Published in Frank, Matyas (ed.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2013, Böhlau-Verlag
Currently, there is a manifest general strategic deficiency in the fields of security policy, the identification of national objectives, as well as corporate governance in private industry. This also impacts on the requirements regarding a skills profile for future command and management personnel. Against this backdrop, an attempt is made at finding an answer by accentuating, horizontally expanding or abstracting the contents of the military sciences with a view to fostering general command sciences. By means of this, and by employing available capabilities and structures, the greatest national benefit is to be achieved regarding scientifically sound command training schemes for military and civilian clients which is geared towards the long-term accomplishment of strategic objectives.
Especially a small state such as Austriawith its focus on a humanities-oriented education and its progressive and systematically updated command philosophy is well placed to assume a leading role in Europeby further developing the military sciences and by establishing general command sciences underpinned by them. This would constitute a contribution, rooted in solidarity, toEurope’s security-related development, which – given the pressing demand for strategic command expertise – would be eagerly embraced by command and management personnel from the fields of politics, the military, and private enterprise.
Daniel Möckli is of the opinion that the EU does not pay enough attention to developments in China and that member states enter individual strategic partnerships with global players at their own initiative without waiting for European proposals. Gunther Hauser states that the EU may well have realised the necessity of deepening its strategic partnership with NATO, but has not developed any concrete approaches to solving the contradiction between soft power prevention and pre-emptive engagement. The ESS, furthermore, may clearly state its intention to intervene militarily also outside of the EU, but in reality it only possesses the character of a carefully worded, supranational declaration of intent.
In his strategic situational assessment at the turn of the year 2012/2013 Lothar Rühl claims that the EU lacks a coherent strategy. In the spirit of a new kind of enlightenment, Lennart Souchon calls for a focus on strategic thought and action, through which postmodern nations could both free themselves from assessment methods rooted in classic war scenarios between nation states and extricate themselves from the grip of everyday political ruckus. Klaus Naumann demands clearer strategic goals governing the deployment of armed forces and raises the question of the interdependence of military and political issues. Andrea Riemer addresses the question of why research has not developed any strategic concepts that meet the needs for order, thereby surrendering the playing field to short-term politics. Martin Wagener points out that a recognised academic discipline called strategic studies has yet to be developed and that treatises on strategy are, for the most part, characterised by a dearth of theory.
The list of quotes from literature documenting a paucity of strategic command culture could be continued ad infinitum - this selection, however, gives some idea of how clear the need for scientifically underpinned science-based strategic leadership expertise has become. People concerned with (security) policy, (military) strategy, and management of industry and private enterprise have increasingly come to realise that miscalculations of the strategic objective no longer become apparent only shortly before the planning horizon is reached, but already come to haunt those responsible for long-term orientation during their terms of office.
The implications of the paradigmatic change which currently contributes to the call for quality strategic leadership may - in the field of security policy – manifest themselves in a repudiation of the paradigm of classic war scenarios between nation states or in reaching the limits of peace building through the transfer of democracy. In the military-strategic context, hybrid conflicts or cyber threats could be viewed as pointing in the direction of such a change; in the economic or entrepreneurial fields it would be the growing doubts concerning the potential of a fully liberalised and completely deregulated economic and financial system no longer built on values.
Before the question can be answered, an explanation must be found as to why the military sciences are regarded as being in statu nascendi. Although they exist nominally, they do not meet the criteria outlined here: creating the foundations to meet the urgent demand for strategy described above, and, at the same time, offering a consolidated course of studies organisationally integrated into the civilian academic environment, culminating in a PhD, thereby granting the license to teach this discipline, as well as making it possible for the faculty staff to self-regenerate (the only example in Austria’s close vicinity appears to be the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence).
It is imperative to reiterate that the prefix military does not mean that research and tuition in the military sciences are to be carried out solely by military command personnel or by lecturers at civilian universities solely for the benefit of military personnel earmarked for command positions in the armed forces. Rather, the prefix shows that the issue is research and tuition content that is nationally relevant, as well as relevant to security. This can be carried out most efficaciously and thoroughly under the aegis of the armed forces’ (and MoDs’) tertiary educational institutions, due to their specific orientation and qualification. This academic discipline should be of special interest to other European states which have not yet progressed towards the new perception of military sciences and would send students to an academic institution which offers such a course of studies. This would allow states with a head start in those sciences to raise their standing visibly, especially as regards smart defence.
