Thinking in Scenarios - as a method of innovative strategic planning (Part 1)
(translated by Christopher Schönberger/Austrian Armed Forces Language Institute)
“It is not important to know, but to be prepared for the future” (Pericles)
It has always been important for human beings to look into the future. Especially the political elites of every historic epoch have striven to know the future, to shape their actions in order to make their empires more secure and to ensure their survival. From the Oracle of Delphi in ancient Greece, to Nostradamus in more recent times, up today, people have been trying to gain information concerning the future. The future, however, is a dimension we cannot fathom.
Political decision takers and planners on the politico-strategic level must have a notion of the imminent challenges and developments in order to align the security architectures and their instruments and make them sustainable.
The necessity of such long-term, sustainable alignment is especially obvious in the security-political field, as armed forces and other emergency services require relatively long planning horizons (due to the long operational life and cost of major-end-items). This, however, has always required information about the future.
As already mentioned, the future is an unfathomable dimension and there is no scientific discipline that allows deterministic predictions. All predictions are images which are constructivist at heart and rely on psychological, empirical and statistical models. If there is no certainty concerning the future, one should disengage oneself from the wish for clear information and accept that all statements concerning the future – especially those reaching into the far future – are more or less wrong.
Strategic decisions are very often based on quantitative prognoses and/or implicit conceptions concerning the future. In this, frequently alternative possibilities of future developments (e.g. of the fields relevant for one’s own actions) are analysed. Ultimately, one settles for one specific development (or vision) of the future, which in turn is the basis for the (strategic) decision. This determination of the future development on the basis of which one’s own strategy is to be optimised can be carried out by means of various criteria (e.g. the most probable development, the best/worst case scenario for the organisation). Strategic planners and decision makers have always had to make their far-reaching decisions amid great uncertainty concerning future developments in complex environments.
The hypothesis here, however, is that in the recent past, especially since the end of the Cold War, not only the uncertainty, but also the complexity of the related systems (of industry as well as politics) has strongly increased. The international system is characterised by increasing multipolarity and therefore by a proliferation of relevant actors, an increasing importance of non-state actors (also those using violence), and an increasing interconnectedness of societies, economies, value systems, etc.
The metatrend uniting all these characteristics is globalisation, the incredible power of which has taken hold of all areas of life and contributes to a strong dynamic of change within the international system. Given the increasing uncertainty, complexity, and dynamic of the contexts and conditions, the assumption seems more plausible that there can be no one single future, but that alternative futures (the so-called scenarios) should be considered. Which means that such scenario-based analysis and planning relies on visions of the future. This thinking in scenarios results from the awareness that future developments cannot be determined on the basis of a prognosis relying either on an extrapolation of figures or on implicit visions of the future.
The aims of this essay are reflected in the following deliberations and outlines:
- What is meant by the term scenarios and what types of scenarios are there?
- How can scenarios be used beneficially in the process of strategic management, and what is their added value?
- Examples of the practical application in the Austrian and Netherlands Armed Forces of the process model are described in this essay.
This method of strategic management does not in any way attempt to ‘reinvent the wheel’, but relies on a tried and tested (generic) process of strategic management, or expands on the same. The decision to go for a strategic orientation and further development of the organisation is therefore (mostly) based not on one, but many possible future developments.
The process model described here may be comprehensively applied to industrial as well as security and defence political strategy development processes.
If one had believed Bill Gates, today’s internet would not exist. He regarded it as a short “hype”, which would soon blow over. This is just one of the misjudgements illustrating the problems of predicting future developments.
A short overview of famous misjudgements may illustrate this:
Wrong prognoses by experts
Worldwide demand for motor vehicles will not exceed one million - if only for lack of available chauffeurs.
Today, there are approx. 600 million vehicles worldwide.
Thomas J. Watson
I think there is a worldwide market for maybe five computers.
Today, more computers than cars are sold.
