to be open. If certain groups are denied the opportunity for political organisation due to ethnic or religious affiliation or ideological orientation, access is closed.

Social organisation: A social system is not made up of people, but of interactions. In essence, social interaction refers to at least two players mutually orienting their social actions towards each other. A multitude of social interactions that occur in one context constitute a social system. Social interactions are controlled by values, standards and roles<sup>170)</sup>.

The most comprehensive of all societal systems is referred to as the social system. It includes and organises all possible interactions between people, who not only see themselves as a social group but also delimit themselves from other similar structures. Within the social systems, an internal differentiation has taken place in order to deal with the increase in real-world complexity. This is the context in which functional sub-systems for religion, economy, law, education, politics, family life and medical care have emerged. The functional sub-system politics is made up of the totality of all interactions, the purpose of which is to prepare for collectively binding decisions for all functional sub-systems of the social system. In modern societies, collectively binding decisions are transferred into the active forms of law and budget. In this sense, the political system intervenes in the existing functional sub-systems of a social system. In this area, legal scholars and public administration experts differentiate between the breadth and depth of regulation. The breadth of regulation "... can be described as a process in which more and more previously unregulated areas of life become subject to legal regulation".<sup>171)</sup> The depth of regulation "...relates to areas of life that are already legally regulated,

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<sup>170)</sup> Richard Münch, *Theorie sozialer Systeme*, Opladen 1976, p. 39 et seq., 46 et seq.

<sup>171)</sup> Axel Görlitz/Rüdiger Voigt, *Rechtspolitologie. Eine Einführung*, Opladen 1985, p. 119.

which are simply standardised further. With the aim of increasing the accuracy of legal control, certain legal standards or even entire systems of standards are expanded further or governed in more detail. This means that the standardisation becomes increasingly detailed and specific...".<sup>172)</sup>

In order to allow for a description and analysis of a social organisation, a vertical segmentation of the subject area must also be carried out. Based on the structural-functional theory, it is possible to differentiate between the approach levels of social system, functional sub-systems, sub-systems of the functional sub-systems and social interactions. The greater the impact of regulation depth at the individual levels, the closer you get to the process control pole. In this context, we tend to talk either of a limited or of a comprehensive social organisation. In the first case, the depth of regulation is limited and the ruled people are given a certain amount of leeway to shape their own individual lives – a civil society. In the second case, all areas of life of the ruled people are standardised down to small details. If there is comprehensive social organisation, then, according to Hättich, it is possible to differentiate between the variants totality and totalitarianism<sup>173)</sup>. Totality exists when, historically and sociologically, all areas of life are fundamentally "politicised", i.e. the comprehensive social organisation is handed down without being brought into question. Where rulers attempt to establish a comprehensive social order via the use of repression, this is totalitarianism. Both varieties are covered by the model of comprehensive social order.

Finally, there still needs to be clarification of how accessibility to the social organisation is arranged. An open social organisation exists when the existing body of law is applied to all ruled people in the same way. If certain groups of people, such as Jews in Nazi Germany or Kulaks in the Soviet Union, are outside of the valid legality, there is a closed social structure<sup>174)</sup>.

Level of implementing the decisions made: This dimension is intended to supplement the model according to Hättich to include the "new" issue of quasi-states<sup>175)</sup>, i.e. fake states as well as failing and failed states<sup>176)</sup>. If a central government is willing and able to implement generally binding decisions across the entire state territory, the level of implementation is nationwide. If the setting, application and interpretation of rules is limited to one or several parts of the state, i.e. it is not nationwide, we may refer to a partial level of implementation. Intact internal sovereignty<sup>177)</sup> is also associated with control and regulation of unofficial interstate routine operations and inter-societal routine

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<sup>172)</sup> Ibid, p. 120.

<sup>173)</sup> Manfred Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung*, loc. cit, vol. 2), p. 47 et seq.

<sup>174)</sup> Ibid, p. 60 et seq.

<sup>175)</sup> See Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge 1990.

<sup>176)</sup> See William I. Zartman (Ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder 1995.

<sup>177)</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton 1999, p. 11 et seq.

transactions<sup>178)</sup>.<sup>179)</sup> Unofficial interstate operations in the form of espionage, diversion, subversion, infiltration etc. must be prevented or controlled by the state agencies of the target state. Unofficial interstate operations are used exclusively to take advantage of or destabilise a state.

The group of inter-societal transactions is made up of personal communication, mass communication, goods (primary products and industrial products), transactions involving services, personnel and capital, movement of means of transport (land, air, sea and internal waterways traffic), movement of people (travel, tourism, migration), ecological and human biological effects (epidemics, surges in narcotic drugs)<sup>180)</sup> and is referred to as “low politics”. Governing and controlling cross-border inter-societal transactions is therefore of eminent importance for every central government, because even in this area events can indirectly or even directly threaten the security of a state in general or its rulers maintaining their position in the centres of power<sup>181)</sup>.

The implementation of the decisions therefore includes, on an internal level, the claim to power in relation to the ruled people and, on an external level, the defence against unwanted external influences. Since 2005, how well the implementation of the decisions is working in individual cases has been recorded annually by the think tank “Fund for Peace”<sup>182)</sup> and published as the “Fragile State Index” in the renowned journal “Foreign Policy”.

Where the implementation of the decisions made is intact, it can be called into question internally by counter-elites with separatist or irredentist agendas or externally by other governments that make territorial claims to part of the territory of a state. Many societies are pluralistic, i.e. the internal social structure is fragmented.<sup>183)</sup> This usually involves a central/peripheral differentiation or segmented differentiation, which is governed territorially.

In the second case of segmented differentiation, we see communal groups<sup>184)</sup>, i.e. social groups whose very high level of socio-cultural density and insularity delimits them from the political community in which they exist on a territorial and political level. If these groups aim to achieve territorial/political separation from the existing state, maintaining the area of sovereignty is a matter for domestic politics.

<sup>178)</sup> See Klaus Faupel, Memorandum zur Gestaltung der Mitwirkung akademischer und anderer externer Fachleute an der Politikentwicklung im Rahmen des Außenministeriums unpublished document 1983; Klaus Faupel, Internationale Regime als Gegenstände für sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung, in: Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1981–1983, Salzburg 1984, p. 95–105.

<sup>179)</sup> Here Krasner talks of interdependence sovereignty. See Krasner, loc. cit., p. 12.

<sup>180)</sup> Klaus Faupel, Entwicklung als Politikbereich auf der Ebene des zeitgenössischen internationalen Systems, in: Wolfgang Jäger/Hans Otto Mühleisen/Hans-Joachim Veen (Ed.), Republik und Dritte Welt: Festschrift für Dieter Oberndörfer zum 65. Geburtstag, Paderborn, 1994, p. 78; Kurt P. Tudyka, Gesellschaftliche Interessen und auswärtige Beziehungen, Das Röhrenembargo, in: Ernst Otto Czempel (Ed.), Die Anachronistische Souveränität, zum Verhältnis von Innen- und Außenpolitik, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 1/1969, Köln, Opladen, p. 205.