The fuel cell for the military sciences
If neither purely military command experience, nor a position as lecturer at a civilian university is the criterion required to hold a chair in military sciences, what is the necessary qualification? The question can be answered with the help of the metaphor of a fuel cell for the military sciences: candidates for command positions in the armed forces or the MoD should first be trained until they attain the highest echelons covered by military command curricula and then, depending on their suitability/capability and the military-scientific requirements, be sent to a civilian university. Following their graduation, the alumni will review the subjects covered from a military point of view, adapt the academic content to military requirements and use the research methodology now available to them to develop a genuinely military-scientific subject – only this would establish a university chair in military sciences which would offer additional benefit compared with existing academic disciplines and thus be deserving of its name.
Why should the military sciences be the responsibility of the MoD?
What are the special qualifications of military educational establishments to serve as a home to sciences relevant on a national scale and with regard to security issues? The primary competence armed forces have to produce in peacetime is the ability, when necessary, to display command superiority and to be operationally effective. This is why - compared with other areas in which the success of concepts has to be corroborated immediately - they have more time systematically to explore command and control techniques, to underpin them scientifically, to optimise them, keep them up to date, and target them towards potential future challenges.
These procedures deal with events relevant to national security, the creation of command expertise when faced with complex tasks and time-critical situations, the preservation of command performance despite personal exposure to physical danger and psychological pressure, planning processes with time lines of different lengths which have to be dealt with simultaneously, joint network-centric command (‘joint’ being related to services, branches and weapons systems, as well as to the cooperation between civilian and military units involved in an operation), and - in order to help prepare decisions – with political advice at the intersection between operational-level and military-strategic/strategic command.
Tertiary-level military educational institutions have a broad foundation on which they can erect the command procedures that need to be developed. This foundation is made up of, inter alia, the study of the cultural and intellectual foundations of command, the findings of polemological research focused on the avoidance of war, the scientific derivation of command principles and philosophies, research into cultural specificities and the implications of intercultural competence for command, an ethico-moral understanding of command, the optimisation of organisational theories in order to meet time-sensitive situations, and a system made up of operations research methods and computer-assisted command simulations.
This wide spectrum of specific capabilities and inputs, their – with regard to national security provision – organically evolved and complex network, as well as their permanent integration into applied armed forces command, which exclusively enables not only the further development of training contents (e.g. by means of a systematic lessons-learned process), but also their verification under real-life conditions, produce a USP which suggests that the military sciences (as they are defined here) should fall within the purview of the tertiary-level military educational institutions. It needs to be stressed that the military sciences, despite their primary orientation towards fostering military command functions, can, already in this subject and content configuration, provide a tangible benefit to non-military command functions tasked with security.
An attempt at defining the term “military sciences“
Any attempt at a definition should begin by disconnecting from the previous, fuzzy view which frequently associated the task of military sciences with providing a basis for waging wars or controlling military conflicts effectively. The military sciences, as they are currently developing in Europe, however, integrate the entirety of academic research and education concerning the contribution of armed forces to national security provision (comprehensive approach) within the framework of security-political strategy formation and decision-making, as well as the planning, structuring, provision, preservation, command, and employment of armed forces.
To clarify the definition, a two-dimensional diagram is used. Each column displays which educational institution is responsible for the research and education pertinent to security, and the lines represent the content categories of this field of research and education.
The first content category includes academic research and tuition pertaining to general, trans-sectoral, security-related command in complex environments, for commanders/managers of the armed forces, the emergency services, in politics, public administration, and private enterprise (characterised by a national orientation; currently comparable to defence sciences in the narrower sense). Tertiary-level educational institutions aspiring to expertise in security-related political consulting require well-founded coordination competence and opinion leadership in this field, geared towards pooling all national resources for the purpose of comprehensive security (comprehensiveness).
The second content category is characterised by a thematic orientation towards the armed forces and could be illustrated by employing the narrower term defence sciences in the wider sense.
The military sciences in the modern understanding therefore comprise those parts of the two content categories given over to tertiary military education institutions, including those segments of civilian university disciplines which deal with the subjects mentioned.