Darryl F. Zanuck
20th Century Fox
Television won’t be able to hold on to any market it captures after the first six months. People will soon get tired of staring at a plywood box every night.
Today, television is regarded as the most popular leisure activity.
640 K storage ought to be enough for everybody.
The storage capacity of PCs is permanently increasing.
Internet is just a hype.
Today, the internet is regarded as a key technology.
The world around us is no simple linear system with clear cause and effect relations, but a complex, dynamic whole, in which a multitude of inter-linked influences act simultaneously. This applies especially to the international political system, in which a large number of actors, forces and interests operate, so that future developments cannot be predicted with anything remotely approaching accuracy.
Thinking in scenarios results from the awareness that such conditions make it impossible to determine future developments by means of a prognosis relying on the statistical extrapolation of quantitative data, or on the basis of implied notions of the future (in the sense of qualitative prognoses).
For this reason, thinking in scenarios is gaining importance in strategic management. Scenarios combine thinking which is both open to the future and systemic. What is meant by the term scenario? A study of the pertinent academic literature and case studies shows that definitions are rather confusing. There are all kinds of variations and combinations of the term and designation alone: scenario analysis, scenario planning, scenario technique, scenario management, etc. The definitions, principles, approaches and characteristics differ from each other, depending on the author and the publication.
This essay employs the term scenario in the following senses:
- are hypothetical visions of the future, based on a coherent combination of possible, assumed developments;
- set out a space of possible alternative developments (space of possibilities or futures);
- describe avenues of development;
- include qualitative and quantitative statements;
- are open to the future, i.e. there is no attempt at a deterministic prediction of the future, but various, possible visions of the future are described;
- are interlinked, i.e. they reflect the effective connections between the relevant parameters and in so doing attempt, so far as possible, to maintain the complexity of reality.
Types of scenarios
As mentioned above, there are a number of different scenario definitions and also different types of scenarios. It is not the aim of this essay to describe exhaustively the terminology and the various types and forms of scenarios.
Nevertheless, the most commonly used procedures to create scenarios will be introduced in the following. These will be structured by means of two criteria, namely the direction of scenario development and how probabilities of actual occurrence are dealt with. This structuring on the basis of these criteria leads to five basic procedures.
Before dealing with these different procedures in greater detail, a further differentiation has to be made, between external scenarios and steering scenarios, as this seems advantageous for the subsequent analyses:
- External scenarios solely employ non-controllable environmental factors. An organisation may use such scenarios to weigh possible framework conditions in pertinent environments of the coming ten to fifteen years, and to derive chances, risks and, finally, own courses of action from them.
- Steering scenarios solely employ internal steering features. Such features can be directly influenced by the organisation. These could, for example, be product characteristics, or elements of a new business model. In the field of security policy, internal steering features could be the strategic realignment of security organisations, i.e. the development of new tasks (or different foci within the current task portfolio) for these security organisations.
These different approaches vis-à-vis scenario development may differ greatly as regards the approach employed - they do, however, share fundamental similarities:
Design field analysis:
- defining the problem field (determining the system boundaries);
- identifying zones of influence;
- deducing factors of influence;
- deducing the determining system elements;
- determining the possible developments of these factors;
- deducing the overall system’s alternative development possibilities;
- selecting the relevant scenarios lending themselves to the further work;
- determining consequences and effects on the field;
- deducing concrete measures concerning the problem;
Procedures concerning scenario development
- Scenario technique
Within the framework of this paper the scenario technique procedure describes an inductive way of scenario development in which the individual scenarios are created as systematic combinations of the alternative traits of a number of key factors. This procedure’s attribute is the systematic, software-supported process resulting in scenarios, the number of which is not laid down beforehand, without a preset framework. During the scenario technique procedure inductive procedures are applied. Inductive approaches are created by means of model-based logic; i.e. they require the use of special software tools.