<sup>181)</sup> Similar: Buzan, States and Fear, loc. cit., p. 18 et seq., p. 331 et seq.

<sup>182)</sup> See homepage of Fund for Peace: <https://fundforpeace.org/>, accessed on 14/06/2020.

<sup>183)</sup> See Robert Jackson, Plural Societies New States: A Conceptual Analysis, Berkley 1977, p. 10–20.

<sup>184)</sup> Ibid, p. 10–20.



If the territorial integrity of a state is questioned from the inside, this involves separatism or irredentism.<sup>185)</sup> Separatists aim to separate their own settlement area from an existing state in order to establish their own state. Irredentists also aim to separate their own settlement area from an existing state in order to be absorbed into a neighbouring state that is similar from a socio-cultural perspective.

The territorial scope of the implementation of the decisions made by a central government also varies between two poles. If the monopoly on the use of force extends to the entire state territory, it is possible to speak of nationwide implementation of the decisions made. If the implementation of the decisions is confined to one part of the state territory, there is a limited implementation of the decisions made.

With this, we have gone over the subject matter of domestic revisionism and developed a multi-dimensional scope of characteristics for the analysis of revolutionary elites<sup>186)</sup> and counter-elites<sup>187)</sup>.

The next sub-section is intended to provide a fundamental overview of the possible arrangements of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.

## Types of regime

The internal regime or even the political structure is used here as shorthand for the relationship between rulers and ruled people within a state. The dimensions of the relationship have already been discussed in detail. For practically all purposes, today we are dealing with (a) democracies, (b) semi-democracies and (c) authoritarianism.<sup>188)</sup>

### *Democracies*

Modern democracy is an expansion stage of polycracy<sup>189)</sup> and forms one extreme of the presented outline of the current typology for the classification of the relationship between rulers and ruled people. "In order to establish formal democracy, it was necessary to ensure universally that power structures would not remain monistic, and instead would develop into pluralism. In addition, the decision-making could not remain monopolised anywhere and instead needed to be shaped for competition. In order to create freedom for the individuals, life phases of an individual and social nature needed to be activated in the dimension of political representation that had been withdrawn

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<sup>185)</sup> Martin Griffiths/Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London 2002, p. 168 et seq., 287 et seq.

<sup>186)</sup> See Harold D. Lasswell/Daniel Lerner (Ed.), *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements*, M.I.T. Press 1967, *passim*

<sup>187)</sup> See Clemens Eicher/Robert Moser, *Research Note: Gegenelitäre Machtorganisation: Theoretische Grundlegung und Konzeption*, in ÖMZ 2015, <https://www.oemz-online.at/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=10358608&#sectionId=0>, accessed on 12/06/2020.

<sup>188)</sup> See Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung*, loc. cit., vol. 2.

<sup>189)</sup> Wolfgang Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, 2nd revised and extended edition, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 28.

from political sovereignty and its representative function. Ultimately, if sovereignty needed to be converted into self-sovereignty, it was necessary for closed systems to be converted into open ones by giving all those subject to the sovereignty access to decision-making, the sovereignty structure and political representation, where this access had previously been denied to some of the subjects."<sup>190)</sup>

This is the ideal typical concept of a democratically constituted society. In terms of the internal structure, it is possible to differentiate between different variants. Democratic regimes can be divided into the variants (a) parliamentary regimes, (b) parliamentary-presidential regimes, (c) presidential-parliamentary regimes and (d) presidential regimes<sup>191)</sup>.

### *Semi-democracy*

Semi-democracies,<sup>192)</sup> also referred to as hybrid regimes, are characterised by a combination of democratic and autocratic elements. Wolfgang Merkel describes this type of regime as defective democracy and presents a typology of four variants of defective democracy. Merkel uses a similar scope of characteristics as Manfred Hättich for this purpose, however Merkel's scope of characteristics has been developed for the description and analysis of defective democracies, while Hättich's typology is arranged in a transtypological or transpyloric and historical manner, and therefore Merkel's description and analysis system merges into that of Hättich. Wolfgang Merkel differentiates between four variants of defective democracy:<sup>193)</sup>

- Exclusive democracy: This sub-type differs from the pure form of liberal democracy in the limitation of the passive electoral right and the accessibility of the decision-making organisation.
- Enclave democracy: This sub-type differs from the pure form of liberal democracy in that either a certain area has eluded the state monopoly on the use of force or there are territorial limits on the implementation of the decisions made.
- Illiberal democracy: This sub-type differs from the pure form of liberal democracy in that the limitation of the accessibility of the decision-making organisation.

<sup>190)</sup> Klaus Faupel, Die Wertkomponente in den Denkschulen der Disziplin Internationale Politik, in: Gerhard Zecha (Ed.), Werte in den Wissenschaften: 100 Jahre nach Max Weber, Tübingen 2006, p. 221. Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung, Opladen 1999, p. 26 et seqq.

<sup>191)</sup> See Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation, loc. cit., p. 367–384.

<sup>192)</sup> See Wolfgang Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies: Where Does Israel Stand? In: Tamar S. Hermann (Ed.); By the People, For the People, Without the People? The Emergence of (Anti)Political Sentiment in Western Democracies and Israel, Jerusalem 2012, p. 185–225. On the empirical examples: Wolfgang Merkel/Hans-Jürgen Puhle/Aurel Croissant/Peter Thierry, Defekte Demokratie, volume 2: Regionalanalysen, Wiesbaden 2006 passim, in particular p. 16.

<sup>193)</sup> See Wolfgang Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, loc. cit., p. 49 et seq.

- Delegative democracy: This sub-type differs from the pure form of liberal democracy through the sovereignty being organised in a monistic manner and the absence of a horizontal division of powers.

### *Autocracy*

Modern autocracies and their totalitarian expansion stage are the counter-model to the modern democracy. In academic and non-academic discourse, this type is also referred to as a monocracy, dictatorship, military regime or undemocratic regime. We have decided to use the term autocracy because this term carries a certain amount of grandeur and has a significant signalling effect. An autocracy in its pure form is characterised by monism in the sovereignty structure and decision-making organisation and a limited social organisation.<sup>194)</sup> Accessibility to the dimensions may vary between open and closed.<sup>195)</sup> We are dealing specifically with the following combinations:

Total autocracies<sup>196)</sup> form an expansion stage of simple autocratism. Total autocracies differ from simple autocracies in the extent to which the political sub-system intrudes on all other functional sub-systems of the social system. All functional sub-systems are standardised in detail, meaning that there is no leeway for an individual to shape their own life – this involves process control. Here, accessibility to the dimensions has a closed structure.