Those parts of research and tuition relevant to security and consigned to tertiary military education institutions can be subdivided into two distinct types of subjects, each of which covers both content categories described above – albeit in different ratios. On the one hand, these are the military-scientific core subjects, whose research and tuition goals are not covered by civilian education institutions and which military education institutions have to cover autonomously (this is why they are also referred to as original subjects). On the other hand, there are the supplementary subjects, which make it possible to analyse the contents relevant to military sciences from the perspective of professional, military requirements. These should, moreover, be the remit of a specific university chair.
Irrespective of a possible tertiary military educational institution, civilian disciplines very often cover topics concerning security. These topics taken from various disciplines, however, are not integrated into a common, institutional/organisational structure. Though their sum may nominally form a significant share of the first content category (described above), it is not more than the sum of its parts. In the model outlined, all forms of military-scientific cooperation with civilian educational institutions (which are the ‘mother disciplines’ of the military-scientific supplementary subjects) would be pooled in the hub of the tertiary military educational institution. For the latter, this would produce a tentative cooperation/coordination competence, which, however, must not be in competition with civilian disciplines.
Core and supplementary subjects must enjoy equal ranking (there is no hierarchical status whatsoever). The only difference is that the supplementary subjects are derived from a ‘mother discipline’ at a civilian tertiary educational institution (which means that the academic qualification/authorisation to teach at a university can be achieved through this mother discipline) – but the core subjects do not (in the long run, the authorisation to teach has to be safeguarded by the faculty staff’s ability to self-regenerate).
Prior to an overview of structures, of the research and instructional contents making up the core subjects derived from the suggested model of military sciences, two principles need to be looked at, which are essential for an underlying view.
The core topic of the military sciences as presented here, from which all other subjects are derived, is command - in the sense of organic command (command in the broader sense). It is a systemic network of effects developed from a cluster of different command qualities that ranges from identification of strategic objectives/analysis of the situation and operational-level planning/analysis of the situation, via command and control (command in the narrower sense), as well as management and leadership, to controlling or concurrent recalibration. This view of command, with the emphasis put on a synergy of command qualities (similar to the interaction of a body’s organs) is new, at any rate in terms of an institutionalised academic discipline. Focussing on the topic organic command would substantially contribute to the creation of a USP or the establishment of opinion leadership concerning the military sciences in the field of security-relevant and national command sciences.
Strategy and Leadership
Strategy as the guiding quality of organic command is primarily seen as a category of thought striving for long-term security, manifesting itself in the determination and definition of targets, and therefore consciously detaching itself from any operational-level implementation, thereby developing a maximum of creative force. The principle of leadership should help bridge the gap between the identification of strategic objectives and their operational-level implementation. To achieve this, honest empathy with subordinates/employees is to be brought to bear, to create dedication in the face of constraints that may be necessary with a view to long-term security, but may also go beyond the professional judgment and insight of those being led. In this, short-term successes should only be regarded as - at best – a collateral advantage.
To complete this presentation of the core tasks of re-considered military sciences, here is an overview of possible core subjects designed to facilitate their implementation.
The military-scientific core subjects would include general command sciences, strategy, operational-level command sciences, applied command sciences, and military logistics.
The list of military-scientific supplementary subjects would include the following: research coordination; network, knowledge, and quality management; military security policy (including peacekeeping and conflict management); the field of military humanities and social sciences (ethnology/cultural sciences, military philosophy, polemology, philosophy of science, cognitive science, military pedagogics); military linguistics; and military publications.
Military philosophy would have to deal with the intellectual history of, especially, operational-level command. The importance of military ethics and the cognitive sciences means that they have to be regarded as self-contained subjects, although they are integral parts of research in military philosophy. Polemology would have to focus on research into the causes of war, the goal being the avoidance of same. Ethnology and military linguistics would have to make a major contribution to the creation of inter-cultural competence.
While the material contents, as well as the tuition and research structures required by the military sciences in the modern understanding are being created, a new, wider thematic demand has developed, which could best be met by the armed forces’ tertiary educational institutions. This paper attempts inter alia an analysis of this demand and a definition of it as a possible, visionary guideline for the current military-scientific realignment of armed forces’ tertiary educational institutions.
Changes in the threat scenarios and increasing economic competition have necessitated a new requirements profile for command personnel. In its general dimensions and at a certain level of abstraction, this profile applies in equal measure to command personnel in military and political organisations, as well as to managers in private companies.