- Reciprocal scenarios
Reciprocal scenarios describe a further inductive procedure in scenario creation. Creating reciprocal scenarios does not differ much from the scenario technique procedure. The procedures concerning the development of influencing factors and the identification of key factors are identical. The projections are also compiled analogous to scenario technique. Scenario formation is the sole difference between this procedure and scenario technique. In scenario formation, cross-impact analysis (instead of consistence analysis) attempts to evaluate the interdependences between the projections’ occurrence probabilities.
- Morphological analysis
A further, viable method of creating scenarios is the morphological analysis. This method contributes to the analysis, structuring and illustration of the entirety of relationships in multidimensional, non-quantifiable and complex problems.
The methodology of scenario illustration only differs from scenario technique in scenario formation. Matching the projections of the future is not, however, carried out in an inductive and model-based manner, but deductively and intuitively.
- Scenario planning
Scenario planning is the traditional and most common deductive approach in scenario creation in the Anglo-American world. In its basic approach towards environment analysis and scenario illustration, this procedure is very similar to scenario technique. Scenario formation, however, is radically different in this procedure. The topics are determined by the scenario team ex ante. This determination of topics is the main difference to the scenario technique procedure.
The most commonly used route to scenario topics employs two dominant key factors or driving forces, referred to as key uncertainties, whose axes are entered in a portfolio. This portfolio is also called scenario logic. Within this scenario logic, (mostly) four scenario topics arise. This also explains why very often precisely four scenarios are used in the Anglo-American world.
- Narrative-normative scenarios/Science-Fiction
Despite their relatively small importance, narrative-normative scenarios are briefly introduced here. They very often serve to illustrate and substantiate so-called guiding visions for (security-political) future-oriented topics. Normative means that an explicit value-orientation underlies the scenarios. They describe wishes or a vision, without leaving the realm of what is possible in principle. In contrast to explorative scenarios, which extrapolate current trend developments into the future, or explore the results of disturbances, normative scenarios are constructed on the basis of concrete wishes or objectives. This often happens in connection with so-called back casting. This procedure examines which steps or prerequisites are required to achieve the goal. Narrative means that these scenarios are designed in a quasi-literary manner, as short narratives about fictitious persons or organisations.
Concluding assessment of various scenario types and forms
There is no basic recipe concerning what is the best or most advantageous procedure to create scenarios. Every type of scenario has its specific advantages and disadvantages.
In Continental Europe, scenarios are mostly created inductively (linking of factors and trends) and in a model-based manner as explorative status quo (scenario technique and reciprocal scenarios).
While the other procedures for scenario creation also meet the criterion of open-endedness (narrative-normative scenarios with modifications), this type of scenario contains the complexity of the problem-solving approach, which correlates with Ashby’s Law of Cybernetics on how to deal with this complexity. This procedure’s disadvantage, however, is that this type of scenario creation is costly in terms of both time and personnel, and that the model-based linking of the projections of the future requires relatively costly software tools.
The difference between the two approaches scenario technique and reciprocal scenarios lies in the consideration and attribution of possibilities to the scenarios.
Consistence analysis assesses the consistency of the individual projections of the future, while cross-impact analysis also observes the probability – the word used in this context is plausibility.
The consideration of probabilities is a contentious issue. On the one hand there are some who argue that such an assignment is very difficult, as any question dealing with future truths and probabilities cannot be answered. On the other hand, assigning occurrence probabilities offers the chance to improve the scenarios’ acceptance and validity considerably since the individual projections (and ultimately also the scenarios) can be assessed by means of the probabilities.
As a concept, thinking in scenarios is generally not designed for the use of probabilities. In other words, when thinking in scenarios, tuning out the probabilities is desired and intended, just as the question of how probable the incidence of these alternative futures will be plays no role. Scenarios created through consistence analysis (as part of scenario technique) are very often pictures of extremes. The aim of such pictures is to show up the possibilities of development which define the future area’s cornerstones. This is why the scenarios do not require any allocated probabilities, as this is a case of prethinking and not predicting the future.