The fact that the concept of total social organisations used here also includes the totalitarian variant and pre-modern regimes<sup>197)</sup> has already been explained elsewhere. Total autocracies in the pure form can still be found today in North Korea and Iran. The existence of total autocracies is an indication that the world is a living museum.<sup>198)</sup>

### Major events

Wherever revisionist forces appear, they challenge the ruling political elite or even the entire political class in a state by calling into question the status quo in terms of the arrangement of the internal regime or the sovereignty geography. This usually happens in a conflictual manner and with at least the threat of force or even the use of some degree of physical force.

Among the major events involving some degree of force that result in a change to the status quo, we must include collective protest. Collective protest may be in the form of protest demonstration, unrest

<sup>194)</sup> See Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung*, loc. cit., vol. 2, p. 62; Wolfgang Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, p. 40 et seq.

<sup>195)</sup> See Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung*, loc. cit., vol. 2, p. 62.

<sup>196)</sup> See Hättich, *Theorie der politischen Ordnung*, loc. cit., vol. 2, p. 61; Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, p. 48 et seq.

<sup>197)</sup> See Gabriel Almond/G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Little, Brown 1966, p. 213 et seq., 299 et seq.

<sup>198)</sup> On this matter, see: Yale H. Ferguson/Richard W. Mansbach, *Politics: Authority, Identities, and Change*, University of South Carolina, 1996 p. 57.

or insurrection. Protest demonstrations may be spontaneous or organised, whereby spontaneous outbreaks of violence and organised use of force may occur. Unrest may be spontaneous or organised, whereby the level of force used varies. Insurrections are organised centrally and the level of force used is very high, meaning that there is usually a high number of victims. Collective protest either needs to spread to a nationwide dimension or must go out on a limb in a strategic manner, i.e. usually in the major cities, in order to effect a desired change to the status quo. Whether or not collective protest is successful in terms of changing the status quo mainly depends on the conduct of the security forces. The attempt can only be successful if the security forces adopt a neutral position or actively support the revisionist side.<sup>199)</sup> In terms of scope, there is no classification for the major event of collective protest. It seems sensible to differentiate the variants as follows: orthodox mass protest, radical mass protest and revolutionary mass protest.<sup>200)</sup> Orthodox mass protest aims to change the political personnel in the centres of power. Radical mass protest also aims to achieve a fundamental change in the internal regime. Revolutionary mass protest goes further and aims to change further functional sub-systems of the social system.

By way of example, reference is made here to the unrest in the former satellite states of the Soviet Union in 1990/91 and to the events in the Middle East in 2010/11. To date, the so-called “Arab Spring” has been impressive proof that major events of this kind, if they produce a positive outcome, can prepare the ground for the proliferation of failing/failed states.

The next sub-class of major event is a coup d'état. In contrast to collective protest, a coup is an “elite project”, whereby a faction of the political class and/or the security establishment is not satisfied with the status quo. “... coup d'état as political technique are that: (a) it is the effort by a political coalition illegally to replace the existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of violence; (b) the violence employed is usually small; (c) the number of people involved is small; (d) the participants already possess institutional bases of power within the political systems. Clearly a coup can succeed only (a) if the total number of participants in the political system is small, or (b) if the number of participants is large and a substantial proportion of them endorse the coup [the latter condition is rarely met].”<sup>201)</sup> Military coups are very common<sup>202)</sup> because this major event takes place in internal regimes with an autocratic or hybrid structure and under these framework conditions the reigning

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<sup>199)</sup> On this viewpoint: Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, crises, and revolutions: (Routledge Revivals): Theories and Research*, New York 2011, p. 315 et seq.

<sup>200)</sup> This classification is based on Buzan's typology of revisionist endeavours. See Buzan: *People, States and Fear*, p. 179 et seqq.

<sup>201)</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Political order in changing societies*, New Haven 1968, p. 218.

<sup>202)</sup> See R.D. McKinley et. al. in: Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, crises, and revolutions: (Routledge Revivals): Theories and Research*, New York 2011, p. 241.

political elite remaining in the centres of power or even the existence of the political class depends on the support of decision-makers in the security establishment.<sup>203)</sup>

In a similar way to Buzan's variants of revisionism, Raymond Tanter/Manus Midlarsky<sup>204)</sup> present a classification of coups according to the scope of the objective of the revisionist challengers. Here, Tanter/Midlarsky differentiate between palace rebellion, reforming coup and revolutionary coup. A palace rebellion happens when there is no mass involvement, the process is short, there is almost no use of force and there is just a change in personnel in the centres of power. A reforming coup differs from a palace rebellion in that parts of the internal regime are changed in addition to replacing the ruling elite. In contrast to the first two sub-types, revolutionary coups are characterised by mass involvement and the use of a low level of force. They are of moderate duration and, in addition to replacing the personnel in power, they also intend to achieve a fundamental change in the internal regime and possibly other functional sub-systems<sup>205)</sup> of the social system<sup>206)</sup>.

I thereby come to the next, most extensive and most violent sub-class of major events in the form of military conflicts. Military conflicts or wars are recorded by various research institutions with similar emphases.<sup>207)</sup> The Correlates of War Project (COW), which was initiated by J. David Singer in 1963 at the University of Michigan and is now being continued as COW 2 at the State University of Pennsylvania, probably enjoys the best reputation in the academic community. A war is defined as a violent, organised conflict causing at least 1,000 deaths. In order to classify the recorded datasets, originally two main classes and several sub-classes of war were formed. This typology was reformed under COW 2 and currently consists of three main classes and several sub-classes.

For our purposes, the only main and sub-classes that are relevant are those that may result in a change in the internal regime or the sovereignty geography.

The first main relevant class that must be mentioned is international war, primarily in the variant of interstate war.

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<sup>203)</sup> Similar: Katherine Chorley in: Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, crises, and revolutions: (Routledge Revivals): Theories and Research*, New York 2011, p. 315 et seq.

<sup>204)</sup> Typology according to Raymond Tanter/Manus Midlarsky reproduced in: Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, crises, and revolutions*, p. 303.

<sup>205)</sup> Luhmann, *Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat*, Osgo 2011, p. 17.

<sup>206)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207)</sup> Correlates of War Project (University of Michigan), Uppsala Conflict Data Project (University of Uppsala), Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung [Working group for researching the causes of war] (University of Hamburg), Heidelberger Institut für internationale Konfliktforschung [Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research] (University of Heidelberg), State Failure Task Force (Center for Systemic Peace).

