U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS AND HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Raymond E. Bell, Jr.
Today as the reserve components of the U.S. Army look to the decline of commitment in Afghanistan, they are turning more and more to potential missions in the continental United States. So as in Austria between the two world wars, the National Guard and the federal Army Reserve will become even more and more involved in the missions of defending the nation’s borders and protecting the populace from the ravages of nature than they are today. The latter mission indeed has already been expanded to include protection against the effects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
This article will therefore describe how the two reserve components of the U.S. Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guards of the various states, are fulfilling the homeland defense and security missions in conjunction with the active army, the other armed services, and civilian counterparts. This is to be done under the aegis of the U. S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
Cybersecurity today and tomorrow: threats and solutions
Stefan Chevul and Johan Eliasson
Once the domain of company IT departments, cybersecurity, protecting information from cyber attacks, has now become an issue of legitimate combat. This article will look at the nature of the threats posed to the past and present, and offers strategies to keep systems safe.
According to the UK cabinet office, the internet-related market in the UK is estimated at £82 billion (almost €100 billion) a year, with British businesses earning £1 in every £5 from the Internet.
However, this greater digital openness, interconnection and dependency bring vulnerability. The UK National Security Strategy has categorized cyber attacks as a tier one threat to national security, alongside international terrorism, with terrorists, rogue states and cyber criminals targeting computer systems in the UK.
From Versailles via Paris to Moscow
Strategic Options and Perspectives of the German Empire with a View to National Power Policy (Part 2)
The Third Reich was, exactly as the German Empire, geared towards war. The period from 30 January 1933 to the beginning of World War II was marked by preparations for war. In this process, two ideological fundamental principles played a particular role: The first principle was about the drawing of – supposed – lessons from the ‘stab-in-the-back-legend'.
The second aspect dealt with the fact that everything, ranging from the establishment of a totalitarian state on the basis of the National Socialist ideology through the re-attainment of the position of a major power by the German Reich by breaking the Versailles Treaty to the build-up of the armed forces, and was geared towards preparing a war 'to conquer new living space in the East, including the reckless Germanisation of the new territories', as Adolf Hitler put it in his first speech as Reich Chancellor to the assembled leaders of the Reichswehr in utter honesty already on 3 February 1933. This ensured that Hitler and the German Generals shared, in parts, the same objectives.
From Versailles via Paris to Moscow
Strategic Options and Perspectives of the German Empire with a View to National Power Policy (Part 1)
At first glance, the strategic-political analysis of the framework conditions for the international systems as well as for all the interrelations of the dynamic “Concert of Europe” between the two world wars1) unveils a seeming paradox with a view to the “dark continent”2) in the “age of extremes”3): Notwithstanding the German Empire’s defeat in the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles,4) by which the central European country’s political and military power was curtailed, the very same country was able to achieve a dominant position in terms of power politics between the “Eiffel Tower” and the “Kremlin” within a little more than 20 years. This position went beyond the scope of the objective that the German Empire, which had been proclaimed in 1871 with pompous political imagery in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, had aimed at in a far less ambitious attempt5).
Modern approaches to an occupying
power’s loss of control – Rome and Judea
Insurgencies and the fight against them have been known ever since the first establishment of civil or military rule. The only thing new is that today an attempt is being made to take a comprehensive view, in a social, economic and religious context. In the context of the situation in Iraqor Afghanistan, the term counterinsurgency has increasingly been used in specialist literature as a technical term descriptive of the western way of combating insurgencies in the twenty-first century. Because of changing circumstances, the question has been asked whether counterinsurgency should be so clearly set apart from other approaches. A change of emphasis is to be expected as the currently most important rulebook, the Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) is being revised. The fact that this manual dates from 2006 reveals that it relies in large part on older, historic examples of counterinsurgency, rather than on lessons learned from more recent events. In an attempt to create a reliable model, these historic insurgencies were condensed into their basic elements, with the aim of identifying structural regularities on the basis of commonalities and differences.