Heinecke is of the opinion that this conflicting view of the two inductive approaches to scenario creation is unwarranted, as the two approaches can complement each other very well.
The scenario planning procedure is especially popular in the Anglo-American world. This procedure employs an intuitive and deductive method and boasts the advantage that simple pictures of the future can be created rather easily and without great effort. They can also be rather easily integrated into the strategic planning and command & control process. This is the reason why thinking in scenarios is much more common in the Anglo-American world than, for example, in Europe. Due to their neglect of systemic thinking, however, these scenarios do not lend themselves to more complex problems. Such scenarios rely on a relatively small number of factors. Due to the fact that the human brain is not capable of managing a high degree of interconnectedness, the illustration of the future space is carried out on the basis of few structural features. This is why the criteria of completeness and systemic thinking are met to a lesser degree than when employing inductive measures.
A further disadvantage of this method is that such scenarios are always relatively strongly constructivist in character. This shows up in practice if one analyses a number of US security-political scenario studies. S/he who lives in Hobbesian world will develop Hobbesian scenarios. Scenarios developed via scenario technique procedure naturally also have a certain constructivistic influence due to the selection and assessment of the influencing and key factors. The model-based linking of these factors, however, manages to weaken any group-subjective influence.
Narrative-normative scenarios (mostly wished-for or opportunity scenarios) are used to construct positive, but to all intents and purposes realistic scenarios of the future. These are primarily anticipatory visions of the future with a prescriptive ambition. The question here is: what kind of future do we want – and how can we achieve it? This is when the question “What has to happen that....?" is posed. The focus of this approach primarily lies on identifying the developments, actions and decisions necessary to achieve the positive, wished-for scenario. As there may be numerous, possibly alternative objectives, several positive scenarios can coexist.
In a security-political context this type of scenario can be used to support strongly normative processes geared at formulating mission statements or visions.
During the morphological analysis, the advantages of an intuitive approach (e.g. directly integrating the scenario team, or eschewing special and very often costly software tools) can be utilised without abandoning the demands of systemic thinking in complex systems. This approach has proved valuable in the development of strategy options (strategy scenarios). By the intuitive linking of the individual factors which determine the future strategy (the so-called strategy elements), participants in the scenario-based strategy development process can submit diverging conceptions of the future, as well as personal ideas and conceptions of the organisation’s future in a strongly discursive, strategic dialogue.
From the author’s point of view, the use of scenario technique (inductive, model-supported approach) in creating external scenarios has proven valuable, while, for above-mentioned reasons, morphological analysis has shown itself to be a very practicable and target-oriented approach in the creation of strategy options.
Applying the concept of Thinking in Scenarios to strategic management
Term strategic management and its object
In the long-term set-up and further development of organisations (companies as well as organisations of public administration), the relationship between the terms future and strategy is characterised by permanent tension. Developing suitable strategies requires information pertaining to the future. Meeting the challenges of the future requires viable strategies.
In order to develop further and survive in the long term, organisations have to break their immutability rooted in the past by means of specific conceptions of the future. To achieve this, they use the option of making decisions. In this, things are permanently and at any given moment done differently than before. This possibility of making decisions eliminates the past’s determinateness. What used to be tried and tested is no longer a premise guiding decisions, and the future loses its indeterminateness. Basically, by disconnecting themselves from what has gone before, organisations want to achieve something specific. That is why this process of reproduction is necessary for their long-term survival.
Strategy work is nothing but the consistent, systematic implementation of this fact. It includes the prerequisites necessary for decisions required by organisations in order to ensure the realisation of their performance processes.
The result of a successful strategy development process is, ultimately, the redefinition of the organisation’s raison d’être (Why are we here? Which problems do we solve?), as well as of its goals. In private enterprises these mostly are profit and growth targets. In organisations which are part of the security architecture, the main question is how the individual organisation can best contribute to the overall national system of comprehensive security.