An interstate war is characterised by the fact that the fighting forces of two recognised members of the state system engage in an ongoing conflict that results in at least 1,000 deaths due to the conflict per year.<sup>208)</sup>

A further main class are extra-state wars. An extra-state war is characterised by a recognised member of the state system conducting an ongoing conflict outside of its border against a counter-elite power organisation, resulting in at least 1,000 deaths due to the conflict per year.<sup>209)</sup> This main class is divided into the two sub-classes: colonial war and imperial war.<sup>210)</sup>

A colonial war is characterised by a recognised member of the state system conducting an ongoing conflict against a counter-elite power organisation, which supports the independence of a particular territorial area in the form of a colony, a protectorate or a mandated territory, which is outside the recognised borders of a state but is under the control of the same state.

Imperial wars are characterised by a recognised member of the global state system conducting an ongoing conflict outside of its borders against a counter-elite power organisation or paracriminal organisation that is based within a failed or failing state and operates from there within or across state borders. Entities of this kind maintain a paramilitary arm, which is capable of conducting an ongoing conflict.

A by-product of the imperial-colonial terminology is that it covers the fact that extra-state wars can also be conducted against non-territorially identified entities, e.g. against pirates, an international terrorist organisation or the private army of a multinational corporation. The non-state entities must have organised armed forces that are capable of conducting an ongoing conflict. Entities of this kind are often referred to as non-state armed groups (NSA).

The next main class is domestic wars. A domestic war is characterised by the fact that lasting conflicts occur within the territorial borders of a recognised member of the state system, and these conflicts result in at least 1,000 deaths due to conflict per year.<sup>211)</sup> This main class can be subdivided into the sub-classes civil war and regional war. Only civil war is relevant for our purposes, which is why the statements below are limited to this sub-class. A civil war is characterised by the fact that the central government of a recognised member of the state system is engaged in an ongoing conflict against a counter-elite power organisation within its own recognised territorial borders.<sup>212)</sup> Within the civil war

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<sup>208)</sup> Meredith R. Sarkees/Frank W. Wayman, *Resort to War 1816–2007*, Washington 2010, p. 61 et seq.

<sup>209)</sup> Ibid, p.63.

<sup>210)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211)</sup> Ibid, p. 64.

<sup>212)</sup> Ibid.

sub-class, it is possible to differentiate between the further sub-classes anti-regime war and territorial power war<sup>213)</sup>. In the case of an anti-regime war<sup>214)</sup>, the counter-elite power organisation is at least aiming to achieve the downfall of the political class. In the case of territorial power wars, a counter-elite power organisation is aiming to override the claim to power of the central government for a certain integral part of the state in order to establish their own state (separatism) or to be absorbed into another different state that is similar from a socio-cultural perspective (irredentism).<sup>215)</sup>

In a similar way to Buzan's variants of revisionism, James Rosenau presents a classification of domestic wars according to the scope of the objective on the part of the revisionist challengers. Here, Rosenau differentiates between personnel war, authority war and structural war. In personnel wars, the conflict is simply about the filling of positions in the centres of power. Authority wars differ from personnel wars in that parts of the internal regime are changed in addition to replacing the ruling elite. Structural wars differ from authority wars in that, in addition to replacing the ruling personnel, there is also an intention to bring about a fundamental change in the internal regime and possibly other functional sub-systems of the social systems.<sup>216)</sup>

A revisionist change in the positions of personnel in the centres of power, the internal regime and the social organisation at domestic level can come about in at least, and probably in no more than, three different ways: via collective protest, coup and civil war.

## Corriculum Vitae

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<sup>213)</sup> This sub-class has been formed by the author in order to subsume all civil wars that are not in the anti-regime war sub-class. As a rule, this concerns a fundamental change in the sovereignty geography within a state – irredentism or separatism.

<sup>214)</sup> This terminology has been adopted by Gantzel: Klaus Jürgen Gantzel/Torsten Schwinhammer, *Warfare since the Second World War*, London 2000, p. 20 et seq.

<sup>215)</sup> Sarkees/Wayman, *Resort to War 1816-2007*, p.67.

<sup>216)</sup> James N. Rosenau, *Internal War as an International Event*, in: James N. Rosenau (Ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, New Jersey 1964, p. 63 et seqq.



## The maritime components in the armed forces of Latin America...

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### ...using the example of Brazil, Columbia and Mexico

Herminio S. de la Barquera A.

The sub-continent of Latin America is indeed a long way from Europe, but it is becoming increasingly important in view of its economy and political significance. In terms of the maritime component of the armed forces of Latin America, this text will present and explain the navies of Brazil, Columbia and Mexico as perfect examples of an evolving blue-, brown- and green-water navy, respectively. The corresponding political and strategic context will also be included.

### Introduction

The claim made by Themistocles 2,500 years ago still rings true: "He who commands the sea has command of everything". In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, controlling the oceans is perhaps more important than ever before. Coastal areas and oceans are important lifelines for the modern population, not only due to the increasing importance of trade, but also because of the huge supply of various ocean resources. This also applies for Latin America. After all, it has been determined that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be the century of Asia and the emerging countries, and also that it will be a "maritime century".<sup>217)</sup> It could therefore be assumed that, with increasing foreign trade, the region of Latin America will also experience a change in the significance of maritime connections, maritime navigation and its own maritime logistics. In addition, safeguarding resources on the seabed and the maritime components of armed forces will definitely be very important.

In contrast to certain regions of Asia, such as the sea area between China, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, which is characterised by a huge conflict potential, there is actually no noteworthy supposition of a conflict between the various states in Latin America.<sup>218),219)</sup> Furthermore, no single country in the region is involved in any conflict on the world stage. The countries in this region should therefore not feel forced to upgrade their naval forces in order to match up to other states. In this context, the disputes in Latin America do not take place explicitly between different states, but instead rather between states and asymmetric opponents such as guerrilla movements or organised crime groups (smuggling rings of all kinds, illegal weapons trading, piracy, drugs and human trafficking, etc.). Nonetheless, many of these activities still represent a great challenge for the security authorities of

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<sup>217)</sup> Mark Baumert (2014): "Das 21. Jahrhundert ist maritim", in: "Meer Verstehen", Blog of the Deutsches Maritimes Institut (DMI) e.V. on maritime matters, 20/03/2014, in: <https://meerverstehen.net/2014/03/20/das-21-jahrhundert-ist-maritim-teil-iii-einer-aufsatzserie/>

<sup>218)</sup> Sascha Albrecht (2011): Seemacht Brasilien? Maritime Ambitionen einer aufstrebenden Macht im Südatlantik. SPW Study. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, September 2011, Berlin.