General Command Sciences dealing with command in complex and security-sensitive environments could make an essential contribution to this current demand for identifying strategic objectives, as well as for organic command if they
The general command sciences (as opposed to the military sciences) therefore no longer define themselves simply as the basis of trans-sectoral command to meet complex tasks, but as its academic research and doctrine proper.
The accentuation spoken of in the earlier attempt at a definition means that it restricts itself to the content category of national and armed forces-related military-scientific research and tuition dealing with general command principles and processes condensed from the military command sciences (see illustration). It also refers to a stronger emphasis on the identification of strategic objectives, joint national command, long-term and sustainable planning, and an expansion to command tasks which may no longer be exclusively relevant to security, but can also be accomplished with the aid of the general command principles/process derived.
Horizontal expansion refers to a broadening of the spectrum of civilian, university-related ‘mother disciplines’ as the mentors of the new supplementary subjects, especially at the level of the national content category pertaining to military sciences.
Abstraction means rejecting the purely armed forces command angle, and, instead, focusing on general principles, applicable both to civilian and military command practice. This creates a basis which is accessible to and intelligible for civilian students without any substantial previous military knowledge, and therefore proves to be more useful for the respective subsequent command/management echelon. Starting from this, subject specialisation can prepare for the subsequent civilian and military assignments.
Military command functions should furthermore cover the transition from military to command sciences (especially the concrete and applied operations command angle of the content category pertaining to the armed forces) through postgraduate training courses (General Staff Course) – the licence to teach military-scientific core subjects could be attained by following the General Staff Course with a PhD in military sciences.
The creation of a PhD in command sciences subsequent to subject specialisation would be important, especially for non-military students.
Core contents of the command sciences comprise organic command and the identification of strategic objectives, as laid out in the model of military sciences in the modern understanding described above. This, however, requires a level of abstraction which meets civilian management requirements.
Organic command would have to be further developed with regard to the interaction between command qualities (from identifying strategic goals to concurrent recalibration), their process stages (including the synchronisation/chronological distribution of several, concurrent planning horizons), and the necessary overlap.
Strategy as a subject would have to be raised above individual, vested military/military-strategic, geostrategic, political or commercial interests, and further developed so as to serve as the basis for a long-term goal, holistically embracing all areas. Beyond its bridging function between the identification of strategic goals and their operative implementation, leadership should be researched and perceived as a link between command and management.
The command sciences would have to deal with the synergetic relationship (especially prevalent in the German-speaking countries) between the theoretic-rational and the empirically guided science paradigms.
Further topics which are systemically and mutually dependent on each other are to:
 This text reflects the author’s personal opinion and hence does not necessarily correspond with the views of the MoDS.
 cf. Möckli, Daniel (ed.), Strategic Trends 2012 – Key Developments in Global Affairs, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETHZurich, 2012. ISBN 978–3–905696–36-3, p. 8f.
 cf. Hauser, Gunther, ’Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS)’, in, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 3/2010, p. 372ff.
 cf. Rühl, Lothar, ’Die strategische Lage zum Jahreswechsel’, in, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1/2013, p. 4.
 cf. Souchon, Lennart, Carl von Clausewitz - Strategie im 21. Jahrhundert, E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Hamburg, 2012, ISBN 978-3-8132-0939-6, p. 10.
 cf. Naumann, Klaus, Einsatz ohne Ziel? Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen, Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg, first edition, 2008, ISBN 978-3-936096-98-9.
 cf. Riemer, Andrea, ’Strategische Theorien und Politikgestaltung im 21. Jahrhundert’, in, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1/2010, p. 24.
 cf. Wagener, Martin, ’Über das Wesen der Strategie’, in, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 4/2010, p. 443.
 cf. Peischel, Wolfgang, 2010, ’Zum Nutzen der Definition des Strategiebegriffes – eine perspektivische Betrachtung’, in, Birk, Eberhard (ed.), GNEISENAU-BLÄTTER, volume 9, Fürstenfeldbruck, 2010. http://www.gneisenau-gesellschaft.de
 cf. Peischel, Wolfgang and Franz Hollerer, ’Leadership - Ein Führungsprinzip zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit’, in, SIAK Journal, 2/2011, BMI, pp18 – 28.