The term strategy
In the private as well as the public sectors the terms strategy and strategic have become modish buzzwords for all long-term planning efforts. The term strategy is obviously used whenever problems have to be solved on a high command echelon and management level.
Up to the middle of the twentieth century, the term strategy was used exclusively in the political, especially the security-political context.
The term is derived from the Greek word strategia, which means the art of leading armies. Aeneas the Greek was probably the first to have used the term. In 357/356 BC he wrote a treatise on strategy for the strategos, the army leader. In the German-speaking world the term was also at first used in the military field, and especially attributed to the theorist of war Carl von Clausewitz.
Just as the understanding of security policy has changed, so has the (security-political) definition of the term strategy. Strategy (in the security-political context) is no longer exclusively limited to war and the military world, but has to be expanded to reflect a comprehensive approach to security and redefined to meet the demands made on current security policy, which also include the so-called new threats. Stupka defines strategy as follows: "Strategy is the planned preparation and coordinated application of all means by the government, and exploiting all its possibilities in order to ensure the security-political goals vis-à-vis every threat.”
The Duden defines the term strategy rather more generally as “a precise plan guiding one’s approach, which serves to achieve a military, political, and psychological or similar goal, and in which one attempts from the outset to factor in what might influence the own actions.”
The term strategic management
Just as there is no uniform definition of strategy, it is not easy to answer the question what strategic management is. The academic debate concerning strategic management developed around 1960. Since then, a vast number of academics and practitioners have worked in this field. As a result, a large number of individual approaches concerning strategic management have developed, which sometimes differ radically in content and methodology.
Despite its breadth and diversity, the term strategic management does not define completely independent topics and approaches. Despite differing perspectives and theoretical starting points, there is a common, basic understanding of what strategic management is. This can be illustrated by means of the following attributes, which are generally associated with the adjective strategic:
- Strategic is used for those management decisions which define or significantly influence the fundamental direction of organisational development.
- The aim of a strategic decision is to ensure a company's long-term success. In industry, this means that a company must be able to establish and defend an advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. Governmental security architectures (police, armed forces, etc.), however, do not compete with each other. In security policy, long-term success means being able to respond appropriately to security-political challenges.
- Strategic decisions attempt to ensure long-term benefit (in industry, long-term success), by deciding the company’s external and internal orientation.
- Strategic decisions aspire to use resources and capabilities as optimally as possible.
The strategic management process
In order to better illustrate the use and additional benefit of scenarios in strategic management, the strategic management process will be presented in this chapter in a very short and concise generic manner.
- strategic situation
Before analysing the environment and a specific organisation, it is advantageous to think about what the organisation represents, what it does and where it is in this. To achieve this, the development, strategy and practice of the last five to ten years are analysed. The analysis focuses on the financial and personnel situation, on resource management, on the current task portfolio (derived from this, the organisation’s benefit for the stakeholders), and the current as well as possible future scope of duties.
- environmental analysis (external analysis)
The external analysis’ deals with the global environment (economic, political, social, technological, demographic developments etc.) and potential competitors (in the security-political context: adversaries).
The main task is to identify potential chances and risks facing the organisation in its external environment. The examination is geared towards the future.
- organisational analysis (internal analysis)
An organisation’s strengths and weaknesses are important factors affecting whether it can manage risks and seize opportunities, which are determined by the environment and its potential changes. This is why the internal analysis, apart from the external environmental analysis, is fundamental to strategy development and formulation.
Organisational analysis is carried out especially to show up an organisation’s strengths and weaknesses. The focus of the analysis lies on the organisation’s resources regarding quality and quantity. It covers the entire organisation and includes, for example, corporate culture, management and information systems, financial situation, personnel situation, cost structure, locations, etc.
The results of the external and internal analyses are combined in the so-called SWOT analysis, in which statements of chances and risks, as well as strengths and weaknesses are transparently juxtaposed. The acronym SWOT stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This juxtaposition illustrates whether an organisation’s current strengths and weaknesses are relevant and, especially against the backdrop of the environments’ potential development, whether they can be employed to manage risks and seize opportunities.