<sup>219)</sup> Arturo C. Sotomayor (2017): "Las fuerzas armadas de Latinoamérica", in: "Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica", Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2017, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, in: <http://revistafal.com/las-fuerzas-armadas-de-latinoamerica/>

the Latin American countries, as well as for the naval forces. In contrast to western navies, which are suffering from chronic cuts in the state budget and are therefore attempting to develop strong cooperation and division of tasks, the navies of Latin America are being expanded and modernised at national level.<sup>220)</sup>

When looking at the history of Latin America, one can see that during the colonial era two different routes were embarked upon: one in the countries ruled by Spain, and the other in Brazil, which was occupied by Portugal. In the first case, economic exploitation primarily took place inland. In addition, trade was even prohibited between some Spanish colonies, such as between New Spain (modern-day Mexico) and Peru. This meant that there was hardly any maritime development.<sup>221)</sup> There was therefore no incentive to build large ships and port facilities, to set about exploiting maritime resources or to explore sea routes. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Spain preferred to exploit the land and did not invest much in harbours and sea trading, meaning that its rivals France, Portugal, Great Britain and the Netherlands were able to expand their advantage.<sup>222)</sup> According to Dallanegra, this historical disinterest in the sea may partially explain why Brazil is now a maritime nation, while almost all other countries in Latin America still show insufficient interest in maritime development.

This situation is not only reflected in the maritime infrastructure of our time (harbours, shipbuilding, trading fleets, etc.), but also in the importance of the navy for the respective country. Hence why Cuervo and Moloeznik<sup>223)</sup>, when comparing the navies of Latin America, have been able to determine that Brazil is always in one of the top spots, for example in terms of fire power. Brazil is in third place out of the navies of Latin America; Columbia comes in seventh and Mexico is ninth. The Brazilian Navy is also able to prevent the use of its national waters by a foreign navy, and if necessary to risk combat in the exclusive economic zone. In contrast to this, Columbia and Mexico do not have these capabilities because their naval forces are more suitable for police surveillance.<sup>224)</sup>

In addition, Brazil can use its navy to protect around 70% of its maritime resources against law-breakers, while Columbia can protect around 100% and Mexico 62.9%. If faced with an attack from a foreign state, Brazil and Columbia can defend 50% of their maritime resources, while Mexico could only protect 10%.<sup>225)</sup>

<sup>220)</sup> Baumert, Das 21. Jahrhundert ist maritim, loc. cit.; also Toshi Yoshihara/James R. Holmes (2011): Der rote Stern über dem Pazifik. Chinas Aufstieg als Seemacht – und wie antworten die USA, E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn.

<sup>221)</sup> Érick Daniel Lino Reynoso (2018): El poder naval: ejemplos representativos en la historia. Una mirada al caso mexicano, thesis in history, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, Toluca, p. 51., also Luis Dallanegra (2013): "Talasopolítica: El aislacionismo marítimo de América Latina", talk in September 2013, Mexico City, in: <http://www.amersur.org/PolInt/Talasopolitica-Dallanegra.pdf>, p. 3.

<sup>222)</sup> Lino Reynoso, loc. cit., p. 52.

<sup>223)</sup> Noé Cuervo Vázquez/Marcos Pablo Moloeznik (2017): "Hacia una medición del poder naval en América Latina", in: Anuario Latinoamericano Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, Vol. 5, p. 306–307.

<sup>224)</sup> Ibid, p. 309.

<sup>225)</sup> Ibid, p. 309–311.

We will now present the three navies (Brazil, Columbia and Mexico) using the “paradigms of the navy in Latin America” (“Paradigmas de las Armadas en Latinoamérica”) developed by Moloeznik<sup>226)</sup>.

Fundamentally, there are two paradigms – Brazil and Columbia – and Mexico lies between them. Brazil is on the way to having a blue-water navy, while Columbia is an example of a brown-water navy. Mexico has a green-water navy. All three navies have an oversized marine corps, which is typical in Latin America. While in England, for example, 10% of navy personnel serve in the marines, in Latin America the average is 40%.<sup>227)</sup>

A navy of the first category (blue-water navy) is capable of operating on the high seas. Its ships can operate for a long time far away from the coast and are suitable for defence against hazards from below, on and above the surface of the water. Aircraft carriers are indispensable for this purpose. A blue-water navy also has capabilities to undertake regular, extensive patrolling carried out in formation. For its part, a brown-water navy is only able to carry out operations in coastal regions, while a green-water navy can operate on the open sea near to its coastal regions.

Between 2006 and 2016, the average proportion of the national budgets allocated to defence in Latin America was 3.7%, i.e. 1.3% of gross domestic product, whereas Brazil allocated 12% of its budget to defence, which corresponded to 5% of its GDP.<sup>228)</sup>

In 2018, Brazil spent 1.5% of GDP (3.9% of the national budget) on defence, Columbia spent 3.2% of GDP (11.6% of the total budget) and Mexico spent 0.53% of GDP (2.1% of the budget).<sup>229)</sup>

## Brazil

The Brazilian Army has 214,941 soldiers, while the navy and air force have 85,605 and 66,068 personnel respectively. As a whole, the armed forces therefore have 366,614 soldiers.<sup>230)</sup> Brazil's defence budget is the largest in Latin America, and in 2016, it amounted to USD 19,978,247,480. However, in 2020 Brazil's defence budget is at its lowest since 2005 at around USD 13,961,605,584.64.<sup>231)</sup>

The political, military and economic significance of Brazil in the regional and global context has considerably increased in recent decades. This phenomenon has also led to the armed forces gaining

<sup>226)</sup> Marcos Pablo Moloeznik (2015): “Perspectiva marítima sobre la seguridad nacional frente a la amenaza del crimen organizado transnacional”, in: CESLA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 18, University of Warsaw, p. 351–360.

<sup>227)</sup> Marcos Pablo Moloeznik (2011): “La Armada de México frente a sus pares de América Latina”, in: Revista del CESLA, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw, p. 39–71, p. 66.

<sup>228)</sup> Marcela Donadio/Samanta Kussrow, (Ed.) (2016): Atlas comparativo de la defensa en América Latina y Caribe, Edición 2016, Resdal (“Red de seguridad y defensa de América Latina”), Buenos Aires, in: <https://www.resdal.org/assets/atlas-2016-esp-completo.pdf>, p. 38–39, 124

<sup>229)</sup> Banco Mundial (2019): “Gasto militar. Datos”, in: <https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>

<sup>230)</sup> Donadio/Kussrow, loc. cit., p. 124.

<sup>231)</sup> Barros, Anderson (2019): “Recortes presupuestarios de defensa en Brasil afectan proyectos estratégicos”, in: “Zona Militar”, 23/09/2019, [https://www.zona-militar.com/2019/09/23/\\_trashed-2\\_\\_trashed/](https://www.zona-militar.com/2019/09/23/_trashed-2__trashed/)

importance for the country's very active foreign policy. Brazil views the southern Atlantic up to the coast of western Africa and the Antarctic as its area of interest and therefore does not appreciate the presence of other armed forces in the region. The major procurement plan for the Brazilian Navy could therefore serve "to form a power-political counter-pole to NATO and western powers".<sup>232)</sup>

Brazil works very closely with some West African countries and South Africa; at the same time, the construction of a research station in the Antarctic is being driven forward. This South Pole base on King George Island was first set up in 1984, but was almost completely destroyed by an explosion and fire in 2012. Brazil put the newly constructed "Comandante Ferraz" research station back into operation in January 2020. The base is not just a location of scientific research; it also offers the Brazilian Navy the opportunity to demonstrate its presence in the Antarctic, just as the neighbouring countries of Uruguay, Chile and Argentina do. Brazil has therefore declared the area in which the research station is located as an "interest zone", without making any formal territorial claims. Brazil and Uruguay differ from Argentina and Chile in this respect.

In 2008, Brazil signed an armaments treaty with France, in which both countries agreed, among other things, to join forces to build conventional and nuclear-powered submarines. Shortly afterwards, the Brazilian Defence Ministry announced a new procurement plan for the navy, which envisages increasing the number of warships by almost double by 2030. This all constitutes a big step for the navy, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.<sup>233)</sup>

The prestigious nuclear submarine project is actually very old. It originates from the time of the military dictatorships in the 1970s, but it was revitalised by the government of Michel Temer. In December 2018, the first conventional submarine "Riachuelo" was launched, and three more are planned by 2022 ("Humaitá", 2020, "Tonelero", 2021 and "Angostura", 2022). It is planned that they will be followed by a nuclear-powered submarine ("Alvaro Alberto") in 2029. The entire construction project is intended to amount to USD 9.5 billion (ENULA 2019) and is an important part of an extensive modernisation plan for the navy, which envisages driving forward the construction of warships of various kinds (aircraft carriers, submarines, corvettes, frigates, dock landing ships, patrol boats, etc.), naval bases and shipyards, as well as the modernisation of ships, weapons systems, sensors and naval facilities in Brazil. It is anticipated that this programme's objectives will be achieved by no later than 2047.<sup>234)</sup>

The nuclear-powered submarines are very important for Brazil, not only due to their undisputed military significance, but also because they are items of prestige and are very important from a (foreign

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<sup>232)</sup> Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 5–6.

<sup>233)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234)</sup> Ibid, p. 10.; also Vanderlei Almeida (2013): "Brasil inicia la construcción de 46 naves de guerra, entre ellas un submarino nuclear", in: "RT", 14/12/2013, <https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/114187-brasil-armada-modernizacion-submarino-nuclear>

policy) political perspective. The aim of operating with up to two aircraft carriers in the future would allow Brazil to mobilise aircraft carrier formations around the world. The country is undoubtedly aiming to use the aircraft carriers, submarines and amphibious forces to become a naval power. After all, these are the very symbols of a naval power: aircraft carriers, submarines and amphibious forces. The huge combative strength of the future fleet will give the Brazilian government many courses of action, which will reflect the country's regional and global power position, although it remains to be seen how the government could or might want to use this position.<sup>235)</sup>

The development of the Brazilian naval forces is very important for the country's foreign policy, as we have already seen. The most important foreign policy objectives are, firstly, to secure Brazil as a leading power – not only in South America, but throughout Latin America – and, secondly, to ascend to become an international power that matches the Brazilian self-image.<sup>236)</sup>

The official reasons for the huge armament plans of the Brazilian Navy are a lack of sovereignty in the Amazon region and in the exclusive economic zone. In addition, the navy is not able to fully monitor and control the roughly 7,500 km-long coastline, as we have already seen. The security of the rich resources on the continental shelf (known as the "blue Amazon") is another argument for the naval armament plans, in order to be able to protect the oil platforms against terrorist attacks and the natural resources against illegal overexploitation.<sup>237)</sup> Obviously, one could ask whether aircraft carriers, submarines and large amphibious forces are absolutely necessary for these purposes. It must also be considered, as already explained above, that in Latin America there is no supposition of war between states.

The project to build a large naval base in the north-east of Brazil is very advantageous from a strategic perspective. This is because a second fleet will be stationed there, not far from the mouth of the Amazon and the access to the South Atlantic. This fleet is intended to have the capabilities to ensure the power projection from sea to land.<sup>238)</sup>

The "Amazônia azul"<sup>239)</sup> idea created by the navy aims, among other things, to raise awareness among the population of Brazil's dependence on the sea and also of the need to protect this area.<sup>240)</sup> This massive maritime area covers around 5.7 million km<sup>2</sup> of major natural resources and has been

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<sup>235)</sup> Vanderlei, loc. cit., p. 13

<sup>236)</sup> Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 24.

Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 17–18.

<sup>238)</sup> Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 11.

<sup>239)</sup> Marinha do Brasil (2019): Bem-vindo à "Amazônia azul", in: [https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia\\_azul/](https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia_azul/), Centro de Comunicação Social da Marinha.

<sup>240)</sup> Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 21.

monitored by the Brazilian Navy since 2014.<sup>241)</sup> To some extent, therefore, the large-scale modernisation plans for the navy can be understood as a response to this difficult surveillance work, but also because the navy in Brazil is considered by many stakeholders to be a maritime power of the country's foreign policy, meaning that numerous representatives from politics, the economy and the armed forces form a kind of "maritime interest coalition".<sup>242)</sup> It may therefore be the case that it is not always the optimum types of ship that are built and selected, but also prestigious programmes that are not always the best solution – such as the nuclear-powered submarines. It is also important that the significance of the South Atlantic is discussed in political, academic, scientific, economic and military areas. However, the decision in favour of nuclear-powered submarines is usually not called into question, for reasons including that, for some high-ranking politicians, there is a connection between owning aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines and the aim to achieve a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.<sup>243)</sup>

Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that defence is particularly important in Brazil. It makes up around 4% of GDP, enjoys the patronage of politics and the economy and for some years has been undergoing a process of modernising armaments and facilities.<sup>244)</sup> The particular significance of the navy can be seen from the budget: In the state budget for 2018, for example, 46.4% of the defence budget went to the navy, 39.4% to the air force and just 14.3% to the army.<sup>245)</sup>

According to Moloeznik, the Marinha do Brasil forms the first "paradigm" of Latin American navies because Brazil is a very important regional power, not just in terms of its armed forces but also due to its economic development. The strategic and tactical objectives of the navy are:<sup>246)</sup>

- The navy must have the necessary resources to prevent a foreign navy accessing the national waters, to control Brazil's various maritime zones and to allow for power projection.
- The modernisation of the naval forces must be driven forward.
- In order to achieve the first objective mentioned above, Brazil needs an appropriate submarine force with conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.