- strategy selection and formulation
Strategic analysis is the basis for the next sub-process of strategic management: strategy development. There is again no common understanding of what the strategy development process encompasses. This especially relates to the differing definition of the terms vision and strategy. Strategy can be seen as following a vision (strategy as a way to achieve a vision previously laid out), or the vision can be regarded as a part of strategy (strategy is the vision and the way to achieve it). Depending on the point of view, vision is therefore either a part of strategy development or precedes it.
Vision is often also seen as a part of normative management, and is one of the bases of the strategic management process. Whereas the vision defines the goal (the what and why), strategy formulation is more about the way (the how). As both elements, however, are essential for long-term success, they were mentioned in the process model described above, and outlined in the strategy development sub-process.
- Vision, mission, mission statement
Omar Bradley, a famous American General of the Second World War and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1948-1953, was of the opinion that organisations “must learn to set [their] course by the stars and not every passing ship”. This applies to companies operating in the international market, as well as to states in the international system, especially given the fast and continuously changing environments.
A vision is a realistic, credible and attractive image of the future developed for an organisation. The vision is a notion of the goal an organisation should work towards, and how the future can be shaped more successfully and desirably than before. The vision primarily communicates a perception of trend-setting ideas concerning the individual future of organisation development. A vision
- raises the employees’ hopes and mobilises their strengths;
- creates energy in the company;
- gives new meaning to the work done;
- ensures long-term focus and creates security and stability; and
- contributes to the company’s continuity.
In order to realise a chosen and formulated strategy an organisation has to take concrete actions. It is therefore the task of the implementation phase within strategic management to ensure that these actions are really taken. To this end, structures and systems are to be designed in consultation with the chosen structure.
The implementation of the chosen and formulated strategy is a very demanding phase. Many promising strategies collapse because mistakes were made during the implementation phase.
A part of strategy implementation is strategic control. This may be the final link of the process. However, it must not be carried out solely with a focus on strategy implementation. The increased dynamics necessitate a permanent controlling process on three levels:
- premise check
Are the assumptions on which the strategy is based (especially concerning the environment) still valid? Did the analysis overlook important aspects?
- implementation check
To what degree was the planned strategy implemented? Where did unexpected problems or opposition occur?
- strategic surveillance
Did the implemented strategy achieve its goals? Was the best strategy option chosen?
(to be continued)
 cf. Bernhard Richter, Das Konzept „Denken in Szenarien“ als Methode der sicherheitspolitischen Analyse. Dissertation. University of Vienna, 2010, p1.
 cf. Gereon Klein, Hans Georg Graf, Arne Schöllhorn, ’Entscheidungsvorbereitung mit Szenarien im Team-Dialog’, in, Falko E. P. Wilms (ed.), Szenariotechnik. Vom Umgang mit der Zukunft, Haupt Verlag, Bern, Stuttgart, Wien, 2006, p. 377.
 cf. Michael E. Porter, Wettbewerbsvorteile. Spitzenleistungen erreichen und behaupten, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 2000, p. 591ff. Jochen Kiesel, Szenario-Management als Instrument zur Geschäftsfeldplanung, Tectum-Verlag, Marburg, 2001 (Wissenschaft im Tectum-Verlag), p.77.
 cf. Alexander Fink, Oliver Schlake, Andreas Siebe, Erfolg durch Szenario-Management. Prinzip und Werkzeuge der strategischen Vorschau, Campus Fachbuch, Frankfurt, 2002, p.2.
 cf. Fink, 2002, p.44; Marina Schwarz-Geschka, Lecture on Seminar Szenarientechnik, event on 15 November 2006, Frankfurt, 15 November 2006.
 cf. Ulf Pillkahn, Trends und Szenarien als Werkzeuge zur Strategieentwicklung, Publicis Corporate Publishing, Erlangen, 2007, p.168.
 see also: Pillkahn, 2007, p.168.
 cf. Fink et al, 2002, p.70.
 cf. Fink et al, 2002, p.70.