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<sup>241)</sup> Marinha do Brasil (2019): Bem-vindo à "Amazônia azul", in: [https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia\\_azul/](https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia_azul/), Centro de Comunicação Social da Marinha.

<sup>242)</sup> Albrecht, Seemacht Brasilien, loc. cit., p. 21.

<sup>243)</sup> Ibid, p. 24–26.

<sup>244)</sup> Francesco Cenerino (2019): Defensa y seguridad en Brasil, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Gobierno de España, p. 1.

<sup>245)</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>246)</sup> Marcos Pablo Moloeznik (2015): "Perspectiva marítima sobre la seguridad nacional frente a la amenaza del crimen organizado transnacional", in: CESLA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 18, University of Warsaw, p. 351–353.

- The consolidation of the marines as an expeditionary force.
- The navy must have large ocean-going ships as soon as possible, particularly multi-purpose units that can be used as floating airfields. The rivers and coastline must still be patrolled and protected.

The Brazilian Navy therefore intends to become a blue-water navy with capabilities for power projection on the high seas. It is therefore possible to understand the major construction plans of the navy, which include submarines and aircraft carriers. From this perspective, it is also possible to understand the recent acquisition of the English-built amphibious assault ship “HMS Ocean” (now “PHM Atlântico”). However, this intention on the part of Brazil to be able to project its naval power even on the high seas does not disregard the contiguous zone, the internal waterways and the exclusive economic zone.

## Columbia

The Colombian Army has 230,537 soldiers, while its navy and air force have 30,917 and 13,596 personnel respectively. As a whole, the armed forces therefore have 275,050 soldiers<sup>247)</sup>. In 2020, Columbia’s defence budget amounted to USD 9,032,224,609, around 6.3% more than in the previous year. This budget includes expenses for the national police force amounting to USD 3,932,873.75.<sup>248)</sup>

The Colombian Navy sees itself as an essential part of foreign policy and a tool for international cooperation. In fact, the navy has developed its own international strategy based on three pillars: international cooperation, the transfer of skills (fighting against organised crime, shipbuilding, scientific research of the seas, etc.) and reinforcing the security of the borders and natural resources.<sup>249)</sup>

The “Strategic Plan for the Navy 2011–2014” (“Plan Estratégico Naval”) also stipulated that the navy needed to seek out cooperation with other naval forces in order to achieve greater interaction with the international community. This cooperation does not necessarily need to be of a military nature; it can also take place as part of humanitarian aid.<sup>250)</sup>

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<sup>247)</sup> Donadio/Kussrow, *Atlas comparativo*, loc. cit, p.42

<sup>248)</sup> Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia (2020): “Presupuesto General de la Nación, Presupuesto Sector Defensa, Vigencia 2020”, in: [https://www.justiciamilitar.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Sobre\\_el\\_Ministerio/Planeacion/Presupuesto/Presupuesto\\_2020.pdf](https://www.justiciamilitar.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/Planeacion/Presupuesto/Presupuesto_2020.pdf)

<sup>249)</sup> Sergio Alberto Oliveros Calderón (2013): *El poder naval y la asistencia humanitaria como mecanismo de inserción internacional de Colombia*, thesis in international relations, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales, Santa Fe de Bogotá, p. 43–44.

<sup>250)</sup> *Ibid*, p. 69–70.



The “Strategic Plan for the Navy 2015–2018” talks of five areas of naval tasks and roles: international role, defence and national security, security of the natural resources in the ocean and in rivers, environmental protection and maritime and river security. This document also views the navy as “a foreign policy tool for the national government”. Therefore, involvement in multinational operations of a humanitarian nature or as part of UN measures is an important objective for the navy. In this way, Columbia would achieve more important interaction with other countries, which would bring with it greater strategic significance at regional and international level. The Colombian Navy could therefore be seen as a medium-sized naval force with regional significance. And this is precisely the objective for 2030: “Una armada mediana de proyección regional”.<sup>251)</sup>

Columbia’s attempt to become a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty is a big challenge for Columbia and for the navy, but also a favourable opportunity to play an important international role. The country’s maritime authorities (such as the “Dirección General Marítima” and the navy itself) view the Antarctic as very significant in terms of politics, science (particularly climate research) and international relations. Since 1989, Columbia has been a signatory that does not have voting rights at the consultative meetings. In order to become a consultative member, Columbia must carry out extensive scientific research, send out scientific expeditions and set up a scientific station in the Antarctic. This is also a good opportunity for the navy, because sending out expedition ships will allow Columbia to extend its influence beyond its regional area and to exercise the defence of its maritime interests.<sup>252)</sup>

Since 2014/2015, the “Dirección General Marítima” and the navy have already carried out four Antarctic expeditions in cooperation with various scientific institutions in Columbia.

Other international matters in which the Colombian Navy has been deployed include “Operation Atalanta” (2008) and “Ocean Shield” (2009). This shows the operational strategic intentions – not only of the Colombian Navy, but also of the three branches of the armed forces – to cooperate in solving international asymmetric conflicts.

The idea of a medium-sized navy with regional scope is based on three elements:<sup>253)</sup>

- knowledge and use of national waters;

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<sup>251)</sup> Armada República de Colombia (ARC) (2015): Plan Estratégico Naval 2015–2018, Santa Fe de Bogotá.

Banco Mundial (2019): “Gasto militar. Datos”, in: <https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>, p. 33–36

<sup>252)</sup> On this matter, see: <https://www.dimar.mil.co/search/Busqueda?keys=Tratado+ant%C3%A1rtico>, as well as Espinosa 2018: 48.

<sup>253)</sup> Sebastián Nicolás Espinosa Posada (2018): Retos y oportunidades relacionadas al Poder Naval en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales en el inicio del siglo XXI, thesis in international relations, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales, Santa Fe de Bogotá, p. 52.

- use of the navy in various international settings;
- defence of the most important interests of the Colombian state.

The Colombian Navy is a paradigm of a brown-water navy, as<sup>254)</sup> the navy has battled against guerrilla gangs, drug dealers and organised crime for a long time. This means that its equipment has been concentrated on patrol boats, the marine corps and naval pilots.

The navy is mainly deployed near the coast and in internal waters. Its main concern here is to fight against “narcoterrorismo” (“drug dealer terrorism”), a combination of drug trafficking and insurgent movements.

The five areas of the navy are: I) national defence and security, II) maritime security, III) research and technical development, IV) environmental protection, V) international deployments.

In contrast to Brazil, where the construction plans for the navy tend to be more long-term, the Colombian Navy has more of a short-term perspective.

The marine corps is not intended to be an expeditionary force, but is more like the police.

National defence and power projection are not the most important objectives, and it is actually the security of the population that takes priority.

Although the Colombian Navy has successfully participated in international operations, its main concern is more focused on land. The Brazilian and Colombian paradigms serve as a guide when we look at Latin American navies. As we will soon see, Mexico shares some important characteristics of both paradigms.

## Mexico

The Mexican Army has 205,689 soldiers, while the navy and air force have 54,179 (some sources talk of 57,824 naval personnel) and 12,462 personnel respectively. As a whole, the armed forces therefore have 272,330 soldiers.<sup>255)</sup> Mexico’s defence budget is the third biggest out of the three countries we are looking at, and is also the smallest in terms of GDP at around 0.539%.<sup>256)</sup> In 2020, the defence budget was around 8% higher than in 2018. Defence budget 2020: USD 5,545,863,680.<sup>257)</sup>

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<sup>254)</sup> Moloeznik, *Perspectiva marítima*, loc. cit, p. 354 et seqq.

<sup>255)</sup> Donadio/Kussrow, *Atlas comparativo*, loc. cit, p.42.

<sup>256)</sup> Indexmundi (2018): “México – gasto militar”; in: <https://www.indexmundi.com/es/datos/m%C3%A9xico/gasto-militar>

<sup>257)</sup> Jorge Medellín, (2019): “Presupuesto 2020. Ejército, más plazas y menos dinero; Marina, más dinero, menos plazas”, in: *Estado Mayor.mx*, in: <https://www.estadomayor.mx/93088>

In contrast to Brazil, there is very little discussion in Mexico about armed forces, armament plans and the importance of the armed forces in foreign policy in politics, academia, the economy and public opinion. There is actually no “naval policy” or “maritime policy” in which the ocean is considered and assessed as an important development factor. The ocean is not even considered as an important development factor in the “National Development Plan 2018–2024”. In fact, if you study the country’s history in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it is only possible to find two presidents who attempted to embark on a course aimed at the ocean, namely Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915) and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1889–1973). The first of the two, Díaz, connected the huge coastal areas with good routes and had lots of port facilities modernised or rebuilt. In 1953, Ruiz initiated the so-called “March to the sea” (“Marcha al mar”). His aim was to develop a “maritime awareness” in the population. He believed that the country had always forgotten about the sea, meaning that it was not able to use the resources in the ocean and, in doing so, to create numerous jobs.

However, nowadays, Mexican politicians have no understanding and no strategic concept of a “maritime policy” in terms of economic development and national security policy.<sup>258)</sup>

This so-called “sea blindness” means that there is no perception of the objective existence of a country’s maritime dependence.<sup>259)</sup> This is obviously not a phenomenon that only occurs in Mexico. Even if Mexico’s geographic characteristics could form the necessary basis for a major naval power (11,122 km of coastline, coast on the Pacific and Atlantic, around 3,000 islands), Mexico is a long way from this status. It lacks a maritime culture, the ocean resources are not sufficiently managed and valued, the port infrastructure is not very developed, and the navy is mainly oriented towards fighting organised crime, i.e. it undertakes not only military but mainly police tasks.<sup>260)</sup>

The Mexican Navy has a successful history of shipbuilding, which reached a high point a few years ago with the construction of a frigate of the SIGMA class 10514. It was built in collaboration with Damen Shipyards Group (Netherlands) and has already been in active service since February 2020. This frigate is the most modern ship of its kind built in Latin America. The construction of eight units was intended to facilitate power projection and a better defence of Mexico’s maritime resources, but the new government (in office from December 2018) has halted this original project until further notice in order to save money. It is highly probable that the project will not be continued in the next four years, which is a real catastrophe for the navy. The Mexican naval capabilities are nowhere near in line with either its economic size or its geopolitical significance.

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<sup>258)</sup> Lino Reynoso, *El poder naval*, loc. cit., p. 48.

<sup>259)</sup> Albrecht, *Seemacht Brasilien*, loc. cit., p. 21.

<sup>260)</sup> Lino Reynoso, *El poder naval*, loc. cit., p. 65.

Moloeznik has classified the Mexican Navy (Armada de México) as an emerging green-water navy for the following reasons:

It has coastal defence capabilities, but only limited resources for deployment on the high seas. The construction of eight SIGMA frigates would have allowed for deployments of this kind. The navy has also built very good maritime patrol ships with the so-called "Trinomio" ("trinomial"), a tactic developed in Mexico based on the integrated use of a ship, a shipped helicopter and a small interceptor boat. However, the more modern technology and better firepower of the SIGMA frigates are simply not comparable.

The Mexican Navy mainly plays the role of a coastguard, including SAR, environmental protection and maritime policing tasks.

It can control its territorial waters and the contiguous zone, its presence is limited to the exclusive economic zone, and it has few warships for deployments outside of the continental shelf.<sup>261)</sup>

As we have already seen, the domination of the marine corps is typical in Latin America and is evidence of a theory of war that favours the land component. At present, the marine corps has around 18,000 personnel, around a third of the entire troops in the navy.<sup>262)</sup>

In spite of the efforts to build the SIGMA frigates, the trend to have a large number of small patrol boats and ships in service is continuing, which some academics have referred to as "dwarfism" ("enanismo").<sup>263)</sup>

The Mexican constitution favours internal security and not naval and national defence, which does not necessarily require control of the seas.

## Conclusions

The Brazilian Navy is quite consciously on the way to becoming a blue-water navy. The political will is there and only budgetary difficulties will be able to either stop or diminish the major plans. The Colombian Navy is shaped by the fight against guerrilla movements and organised crime, meaning that it is difficult for it to become a green-water navy in two oceans. It is more likely that it will tend to remain a brown-water navy. The Mexican Navy has taken a few important steps towards becoming a green-water navy, but due to the very narrow views of the current government, this objective will not

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<sup>261)</sup> Moloeznik, *Perspectiva marítima*, loc. cit, p. 360.

<sup>262)</sup> On this matter, see: <https://www.defensa.com/s-500/infanteria-marina-armada-mexicana> (accessed: 28/08/2020).

<sup>263)</sup> Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, (2009): "Hacia un marco teórico y analítico del poder naval. Contribución doctrinaria al desarrollo de la Armada de México", in: "México y la Cuenca del Pacífico" Journal, Vol. 12, No. 35, May-August 2009, p. 99.

be able to be achieved in the foreseeable future. As in the case of Columbia, the importance of the fight against organised crime plays a role in this area. Therefore, in contrast to Brazil, the marine corps is not seen as an expeditionary force, but rather in some cases as a corps that undertakes policing work. It is very probable that green-water navy status will not be achieved by 2030, but rather by 2040 at the earliest.

## Corriculum Vitae

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