 In the case of reciprocal scenarios, the expression used is not projection of the future, but, because of the allocation of occurrence probabilities, trend projections.
 cf. Robert Gaßner, Karlheinz Steinmüller: ’Narrative normative Szenarien in der Praxis’, in, Falko E. P. Wilms (ed.), Szenariotechnik. Vom Umgang mit der Zukunft, Haupt Verlag, Bern, Stuttgart, Wien, 2006, p.133-143.
 cf. Jürgen Gausemeier, Alexander Fink, Oliver Schlake, Szenario-Management. Planen und Führen mit Szenarien, Carl Hanser Verlag, München-Wien, 1996, p.110 & p.112.
 Ross W. Ashby’s central tenet concerning the handling of complexity is “Only variety absorbs variety“, cf, Magret Richter, ‘Syntegration - Die kybernetische Entwicklung von Szenarien’, in, Falko E.P. Wilms (ed), Szenariontechnik. Vom Umgang mit der Zukunft, Haupt Verlag, Bern-Stuttgart-Wien, 2006, p.110f.; and W. Ross Ashby, Design for a brain. The origin of adaptive behaviour, Chapman and Hall, London, 1970, p.246ff.
 cf. Albert Heinecke, ’Die Anwendung induktiver Verfahren in der Szenario-Technik’ in: Falko E. P. Wilms (ed), Szenariotechnik. Vom Umgang mit der Zukunft, Haupt Verlag, Bern-Stuttgart-Wien, 2006, p.183-213.
 cf. Alexander Fink, Andreas Siebe, Handbuch Zukunftsmanagement. Werkzeuge der strategischen Planung und Früherkennung, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, 2006, p.16.
 cf. Roman Lombriser, Peter A. Abplanalp, Strategisches Management. Visionen entwickeln, Strategien umsetzen, Erfolgspotenziale aufbauen, 4th edition, Versus-Verlag, Zürich, 2005, p.21; and Andreas Stupka, Strategie denken, AV + Astoria Druckzentrum, Wien, 2008 (Truppendienst-Handbuch), p.25; and Albert A. Stahel, Hans Künzi, Christoph Blocher, Strategisch denken. Ziel - Mittel - Einsatz in Politik, Wirtschaft und Armee, vdf Hochsch.-Verl. an der ETH. Zürich, 1997 (Strategische Studien, 14), p.1.
 cf. Harald Hungenberg, Strategisches Management in Unternehmen. Ziele – Prozesse – Verfahren, 5th edition, Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2008, p.5 and Stahel et al, p.2.
 cf. Stupka, 2008, p.41.
 Stupka, 2008, p.41.
 Duden, Fremdwörterbuch, vol 5 (1982), Dudenverlag, Mannheim-Leipzig-Wien-Zürich, 1982, p.730.
 cf. Hungenberg, p.4 and Lombriser, Abplanalp, p.41; see also Dieter Hahn, Harald Hungenberg, PuK. Wertorientierte Controllingkonzepte, Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2001; Gerry Johnson, Kevan Scholes, Exploring Corporate Strategy, Pearson Higher Education, Hahn, Hungenberg, 2005, p.100f; Günter Müller-Stewens, Christoph Lechner, Strategisches Management, Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart, 2005, p.15ff.; Johnson, Scholes, 2005, p.16ff.
 cf. Lombriser, Abplanalp, 2005, p.47.
 cf. Hungenberg, 2008, p.438 and Lombriser, Abplanalp, 2005, p.48.
 cf. Hungenberg, 2008, p.24 and p.457.
 Omar Bradley quoted in: Fink, Siebe, 2006, p.80.
 cf. Hungenberg, 2008, p.10 and Lombriser, Abplanalp, p.50.